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INTRODUCTION
Simple questions hardly ever allow for simple answers. The main question of 
this thesis is simple: what is palliative care? As will be shown throughout the 
following chapters, the more one reflects about this question, the harder it 
becomes to answer it. Palliative care is a concept that is more ambiguous, less 
clear and less unitary, than is often presented in the literature.
If one examines the evolution of palliative care in the last three decades, it 
is safe to conclude that this ambiguity of the concept has increased and is still 
increasing in the context of recent developments. As long as palliative care was 
identified as hospice care, its demarcation from other medical practices was 
rather unproblematic. In fact, hospice caregivers chose to leave the formal health 
care system, take distance from it, out of a moral discomfort with the way dying 
patients were approached in hospitals. Thus, separate institutions were 
established situating themselves in a specific tradition of earlier hospices (Clark 
and Seymour, 1999; Humphreys, 2000). The modern hospice movement wanted 
to show that when curative treatments have failed, and when life prolonging 
measures are no longer feasible, there is still a lot that can be done to provide 
relief to the dying. The message that ‘nothing can be done anymore’ was 
unheard of in hospice practice. Apart from the firm organisational link of early 
palliative care with hospice buildings, the hospice concept itself was relatively 
univoque, based as it was on a solid consensus among those providing care in 
the hospices. Four aspects of the concept of hospice merit attention. First, the 
hospices intended to provide care for the dying. Hospice care was identified as 
terminal care and thus, its scope was limited. Second, hospice care in the late 
1960s was mainly associated with cancer care. It assumed a progressive disease 
trajectory which would in its far advanced stage unavoidably lead towards death 
within a limited time span. Third, even though hospices were open for all 
patients, they were all based on Christian values and ideals. And fourth, related 
to these values, there was a solid consensus regarding the ethical norm that 
euthanasia should not form a part of hospice care, whereas at the same time 
more and more voices pleaded for a legalisation of euthanasia in British society.
The paradox of the hospice movement is that, while it separated from the 
mainstream health care system, the idea has always been to re-integrate its 
philosophy into the same mainstream health care system. Knowledge that
1. Palliative care in focus
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originated from research in pain and symptom management had to be adopted 
by physicians caring for their dying patients in hospitals and nursing homes. 
New attitudes regarding the acceptance of human mortality were to re-integrate. 
The same goes for psychosocial and spiritual aspects of care which were absent 
in medicine. While many hospice institutions were established, caregivers in 
these institutions did not stop to stress that hospice is first and foremost a 
philosophy, not an institution.
Thus, when the hospice movement gained international recognition, it was 
not difficult to imagine that ‘hospice’ became organised in other institutional 
forms than the separate hospice building. In 1975 for instance, Balfour Mount 
founded a hospice unit in the Royal Victoria Hospital in Montreal, but since the 
term ‘hospice’ carried negative associations in the French language, he proposed 
the term ‘palliative care’ as an alternative (Saunders, 1996). When the first 
European palliative care unit in Sweden began in 1977, it took the form of a 
hospital-based home care service (Valverius, 1999). Two years later, a Swedish 
government report took a stand against the opening of hospices as the solution to 
improving care for the dying. In 1980, the first palliative home care services 
were established in Italy (Privitera, 1999). In 1983, the first palliative care unit 
in Germany was situated on the top floor of a University Hospital (Illhardt, 
1999). Also in Spain and Belgium, the first palliative care services were not 
developed in separate institutions but in hospitals (Gracia, 1999; Broeckaert, 
1999). And in the Netherlands, important initiatives to improve terminal care 
were taken within the field of nursing home medicine (Janssens and Ten Have, 
1999).
Thus, palliative care in many European countries was integrated in the 
mainstream health care system from the outset, even though many pioneers had 
received their education in hospices in Great Britain. The justification for the 
establishment of separate institutions, namely the insufficiency of care for the 
dying in the mainstream health care system, became more and more challenged. 
Instead, the integration of hospice, conceived of as a philosophy, in a variety of 
medical practices was aimed at.
While in countries such as Spain, Belgium and Sweden a consensus 
existed that the development of palliative care would not profit from the 
establishment of separate institutions, in other countries, notably the United 
Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands other forces were also at work. In the 
context of increasing involvement of the national governments, together with the 
involvement of medical associations, these forces feared that palliative care 
would become medicalised and bureaucratised. In the context of health care 
policies stressing cost-effectiveness, evidence based models of practice, and
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efficiency, they claimed that the original hospice philosophy would be in danger 
of becoming neutralised. Especially in the UK, notions such as medicalisation, 
bureaucratisation, routinisation, secularisation have been confronted with the 
early ideals of the hospice movement (Clark, 2000). Today however, most 
official European health care authorities stress the necessity to integrate 
palliative care in the mainstream health care system.
The integration process of palliative care that is still going on was 
foreseen and hoped for by the early modern hospice movement. It can however 
not be denied that this integration process has had substantial impact, not only 
on the organisational forms in which palliative care is given shape, but also on 
the philosophy of the hospices. First, the identification of palliative care with the 
terminal phase of illness is rejected now by a majority of palliative care 
practitioners who hold instead that palliative care starts from the time of 
diagnosis (see chapter 3). Second, the identification of palliative care with 
cancer care is put more and more under critique. It is widely acknowledged that 
patients suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, heart failure, aids, multiple 
sclerosis and other chronic diseases have been neglected by palliative care 
practitioners for too long. Third, the Christian values underpinning the 
philosophy of the hospices can no longer be taken for granted as in the context 
of the health care systems palliative care is considered to be a secular discipline. 
Fourth, the ethical norms are more and more subject to debate. In the 
Netherlands, the majority of physicians providing palliative care accept 
euthanasia as a means of last resort and in many other countries, there is no 
consensus that euthanasia should be excluded from palliative care (see chapter 
8). Debates on the validity of the doctrine of double effect, withholding and 
withdrawing life prolonging treatment, terminal sedation, research in palliative 
care have intensified during the last three decades and a consensus cannot be 
expected.
The integration process of palliative care into the mainstream health care 
systems has made the concept of palliative care ambiguous and ambivalent. The 
scope of palliative care is unclear. Its demarcation from other medical practices 
has become problematic. The values underpinning the concept of palliative care 
are now under debate as well as the ethical norms for good palliative care 
practice.
In this thesis, the concept of palliative care is described, analysed and 
evaluated, especially with regard to the moral issues that arise in palliative care.
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2. The European Pallium project on palliative care ethics
The assumption that the concept of palliative care is ambiguous and in need of 
critical analysis was the motive to initiate the European Pallium project on 
palliative care ethics. With financial support from the European Commission, 35 
experts in the field of palliative care from Belgium, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom were brought together. 
The project started in March 1998 and was completed at the end of February 
2001.
The Pallium project set itself four aims, running parallel with four phases:
1. To examine and compare the organisational forms of palliative care;
2. To analyse and compare the concepts of palliative care;
3. To explain the relationships between concepts and institutional heterogeneity 
of palliative care
4. To analyse and evaluate the ethical debates on palliative care and the moral 
implications for the further development of palliative care.
The research of this thesis was carried out in the context of the Pallium 
project. All chapters contribute to one of the four aims of the project. Chapter 4 
was written in close co-operation with 8 project participants. Many chapters 
have benefited from the input of colleagues. The confrontation of various 
concepts of palliative care with one another provided insight into the 
particularity of the concept prevailing in a specific country. At the same time, 
the comparative character of the project was helpful in gaining a sharper, more 
critical view on the concept prevailing in one’s own nation. Unexamined self­
evidences were brought to the surface and became problematic in the light of 
concepts within which these self-evidences are non-existent or under debate. 
Through international comparison, aspects of palliative care that had been left 
unattended in the context of specific national debates, could be re-introduced. 
The concept of palliative care thus became more problematic on the one hand 
but richer on the other hand. The surplus value of the European Pallium project 
had everything to do with its comparative character through which different 
concepts of palliative care were confronted with one another.
3. Objectives of the study
The research has been carried out at a time in which the understanding of the 
concept of palliative care is undergoing important changes. The concept is 
increasingly associated with a variety of meanings. On the one hand, it is no
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longer possible to argue for a single, ‘true’ concept of palliative care. On the 
other hand, if one follows the literature on palliative care, the meaning of the 
concept is often too easily taken for granted. At the most, a definition serves to 
identify what is meant with palliative care. In other words, even though this 
thesis does not argue for one ‘true’ understanding of palliative care, it does 
intend to explicate the various meanings that the concept of palliative care 
carries with it since these meanings often remain hidden under the surface. The 
first objective of this thesis has therefore been to explore, clarify, analyse and 
evaluate different understandings of the concept(s) of palliative care.
In the course of the study, it has become clear that clarification and analysis of 
the concept of palliative care is for a significant part an ethical enterprise. The 
demarcation of palliative care from other medical practices requires ethical 
research. Moral notions that are used in the debates on palliative care are 
indicative of a certain specificity of palliative care, either because they differ 
from notions that are used in the context of curative medical practices, or 
because they are attributed a specific meaning in the context of palliative care. 
However, if one follows these debates on palliative care, critical analysis of 
these notions remains absent. Often it remains unclear what is meant with 
‘quality of life’. The notion of autonomy is uncritically adopted from a form of 
medical ethics that is primarily associated with curative care. The notion of pain 
is still approached with a medical gaze. Many other examples of notions that are 
insufficiently reflected upon can be given. In this thesis, a number of notions 
that are used in the debates are analysed from a theological or philosophical 
perspective. The claim is that philosophical or theological theory can bring 
aspects of notions to the surface that have been forgotten by a dominant, action 
oriented form of medical ethics. The second objective of the thesis has thus been 
to provide new perspectives on palliative care by analysing moral notions that 
are used in the debates on palliative care from a theological and philosophical 
perspective and to introduce practically relevant notions that have been 
forgotten.
This second objective also has consequences for the debates on medical 
decision-making at the end of life in palliative care. Aspects that have been 
underestimated so far are proposed again and the particularity of dominant 
discourses is brought to the surface. For instance, up until recently the Dutch 
debate on euthanasia has been mainly concerned with data, procedures and 
guidelines. Now that palliative care is more and more at the focus of interest in 
the Netherlands, new perspectives on euthanasia emerge. The vast majority of
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Dutch physicians agree that good palliative care can prevent requests for 
euthanasia. Alternative modalities of palliative care are more under attention. At 
the same time, the issue of euthanasia is still considered a taboo by many 
palliative care practitioners from other countries. An open, international debate 
on euthanasia is absent. Consequently, the Dutch debate on euthanasia needs to 
be broadened, drawing attention to possible alternative palliative modalities. 
Furthermore, tools need to be provided for an open and critical international 
debate in which different opinions are allowed to co-exist.
4. Outline of the thesis
Chapter 1 provides a summary analysis of the ethical theory that is adopted in 
this thesis. It will be argued that medical ethics, in order to be relevant for 
palliative care practice, should re-orient itself towards its theological and 
philosophical roots.
It is far from accidental that the origins of modern palliative care and the 
origins of modern medical ethics can be traced in the same period of time, 
namely at the end of the 1960s. After all, both movements have come forth out 
of moral discomfort with a health care system that primarily focused on cure and 
life prolongation, if necessary with the means of disproportionate technological 
interventions. However, whereas the hospice movement stressed the importance 
of pain and symptom control and of psychosocial and spiritual aspects of care 
this was not the main goal of medical ethics. The moral discomfort of the new 
discipline of medical ethics related to the paternalistic attitude of physicians. In 
the context of the technological possibilities of medicine, it was noted that the 
application of medical technology could under circumstances be more harmful 
to the patient’s well-being than beneficent. And if that is so, the decision to 
apply such interventions should no longer be made by physicians but instead by 
patients themselves. The power of the physician to administer medical treatment 
where and whenever possible should be handed over to the patient. The 
principle of autonomy thus became foundational for modern medical ethics. In 
the 1970s medical ethics developed into a principlist action-oriented theory 
which served to solve moral dilemmas in medical practice. The philosophical 
and theological roots of medical ethics were abandoned. Medical ethics came to 
be seen as a distinct field of science since it had adopted the theoretical 
framework of the medical sciences.
In chapter 1, this approach of medical ethics is criticised and it is argued 
that medical ethics should not be seen as a distinct science but as a part of
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philosophy or theology. Instead of solving moral problems, the first task of 
medical ethics in general and of palliative care ethics in specific should be to 
listen closely to what is said and written by the caregivers in the field. What 
notions are dominant in the debates on palliative care? What is the philosophical 
and theological meaning of the notions that are used? What notions are not 
used? In critically analysing what is said, and especially what is not said, a 
richer understanding of palliative care practice evolves and orientations for 
concrete action can emerge. The concept of medical ethics that is used in this 
thesis is solidly based on its philosophical and theological roots, holds a certain 
critical distance from palliative care practice, and claims to have more practical 
relevance than the dominant ‘problem solving’ conception of medical ethics.
In chapter 2 conceptual and ethical aspects of palliative care are examined 
from an historical point of view. The modern hospice movement that originated 
in the 1960s situated itself in the tradition of hospices that were established in 
the early Christian era to provide shelter for pilgrims who were on their way to 
the holy places. According to Cicely Saunders herself, the principles of the 
modern hospice movement are an extension of the principles of these early 
hospices (Saunders, 1994a). Furthermore, the British hospices that were 
established after 1967 were clearly situated in the tradition of the pre-modern 
hospices which originated at the end of the 19th century and at the beginnings of 
the 20th century. These hospices were specifically designed to provide care for 
the dying. Insight in the historical roots of today’s palliative care reveals 
continuities but also discontinuities. The ambivalence and heterogeneity of the 
organisational, conceptual and ethical aspects of palliative care can be explained 
by the integration process that is currently taking place in many European 
countries. Problems regarding the demarcation of palliative care from other 
medical disciplines are analysed. It is argued that the norm ‘not to hasten death’ 
in palliative care should be subject to a critical, open debate. Normative 
statements require arguments to support them.
Chapter 3 aims to identify and analyse the views of professionals working 
in the field of palliative care on the concept and ethics of palliative care. It 
results from a large scale questionnaire study among more than 2000 palliative 
care experts. The assumption that palliative care is subject to change is 
corroborated. The opinion that palliative care should be fully integrated with the 
mainstream health care system is held by a majority of respondents whereas at 
the same time concern is expressed about the specificity of the moral values 
underpinning palliative care. Integration of palliative care without the 
medicalisation of its philosophy seems to be a challenge for the future 
development of palliative care. Medicalisation threatens the essence of palliative
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care; an essence which relates to the provision of total care in which the 
medical, psychological, social and spiritual realms of care are of equal 
importance.
Chapter 4 analyses the various debates on palliative care in the 
Netherlands. On a fundamental level there is a consensus about the basic 
characteristics of palliative care. However, if one follows the debates in the 
literature, disagreements occur relating to the scope of palliative care, the 
organisational structures most suitable to provide palliative care in, the moral 
values underpinning palliative care, and the historical development of palliative 
care in the Netherlands. Also the euthanasia debate, so typical for the Dutch 
context, is not only concerned with the morality or immorality of ending 
someone’s life. It will be indicated that the Dutch euthanasia debate cannot be 
understood without taking the quality of palliative care provision into account. A 
lot of disagreements can, at least for an important part, be clarified by looking at 
the political agenda of the participants. If one leaves out the external goals, such 
as political interests, status and competition, there may be more consensus on 
what palliative care is than appears from the debates. The debate on palliative 
care in the Netherlands should therefore be re-oriented towards the internal goal 
of palliative care: the quality of life of the patient and his or her loved ones.
Chapters 5 and 6 analyse notions that are used in the literature of 
palliative care. Chapter 5 is a phenomenological analysis of the notion of pain. 
Whereas pain in the context of medicine used to refer to a bodily injury that has 
to be removed as soon as possible, phenomenology has depicted pain as an 
experience. The meaning of pain, from religious, metaphysical, social, moral or 
artistic points of view has been left unconsidered within the biomedical 
paradigm. The introduction of the concept of total pain by Cicely Saunders has 
also come forth out of a critique of this biomedical paradigm. However, even 
though in theory the multi-dimensionality of pain is acknowledged, medical 
practice is slow to adapt to the new challenges lying ahead. Moreover, it can be 
questioned to what extent the concept of total pain still carries traits of the old 
Cartesian biomedical paradigm. Distinctions between medical, psychological, 
social and spiritual aspects of pain may lead to a fragmentation of care in which 
the physician is still pre-occupied in removing physical pain. New multi­
dimensional perspectives on pain that allow for other ways of dealing with pain 
than only medical intervention are now beginning to emerge.
Whereas in chapter 5 new perspectives are introduced on a notion that is 
often used in palliative care practice, chapter 6 draws attention to three notions 
that are less frequently used in palliative care: the notions of medical restraint, 
authenticity and hope. It is argued that these notions can reveal important
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aspects of the medical, psychosocial and spiritual realms of palliative care. In 
palliative care, the boundaries of medicine are acknowledged. At a certain stage 
there comes a time in which the quality of life of the patient becomes the sole 
criterion for medical decision-making. This acknowledgement, together with the 
acknowledgement that psychosocial and spiritual elements of care are just as 
important as medical aspects is illuminated by the notion of medical restraint. 
And instead of the notion of autonomy, that is intrinsically connected with the 
dominant conception of medical ethics, the notion of authenticity is proposed 
because it is better equipped to include elements of fragility and dependency; 
elements that are characteristic for the condition humaine in general but 
especially for the condition the dying are in. It is argued that, in order to render 
account of solidarity, the notion of authenticity should be paired with the notion 
of hope. Hope should not necessarily refer to obtainable objects. Hope is also 
connected with eschatology, i.e. with questions regarding what is of ultimate 
importance to us in the face of death.
Chapter 1 analyses the ethical theory adopted in this thesis. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
examine conceptual aspects of palliative care and clarify the ethical and 
philosophical debates on palliative care. Chapters 5 and 6 analyse notions that 
are used in those debates. Moreover, forgotten aspects of those notions are 
proposed in order to broaden their meaning for palliative care practice. Finally, 
chapters 7, 8 and 9 deal with moral dilemmas in palliative care. None of these 
three chapters purports to solve the dilemmas that occur in palliative care 
practice. Rather, they intend to (1) clarify the ongoing ethical debates in the 
context of palliative care, (2) broaden the debates with the help of philosophical 
and theological theory and (3) propose moral perspectives that allow new 
orientations for action to emerge.
Chapter 7 thus deals with the question how a hospice in which euthanasia 
is not provided deals with its patients’ requests for euthanasia in the context of a 
country which officially tolerates euthanasia to be carried out. It results from a 
participant observation study in one of the hospices in the Netherlands. With the 
help of four case reports, options in palliative care to deal with euthanasia 
requests are scrutinised. Sometimes, terminal sedation may be a good alternative 
for euthanasia, from the patient’s perspective as well as from the perspective of 
the caregivers. The option of withdrawal of life prolonging treatment may give 
patients a sense of security that their dying process will not be endless. Only in 
very few, extremely tragic cases, euthanasia may be unpreventable. This chapter 
makes clear that sometimes, medical decisions that can be defended with the
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help of the doctrine of double effect, cause intense emotions on the side of the 
caregivers. Everyday practice appears to be different from ethical logic.
Chapter 8 analyses the issue of terminal sedation in palliative care 
practice. While euthanasia is by far the most debated topic in the Netherlands, 
the issue of terminal sedation has up to now not been given the attention it 
deserves. It is argued that terminal sedation is not the same as euthanasia from a 
moral perspective. If we assume that the taking of another person’s life is at 
least prima facie wrong, and if we assume that intentions are relevant for the 
morality of our actions, terminal sedation is a morally better option than 
euthanasia. However, some patients may not want to die unconsciously. Some 
may persist in their euthanasia request. These are hard cases in which it is 
problematic to give final answers. But others may prefer sedation to euthanasia, 
for instance because they do not want the team that has cared for them to 
actively end their lives. That is why it is imperative to provide patients who 
want to die with at least an alternative. Patients requesting for euthanasia should 
be given a choice. If that is so, the issue of terminal sedation deserves more 
attention in the Dutch debates on euthanasia than it has received so far.
The last chapter deals with the question to what extent clinical trials can 
be part of palliative care. Certainly, patients who are about to die should not 
engage in such trials. But for patients for whom the time of death is still 
relatively far ahead, clinical trials may be an option. Clinical trials do not serve 
the well-being of the patient. What’s more, they can cause serious harms. In 
other words, they put that at risk what is at the heart of palliative care. Again the 
notions of authenticity and hope are proposed to provide a way out of this tragic 
dilemma. Some patients’ lives may gain meaning by engaging in clinical trials, 
not as a last possibility to cling to cure but as a means to help the treatment of 
future patients improve.
The conclusion of this thesis focuses on four challenges that lie ahead for 
palliative care in the nearby future. In this study, directions have been proposed 
to meet these challenges but further research is necessary. First, further research 
is required to demarcate palliative care from other medical practices. The 
specificity of palliative care is for an important part a moral specificity and its 
articulation is primarily an ethical enterprise. Second, if new enriching 
perspectives on palliative care are to emerge, historical, philosophical and 
theological analyses of moral notions used in the debates need further 
development. Third, debates on medical decision-making at the end of life need 
to be broadened, stressing alternative palliative modalities for euthanasia and 
assessing what patients really mean when they say that they want to die. Fourth, 
increasing interest in palliative care has stimulated the development of new
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attitudes towards our mortality in which it is acknowledged that it is our 
mortality that enables us to give and receive meaning in life. These new attitudes 
towards death and dying need further attention.
13
14
ETHICAL THEORY AND CARE PRACTICE 
A THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
CHAPTER 1
A slightly modified version of this chapter was published as*:
Janssens MJPA, ten Have HAMJ, Medische ethiek en zorgpraktijk. Een 
diagnose vanuit moraaltheologisch perspectief. Tijdschrift vcor Theologie 1999; 
39: 162-177.
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ETHICAL THEORY AND CARE PRACTICE
A THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Introduction
“Academic theology seems to have lost its voice, its ability to command 
attention as a distinctive contributor to public discourse in our culture ... To 
gain hearing in our culture, theology has often assumed a voice not of its own 
and found itself repeating the bromides of secular intellectuals in transparently 
figurative speech. Theologians with something distinctive to say are apt to be 
talking to themselves ... Can a theologian speak faithfully for a religious 
tradition, articulating its ethical and political implications, without withdrawing 
to the margins of public discourse, essentially unheard?” (Stout, 1988, p. 163). 
According to Stout, modern academic theology seems to be in a position that 
can be called tragic. If it understands itself as theology, it will have to withdraw 
from public discourse. If it wants to participate in public discourse, it will have 
to refrain from its distinctive theological preconceptions. For moral theology 
both options are unsatisfactory. Moral theology should be situated on the 
intersection of church and society. It wants to be ‘proper theology’ and at the 
same time it wants to be of public interest (Merks, 1995).
It can be argued that the concern for the relative absence of theology in 
public discourse is not entirely justified. If one considers the Dutch media, one 
will have to acknowledge that the voice of theology is not absent at all. 
Theology does have a distinctive voice in various public debates. Debates on the 
24-hour-economy received much input from theologians. In debates on the 
status of asylum seekers, theology was not absent at all. Furthermore, one has to 
acknowledge that in the third world countries, liberation theology continues to 
be at the focus of interest. And has not feminist theology proved important in the 
women’s movement? On second thought, speaking of ‘the’ public debate 
appears to be a simplification; and the statement that theology has lost its voice 
in ‘the’ public debate is a simplification too.
However, at least within one realm of the pluriform Dutch society, 
theology seems to be remarkably absent. This is the realm of medicine and 
medical ethics. Whereas theology manages to hold up its distinctive voice in 
various public debates, it seems as if it has lost this voice in the debates on 
euthanasia, abortion, genetics, etcetera. In this realm theology does seem to have 
withdrawn to the margins of public discourse.
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In this chapter, the marginalisation of theology within the realm of 
medical ethics will be scrutinised. First, it will be argued that this 
marginalisation can be explained by the self-understanding of current medical 
ethics. It is claimed that modern medical ethics has subordinated itself to 
medicine. It has adopted a medico-technical theoretical framework within which 
technical problems require technical solutions. Modern medical ethics has lost 
its critical distance towards medical practice. This loss can explain why modern 
medical ethics has separated itself from fundamental theological (and 
philosophical) theory. Because medical ethics is in lack of critical distance 
towards medical practice, important perspectives have systematically fallen 
outside its scope.
In the second paragraph, it will be argued that a reinsertion of these 
perspectives requires a reorientation of medical ethics towards more 
fundamental philosophical and theological theories. It will become clear that 
medical ethics should eventually not intend to solve problems, but instead 
should intend to critically scrutinise the discourse of public debates on moral 
issues and to reveal the particularity of this discourse. The relation between 
medical ethics and practice is thus not a direct, immediate relation. A direct 
relation to medical practice is reserved to the actors in the field, for instance 
physicians and nurses. Instead, the relationship between medical ethics and 
medical practice is mediated by that which has already been said by others. The 
paradox is that medical ethics will regain its practical relevancy if it will resume 
a critical distance to medical practice.
If medical ethics understands itself in this new way, an orientation 
towards theology and philosophy is required. In the third paragraph, suggestions 
for a theologically based medical ethics (or a medical moral theology) will be 
proposed. The distinction between moral theology and moral philosophy does 
not relate to their material objects; both can be directed towards a variety of 
practices. Neither is the distinction located in the formal object; the 
methodological tools used to approach the material objects do not necessarily 
differ. Instead, the distinction between moral theology and moral philosophy is 
explained by the specific interest of the moral theologian, namely relating 
(Christian) faith to contemporary practices in the conviction that the Christian 
tradition is of relevance for these practices.
Theological medical ethics does not start from a vacuum. In formulating 
and analysing new theoretical approaches towards medical practices it has to 
connect to theories and debates that have already been developed. In the last two 
paragraphs, two examples will be discussed of debates and theories to which a 
theologically based medical ethics can connect in order to formulate innovative
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approaches towards medical practice and thus be practically relevant. The fourth 
paragraph discusses the past, and to some extent forgotten, debate on what used 
to be called anthropological medicine. In the fifth paragraph the current debate 
on palliative care will be addressed. Both debates reflect(ed) an increase in 
attention towards specific care practices. This shift in attention does not only 
require an adaptation of medicine. It also reveals the necessity of a reorientation 
of medical ethics itself.
1. The technological framework of medical ethics
The marginalisation of the role of theology in medicine can be explained by the 
assimilation of current medical ethics to a medico-technical framework. Also the 
anthropological assumptions of medicine do not differ from the anthropological 
assumptions which medical ethics has adopted as its own.
The domination of a medico-technical theoretical framework in medical ethics 
has been analysed by Zwart (Zwart 1993; Zwart 1995). Zwart argues that we 
have to return to the historical beginning of medical ethics in the Netherlands. 
He locates this point of departure in Van den Berg’s Medische macht en 
medische ethiek (medical power and medical ethics), published in 1969 (Van 
den Berg, 1969). In this book, Van den Berg formulates a contrast experience at 
the bedside of a blind and severely handicapped child with the words “Het is 
niet juist' (“it is not right”). This experience convinced Van den Berg that not 
everything which can be carried out should be carried out. Acknowledging this 
experience of concern in regard to the recently developed technological 
possibilities of medicine, the task of medical ethics is said to limit medical 
power by creating room for patients’ self-determination. The new medicine was 
in need of a new medical ethics. The old maxim of medical ethics used to be to 
preserve human life where and whenever possible. The new maxim of medical 
ethics should, according to Van den Berg, be to preserve human life where and 
whenever meaningful. The application of this maxim to concrete cases became 
central for the self-understanding of the new medical ethics. Zwart writes: “The 
new medical ethics thus started to answer the questions posed by medicine in 
technical terms. Technical problems require technical answers” (Zwart, 1995, p. 
31). At the moment Van den Berg formulated his new moral dictum, the initial 
contrast experience had already subsided. In Van den Berg’s formulation of the 
maxim, the new discourse of medical ethics is already present. The new medical 
ethics has positioned itself within a technical framework.
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It is possible to argue that medical ethics has become more multifaceted 
during the last thirty years. Indeed, the application of the above-mentioned 
maxim is no longer considered to be the only task of medical ethics. Towards 
the end of the 1970s four moral principles were formulated in the U.S. 
(sometimes ironically called the ‘Georgetown Mantra’): respect for autonomy, 
nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice. These principles served partly as tools 
for medical ethics in answering questions with regard to the application of the 
maxim. This principlist ethics has received much criticism. But it can still be 
argued that a significant part of current medical ethics continues to be guided by 
a medico-technical framework aimed at problem solving through application of 
ethical principles. This observation can be underlined by discussing 
contemporary representatives.
“Problem solving in applied ethics” is the subtitle of a doctoral thesis of 
Van Willigenburg (Van Willigenburg, 1991). It is a study of the structures and 
dynamics of the reasoning process through which an ethical expert reaches a 
moral conclusion with regard to a concrete moral problem. According to Van 
Willigenburg, the ethicist has “expertise . in quick problem solving” (Van 
Willigenburg, 1991, p. 15). He is familiar with moral notions and 
argumentations and is therefore better equipped to provide quick and sound 
advice in moral deliberations than other participants. From a methodological 
point of view, the ethicist should be strictly rational and completely explicit. 
That explains the last sentence of the thesis: “The enlightenment-spirit of 
Bentham’s work should be possessed by anyone who claims to be an expert 
advisor in the field of ethics” (Van Willigenburg, 1991, p. 221). The ethicist 
may be an expert in moral reasoning, he should however not assume the role of 
a prophet. Van Willigenburg considers him a guest of medicine and therefore he 
should be modest towards his hosts. Ethicists are advisors in service of 
medicine. Questions with regard to the values and goals of medicine as such lie 
beyond the reach of ethics. If, for example, ethicists argue that medical ethics is 
often (mis)used in order to legitimise technological progress (Ten Have and 
Kimsma, 1987), they are called for caution by Van Willigenburg: “... the 
question is whether the ethicist will be able to carry out fruitfully these research 
tasks. Serious mistakes may be made” (Van Willigenburg, 1991, p. 38).
In the ethical discourse of which Van Willigenburg is a representative, 
medical ethics is regarded service to medical practice. Moral problems that 
occur in medical practice have to be solved by the ethical expert. Medical 
practice prescribes the logos of ethics. Medical practice itself cannot be subject 
to critical analysis because of a pragmatic reason and a theoretical reason. The 
pragmatic reason instructs the ethicist not to offend his host. Theoretically, it can
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be argued that if medical practice is to formulate the ethi cist’s tasks, a critical 
distance to medical practice is no longer possible. The ethicist becomes 
captivated in a foreign discourse that initially was not his/her own. Medical 
ethics has lost its proper framework and when Van Willigenburg uses the 
metaphor of guest and host he seems conscious of this very loss. After all, as a 
guest you have to adjust to your host, whether you like it or not. The self­
understanding of medical ethics as a guest of medicine can be further clarified 
by analysing the anthropology of medical ethics.
As long as Cartesian dualism continues to be the underlying paradigm of 
medical practice (Crul, 1999), it is part of the underlying assumptions of current 
medical ethics as well. In medicine, the human being is approached as a duality 
of mind and body. Given the self-understanding of medical ethics as outlined 
above, it is not considered the task of the ethicist to criticise this anthropology. 
The body is object of the autonomous will of the person. It is an instrument, 
used to promote the self-fulfilment of the person. As long as the person does not 
give his consent, nobody is allowed to touch his or her body. Dupuis and Thung 
explain: “... corporeality is defined as a boundary, namely as the realm to 
which values, norms and choices do not apply. Human behaviour, in the sense of 
choice-making, only starts beyond this border of corporeality.” (Dupuis and 
Thung, 1988, p. 71). While medicine is interested in the body, medical ethics is 
interested in the autonomous person who is the owner of the body. Ethics 
determines the conditions under which medicine may touch and invade the 
body. Therefore, the paradigm of medicine and medical ethics is the same. If the 
person consents, medicine is allowed to intervene. The question whether the 
intervention is morally allowed has thus become dependent on the right to self­
determination of the person. The intervention as such is no longer scrutinised. 
After all, that would imply a critique of the values and goals of medicine and 
that is beyond the proper scope of ethics.
This discourse fails when medicine’s interventions are no longer 
successful; when cure of the defect body appears no longer possible. The 
paradigm which considers the body as instrumental for the person’s self­
fulfilment, belongs exclusively to the realm of curative medicine. The 
instrumental notion of the body also presumes the social independence of the 
person. When personal development is frustrated due to a bodily defect, 
medicine is there to remove the defect as quickly and effectively as possible. 
When however, the body has become chronically ill, the discourse of medical 
ethics does no longer suffice. Medical ethics has difficulties in coming to terms 
with care practices such as nursing home medicine or care for the elderly 
(Pijnenburg, 1992). It has been argued before that the increasing number of
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chronic patients has demonstrated the urgency of an adjustment of medicine 
(Sporken, 1983). Now, it can be added that an increasing need for care practices 
also reveals the urgency of an adjustment of medical ethics.
If this diagnosis of current medical ethics is correct, medical ethics can be 
characterised as an ideology. According to Boff, an ideology is “A theory that is 
developed in an immediate relation with lived life and the practical functions of 
empirical existence. Because this theory has almost no critical distance towards 
concrete life, it digests matters from their utter, perceivable form of appearance 
... Ideology thus refers to a disguised theory, a false consciousness” (Boff, 
1983, p. 92).
2. The proper context lost
Many ethicists involved in medical ethics are affiliated with a medical faculty 
and university hospital. The link to medical practice is constituted through 
ethical consultancy, moral deliberation, memberships of the ethical committees, 
or preparation and evaluation of protocols. Many ethicists do participant 
observation studies in clinical wards to find out how the actors in the field deal 
with moral issues in everyday practice (Ten Have and Lelie, 1999). Without this 
link to medical practice, medical ethics would not exist. But at the same time, 
the dynamics between ethical theory and medical practice should be subject to 
continuous scrutiny in medical ethics. Medical ethics should continuously reflect 
on its own theoretical foundations in order not to become an ideological 
legitimisation of medical practice. As argued above, a medical ethics which 
understands itself as a service to medicine shows characteristics of an ideology. 
Important perspectives fall out of its scope due to a lack of critical distance. In 
this paragraph, it will be argued that a re-orientation towards the theological and 
philosophical underpinnings of medical ethics is necessary in order to (1) keep a 
critical distance and (2) be practically relevant. The flaw of current medical 
ethics has everything to do with the little use of philosophical and theological 
theories.
2.1. Critical distance
The relationship between medical practice and medical ethics is a mediated 
relationship. Ethicists are never subjects of medical decisions and actions and 
are not supposed to take over the role and duties of the caregiving team. Moral 
responsibility for decisions remains with the team. The subject matter of the
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ethicist is always of a second order. In other words, the subject matter of 
medical ethics consists of what has already been articulated by others (Zwart, 
1998). Ethicists should scrutinise this material in a creative way. If the debates 
have already been formulated in moral terms, these terms should be scrutinised 
by making use of theological or philosophical expertise. Which terms have been 
used in the debate? What do these terms mean in the debates? Which meanings 
are implicitly or explicitly attributed to them? And, especially, which moral 
meanings remain unspoken? Which terms are not used? Such kind of questions 
intend to reveal issues that may seem self-evident in the debates but are on 
second thought less self-evident than initially believed. In other words, they 
bring the particularity of the debates to the surface and in doing so, they reveal 
much about our contemporary self-understanding. The current medical ethical 
debates, together with the prevailing moral notions, are confronted with other, 
forgotten debates. Notions can be re-introduced that may have disappeared from 
the common theoretical frameworks and paradigms. Meanings attributed to 
moral notions in specific debates can be confronted with different meanings they 
used to have in earlier times but which have not survived. Notions that are 
central in debates outside the realm of medical ethics can be confronted with 
medical ethical debates. In this way, perspectives can be revealed that remained 
hidden before. The ethicist’s task is a Socratic task: seeming self-evidences are 
revealed and put under renewed critique.
As long as medical ethics continues to perceive itself as service to the 
medical profession, it is hardly able to escape from the used paradigms and 
conceptual frameworks, as well as the established consensus. However, medical 
ethics should not take for granted the regular discourse or the legitimacy of 
consensus. Then, it may appear that consensus have been established in a 
particular domain because important moral meanings are (1) left unconsidered 
or (2) are referred to the private realm in which individuals are said to be free to 
follow their preferences. These moral meanings, which cannot be reconciled 
with the consensus, must be re-introduced in the medical ethical discourse. 
Medical ethics is revelation of forgotten moral meanings.
Ethics always starts from certain suppositions. The ethicist has particular 
interests. And honesty requires that these interests are made explicit. Hauerwas 
has rightly pointed out that ethics is always in need of an adjective, a ‘qualifier’ 
(e.g. liberal, Christian or pragmatic) (Hauerwas, 1983). Ethics can never pretend 
to be neutral but is instead based on certain moral convictions that prevail in 
well-defined communities. The (often implicit) pretension of current medical 
ethics to make use of a ‘neutral moral language’ can be exposed as an ideology 
as defined by Boff. The adjective ‘neutral’ should be replaced by another
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adjective that denotes the particularistic character of the ethicist’s suppositions 
(Welie, 1998).
Therefore, also the conception of medical ethics proposed here is in need 
of a qualifier. A Socratic ethic, questioning consensus, is always an ethic that is 
based on certain interests. Thus, only some meanings are revealed, other, 
perhaps equally important meanings, remain hidden. This process (that can be 
considered an eclectic process) can be explained by the necessary 
preconceptions of the ethicist. We are now in the middle of what has been called 
the ‘hermeneutical circle’: meanings alter preconceptions but cannot exist 
without preconception. This means that ethics can never be definite, can never 
speak final words, and is always characterised by ambiguity.
2.2. Practical relevance
Practical relevance of medical ethics has not so much to do with solving 
problems. Solutions to problems are a responsibility of the actors in the field. As 
Van Tongeren has stated, the goal of ethics is a sensitisation of moral experience 
(Van Tongeren, 1988). In revealing lost moral meanings, current debates can be 
broadened. Practices that seemed unproblematic before can become problematic 
again and are thus put at risk. New meanings require a revision of the central 
notions in the debates. Sometimes, prevailing moral notions are re-interpreted. 
Sometimes, they are in need of replacement by other notions that are better 
equipped to identify the problematic issues at stake. If common language is 
inadequate to formulate what is at hand, neologisms can be introduced (Zwart, 
1998). In revealing moral meanings, the actors in the field (the caregiving team) 
become sensitised in dealing with moral problems that occur in everyday 
practice. This may mean that, instead of making it easier, ethics can make it 
harder to solve problems or provide concrete directions for decision-making. 
Problems may appear unsolvable, situations may appear tragic, exactly because 
the meanings that are brought to the surface appear to have an inevitable moral 
validity.
The ethics that is proposed here acknowledges its particularity but does 
not lose its normativity. The introduction of meanings and the critique on the 
current debates does open room for alternatives in dealing with practical 
problems. New orientations for acting can be suggested.
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3. Towards a medical moral theology
Medical ethics usually locates theology in the sphere of intra-ecclesiastical 
debates; only there exists a consensus on theology’s preconceptions (Kuitert, 
1988). Again, current medical ethics presumes a neutrality on the side of the 
ethicist. That ethics is always interpretative, starts with suppositions and is 
always in need of an adjective, is not acknowledged. Therefore, not only 
theological ethics, but also philosophical ethics is located in spheres that lie 
outside medical ethics. Medical ethics nowadays exists because of an 
Entmachtung der Überlieferung, a disempowerment of tradition (Gadamer, 
1975). But moral theology is explicitly based on the acknowledgement of the 
authority of tradition(s).
Traditionally, moral theology has been based on two norms: the bible (norma 
non normata) and the tradition (norma normata). A third norm should be added: 
experience. After all, the truth of the bible and the Christian tradition does not 
exist without the acknowledgement that it has practical meaning for humanity. 
Whereas philosophical ethics can be defined as hermeneutics of experience (Van 
Tongeren, 1988), moral theology can be defined as hermeneutics of experience 
in the light of bible and tradition. The material object of moral theology does not 
differ from the material object of moral philosophy. And if, as outlined above, 
the goal of (medical) ethics is the sensitisation of moral experience, this goes for 
moral philosophy as well as moral theology. The formal object of moral 
theology does not differ either from the formal object of moral philosophy. The 
methodology of moral theology needs a philosophical underpinning. Moral 
philosophy is of relevance to moral theology in the sense that moral theology 
always presupposes a theologically relevant moral philosophy (Mieth, 1996).
This does not mean that moral theology would not have a distinctive 
significance as a separate discipline. In the biblical and Christian tradition, 
people have expressed their experiences which continue to carry significance in 
our times. It is an ecclesiastical duty to keep those experiences alive. Moral 
theologians have to interpret and actualise these experiences in the variety of 
current debates and practices. They assume that many of these experiences, not 
all, are still relevant and able to reveal important moral meanings, also in the 
context of a secularised, post-modern society. The preconceptions of moral 
theology are basically rooted in the lived Christian tradition. The Christian 
tradition however, is not a crystal clear concept. People have murdered and 
tortured, and apart from these crimes, a lot more harms have been committed in 
the name of the Christian tradition. Moreover, the Cartesian dualistic
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anthropology, criticised above, can draw on important parts of Christian 
theology. Therefore, simply acknowledging the normativity of the Christian 
tradition is problematic. If it is said that the Christian tradition carries 
normativity, it always has to be seen in the context of our contemporary 
subjectivity. Theology must be situated at the crossroads of our contemporary 
experience and the truth of the Christian tradition. Truth does not exist without 
experience. At the same time, truth always carries objectivity because it is not 
completely dependent on our interpretation.
Moral theology is concerned with the church and intra-ecclesiastical 
debates. But moral theology is also concerned with society in general (Demmer, 
1987; 1989). In the latter context, also non-Christians are addressed. It is also 
this larger societal context that is of special concern in the context of this 
chapter.
It has already been argued that the tasks of moral theology and moral 
philosophy are the same, namely the articulation and explication of moral 
meanings. The difference between the two disciplines relates to their 
preconceptions. Only in the light of these preconceptions, it is understandable 
where the discomfort with current debates comes from and which meanings are 
actually formulated and scrutinised. Moral philosophy needs an adjective 
qualifier as well as moral theology. But for moral philosophers this 
preconception is not fixed. A liberal moral philosopher will reveal other 
meanings than a Christian philosopher.
For moral theology, certain options are excluded. If one accepts the norm 
of the bible and tradition, not everything is possible. For current medical ethics 
this is where the weakness of theology lies. But it can also be seen as her force. 
It is the connection with the Christian tradition which provides the moral 
theologian with the critical potential in the face of practices which reduce 
humanity.
In the introduction it was pointed out that the anthropology of medicine, 
together with the anthropology of current medical ethics, is a reduced type of 
anthropology. Below, an alternative anthropology will be briefly outlined which 
is relevant for medical ethics and which articulates insights from the Christian­
theological tradition.
According to this tradition, everything is created by God and is aimed at 
returning to God: ‘exitus’ is followed by ‘reditus’. Since God is the creator, the 
whole of His creation contains traces (‘vestigia’) of His that refer back to Him. 
However, man is attributed a verisimilitude with God. Man is not only 
considered to be a trace but also an image of his/her Creator. For a long time,
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this ‘imago Dei-character’ of man was situated in the rational part of the soul; it 
was thus considered separate from the passions and the body. It can be argued 
that this view is comparable, at least in its dualism, to the currently dominant 
view of medicine and medical ethics. However, especially Thomas Aquinas has 
modified this ‘Neo-Platonist’ view as he pointed out that man should always, 
first and foremost, be considered as oneness of soul and body. The soul, 
conceived of as the form of the body (forma corporis), becomes detached from 
its original state at the moment of death, when the soul is separated from the 
body (Thomas Aquinas, 1996). Full beatitude is not possible without the body 
(see also De Grijs, 1967).
The scheme of exitus -  reditus, although originally part of a Neo­
Platonist framework, provides the image of God-character of man with a 
dynamic strength. In order to return to God, man is given the liberty to choose. 
This liberty is considered by the church as a token of man’s nature (as image of 
God) (Gaudium et Spes, 1967). The moral life of man thus becomes situated in a 
dynamic framework; man has been created by God, lives in the hope of 
returning to God and reach full beatitude at the end of times. Since the 
resurrection of Christ, God’s kingdom has already been established, albeit still 
in an imperfect state. It is already there, but not yet in its perfect form. Moral life 
of man is situated in the midst of the ‘already’ and the ‘not-yet’.
Important in this context is that in the Christian tradition, the human 
person is considered first and foremost as a unity of body and mind. Distinctions 
between mind and body can be made only after having realised the unity of the 
person. The distinction is not said to be between the body and the person. 
Instead, the human person is said to consist of mind and body which are 
mutually dependent. As the person is considered an image of God, and therefore 
in a more privileged situation than all other creatures, he or she has been given 
dignity. Human dignity is an ontological category which everyone, as a person, 
has. At the same time, dignity can also be considered a moral criterion. 
Acknowledging dignity and protecting it in situations in which it is threatened is 
therefore the criterion for a moral life. In protecting dignity, human beings can 
anticipate the fulfilment of the Kingdom of God.
Debates on potential attributes that would determine the personhood of 
human beings do not have a place in theology. Human beings simply are 
persons, personhood is an ontological category, independent of the concrete 
state human beings can be in or the particular characteristics they have. If we 
also recognise that at least some philosophers argue that it is impossible to 
identify the attributes that are essential for personhood, it seems irrelevant for 
theology to discuss these attributes (Gordijn, 1996).
27
4. Theological medical ethics and anthropological medicine
In formulating new, practically relevant perspectives on medicine, theological 
medical ethics can draw on earlier debates which did give rise to new 
orientations, but have been marginalised by current medical ethics. In 
recapturing and reviving outcomes of such debates, theological (or 
philosophical) medical ethics can reveal important, but forgotten, meanings in 
current debates. An example is the recent history of anthropological medicine.
Anthropological medicine is a reaction to a kind of medicine, dominant in 
the first half of the 20th century, which was almost exclusively oriented towards 
the sciences. Anthropological medicine is a generic term; it covers various 
meanings. However, three basic characteristics can be distinguished (Ten Have, 
1995). First, anthropological medicine rejects any form of dualism. The patient 
is considered as a unity of mind and body and can therefore not be reduced to 
his illness. Second, anthropological medicine criticises the uncritical faith of 
medicine in the sciences. Anthropological medicine considers medicine to be 
first and foremost an art, in which there is no place for strictly objective 
knowledge. Third, anthropological medicine does not only understand illness as 
a negative entity. It is argued that we should also attribute a positive meaning to 
illness. “Illness is a way of being a person ... illness has to do with an answer of 
the person to his or her existence” (Ten Have, 1995, p. 11). With the rise of 
modern medical ethics at the end of the sixties, the orientations provided by the 
anthropological medicine faded into the background. Questions with regard to 
the goals and values of medicine came to fall outside the scope of medical 
ethics. The new moral discourse adapted to the paradigm of curative medicine 
with its almost exclusive orientation towards physical health.
Within the Christian tradition however, physical health has never been an 
absolute value. Health (perhaps it is more accurate to speak of ‘wholeness’) does 
not only represent the physical function of a person, but refers also to 
psychological, social and spiritual aspects. In this sense, health is never fully 
present. To a certain extent, infirmity inevitably belongs to human existence. 
Physical health is only one aspect of human existence, albeit an important one, 
that makes a life in dignity possible. And curative medicine is only one societal 
realm through which people are helped to develop and fulfil themselves. Other 
societal realms can be equally important, or even more important. The task of 
medicine is not so much to fulfil people’s preferences. More important is to 
enable people in the context of a society to live a life in dignity, with or without 
physical limitations (Government Committee on Choices in Health Care, 1992). 
Medicine, in this sense, is truly service to mankind, a conception that was also
28
formulated by Pope John Paul II addressing the medical profession: “No one of 
you can limit yourself to being a doctor of an organ or apparatus, but you must 
treat the whole person, and what is more, the interpersonal relationships which 
contribute to his well-being” (Pope John Paul II, 1993, p. 191).
For anthropological medicine, it is not only the individual person who is 
central. Also his dialogical relationships, which essentially contribute to the 
person one is, are crucial. Schotsmans has added a third level, apart from the 
levels of the ‘I’ and the ‘I and you’, namely the level of ‘we’. With this level, he 
is referring to the solidary sense of responsibility of people in the context of a 
society (Schotsmans, 1994). This broader perspective on personhood can be 
applied to a variety of problem areas.
In 1998 for example, there was a lively debate on the implementation of 
legal requirements for organ donations in the Netherlands. Earlier that year, all 
citizens received a registration form asking whether they would want to donate 
their organs after death, or leave the decision to their (bereaved) loved ones. 
According to the law, everyone who has returned a written declaration of 
consent for the donation of their organs, the organs can be removed after the 
moment of death. However, in practice, proxy consent is always requested, even 
if a written consent form has been returned by the deceased. If the loved ones of 
the deceased refuse the removal of organs, the organs will not be removed.
Whereas the government, appealing to the level of the ‘we’, stimulates 
people to give their written consent and puts the level of the ‘I’ central in its 
justification of the removal of organs, in the end, the second level of the ‘I and 
you’ decides, even if the decision of the bereaved goes directly against the wish 
of the deceased. Whereas the law permits the removal of organs in such cases, 
practice appears to be more ambiguous. And probably, this practice is not only 
signifying respect for the wishes of the bereaved but also reflects an 
understanding that dialogical relationships are essential for the person of the 
deceased himself. Current medical ethics might object to this practice, appealing 
to the first level of the ‘I’ and the autonomy of the individual. But on second 
thoughts, it remains to be seen whether the deceased is actually ignored.
Another question is whether a person who refuses organ donation does 
have a right to receive another person’s organs. This question can be answered 
with the help of the notion of ‘solidary responsibility’ as a part of the 
perspective on personhood that was outlined above. Moreover, if one argues that 
life in solidarity with and responsibility for others is a part of personhood, the 
question does not even arise. Self-evidently, this person should be allowed to 
receive other persons’ organs.
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5. Theological medical ethics and palliative care
In 1983, Sporken argued that the increasing number of chronic patients 
demonstrate the urgency of a modification of the biomedical paradigm. Chronic 
patients confront medicine with its inability to take away illness. According to 
Sporken, medicine should shift its attention from curative interventions to care. 
One of the care practices now very much in the focus of attention is palliative 
care. Palliative care is defined in the Netherlands as “the continuous, active, 
integral care for patients and loved ones, by an interdisciplinary team starting 
from the moment that, from a medical point of view, cure can no longer be 
expected” (Working group on palliative care, 1996, unpublished).
It is in this context important to realise that palliative care was developed 
outside the realm of modern medicine, in the independent hospice. The relative 
distance of palliative care from the formal health care system in these early days 
provided the opportunity to reveal the blind spots of medicine. Exactly because 
palliative care was originally organised outside the formal health care system, 
the relative absence of care in medicine could be brought to the surface. At the 
same time, from the early start, there was always a consciousness that palliative 
care was to move back into medicine. Cicely Saunders stated: “... we had to 
move out, so that attitudes and knowledge could move back in” (Saunders, 
1981, p. 4).
Palliative care is called “total care”: the medical, emotional, social and 
spiritual needs and wishes of the patient, together with his/her loved ones are 
central. From a personalist point of view, it can be argued that palliative care 
entails a surplus value because the variety of human needs and wishes are 
acknowledged (Schotsmans, 1995).
Only since the beginning of the 1990s, palliative care has become a policy 
issue in the Netherlands. This increase of interest is important, not only for 
patients receiving palliative care but also for the whole of medicine. The 
development of palliative care has stimulated attention for care practices in 
general. Palliative care has disclosed the marginalisation of care practices in the 
context of medicine and in the context of medical ethics. Because medicine was 
not self-critical, and because medical ethics has lacked critical distance to 
medicine, it was taken for granted that cure was the exclusive goal of medicine. 
In other words, because questions with regard to the goals and values of 
medicine were not addressed, care fell outside the scope of medicine and 
medical ethics. Because of the growing interest in palliative care, questions with 
regard to the goals and values of medicine have now returned in public debate.
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Palliative care thus not only implies a critique of an exclusively curatively 
oriented medicine, it also implies a critique of current medical ethics.
From a historical point of view, palliative care was also developed as a 
reaction against the British Voluntary Euthanasia Society which flourished in 
this period (see chapter 2). According to Cicely Saunders, pleas for a 
legalisation of euthanasia could partly be explained because of medicine’s drive 
to prolong patients’ lives at all costs with the technological means available. In 
many cases, the question whether life prolongation contributed to the quality of 
patients’ lives was not posed. The “therapeutic furor” of medicine at that time 
often did more harm than good. Just as Van den Berg pointed out in the 
Netherlands, Cicely Saunders was one of the first physicians in the UK to point 
out that the technological imperative, urging to prolong life where and whenever 
possible, led to an increase in euthanasia requests. Saunders found herself at 
exactly the same turning point as Van den Berg. Van den Berg pleaded for 
patient autonomy and saw no objections to active euthanasia. Saunders’ 
response however, was different as she argued that euthanasia requests can and 
should be prevented through good palliative care. But both were in the same 
situation and both agreed that uncritical acceptance of the technological 
imperative could be harmful instead of beneficial.
Preventing euthanasia requests (and acts) is also one of the reasons why 
palliative care has received much interest in the Netherlands lately (see chapter 
7). However, it is clear that the debate in the Netherlands is increasingly 
dominated by calculations, procedures and percentages. Depending on the 
interpretation of the available statistics, one will either favour or criticise Dutch 
policy. The ‘proceduralisation’ of the Dutch debate seems to imply that 
euthanasia would be a morally acceptable act as long as the official conditions 
are met and the act is carried out in a careful manner. Questions with regard to 
the morality of euthanasia as such have been marginalised, not only because a 
vast majority of the Dutch medical profession and the Dutch population in 
general favour euthanasia under conditions, but also because the medical ethical 
discourse has exclusively asserted patient autonomy.
Because of the recent development of palliative care, changes are now 
taking place in the Dutch debate. Questions whether good palliative care can in 
many cases prevent euthanasia requests are re-issued. Consequently, the 
morality of euthanasia as such is becoming an issue again. Many people agree 
that palliative care is not able to take away all euthanasia requests. But if one 
accepts that in some, maybe many, cases palliative care is able to prevent 
euthanasia to be carried out, it is necessary to further develop palliative care.
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The primary goal of palliative care however, is not to prevent euthanasia 
requests; the primary goal is to provide good care (Janssens et al, 1999).
In short, the recent shift in attention from cure to care practices requires a 
conception of medical ethics different from the dominant conception. Medical 
ethics should reorient itself to its fundamental theological and philosophical 
roots and initiate debates on the fundamental goals and values of medicine. Care 
practices, like palliative care, have demonstrated the marginalisation of the 
chronically and incurably ill within medicine and medical ethics. Moral 
philosophers and moral theologians should do justice to the discomfort 
experienced by so many with regard to medical ethics’ implicit and exclusive 
adherence to the traditional biomedical paradigm; they should suggest new 
orientations and new perspectives.
Conclusion
In the early pages of this chapter, it is argued that theology has not lost its 
distinctive voice in a variety of public debates but that the theological voice in 
the medical ethical debates is strikingly absent. It is explained that this absence 
is due to the current medical ethical discourse which, on theoretical and 
pragmatic grounds, has insufficient critical distance to medicine. Due to the self­
understanding of medical ethics, moral theology has become marginalised: the 
distinctive theological voice is located in the intra-ecclesiastical discourse where 
there is a consensus on the fundamental preconceptions. Central to my 
argumentation is that, because the philosophical and theological perspectives 
have been relocated outside the scope of medical ethics, important moral 
meanings have remained hidden. It is the task of medical ethics as proposed here 
to re-introduce these forgotten moral meanings in the debates so that new 
perspectives emerge and a sensitisation of the moral experience of caregivers 
becomes possible.
In reviving relevant moral meanings, moral theology can connect to a 
variety of earlier or recent debates. This has been clarified with the help of two 
examples: the debate around anthropological medicine, which has become 
marginalised by the dominant conception of medical ethics, and the recent 
debate on palliative care. Especially the latter debate indicates a recent shift of 
attention, from a dominant interest in curative medical practices to a new 
interest in care practices. The recent debate on palliative care has created room 
for a new debate on the values and goals of medicine. It highlights the urgent 
need for a modification of the biomedical paradigm, not only from the side of
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medicine but also from the side of medical ethics. More fundamental questions 
on medicine require a more fundamental, theologically or philosophically based 
medical ethics. The paradox is that in recapturing a critical distance towards 
medical practice, medical ethics will become more practically relevant. In the 
following chapters, the philosophically and theologically based medical ethics as 
advocated above will be used to explore the meanings of the concept of 
palliative care and to analyse and evaluate the ethical debates in palliative care. 
The practice of palliative care can be helpful in developing a conception of 
medical ethics that is different from the dominant one. And the theory of 
medical ethics as outlined above can be helpful in providing new, provocative, 
and challenging perspectives on the practice of palliative care that can sensitise 
the experiences, not only of the caregivers in palliative care, but also of 
caregivers in medicine in general. The relationship between care practice and 
ethical theory is thus a circular relationship. Care practice stimulates the 
development of new theoretical perspectives and ethical theory stimulates a 
broader understanding of care practice.
Note
* Differences with the published version:
- Some information on the history of palliative care, which will be described in other 
chapters, has been deleted in paragraph 5, in order to avoid repetition.
- The conclusion has been summarised.
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OF PALLIATIVE CARE
CHAPTER 2
This chapter has been published as:
Janssens MJPA, Quartier T, Ethische und konzeptuelle Aspekte der 
Palliativmedizin. Zeitschrift für medizinische Ethik 2000; 46: 273-287.
35
36
ETHICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ASPECTS 
OF PALLIATIVE CARE
Introduction
In almost all European countries an integration process of palliative care with 
the formal health care system is taking place. While in many countries palliative 
care started to develop with the foundation of independent in-patient hospices, it 
is now increasingly organised in the context of the national formal health care 
systems. This integration process should be seen as a source of many important 
questions. As long as palliative care was organised in independent hospices, 
which understood themselves as a separate movement with univocal, often 
religiously inspired, moral norms and values, the concept of palliative care was 
also rather clear and homogeneous. However, since palliative care is now 
increasingly organised and formed in hospital wards, nursing homes and home 
care services, the concept of palliative care has become ambiguous. In this 
chapter, it will be argued that in the context of recent developments, the concept 
of palliative care is in need of a critical analysis. A distinction will be made 
between normative and empirical dimensions of palliative care.
1. Normative dimensions of palliative care
Palliative care has been defined by the World Health Organisation as follows: 
“Palliative care is the active total care of patients whose disease is not 
responsive to curative treatment. Control of pain, of other symptoms, and of 
psychological, social and spiritual problems is paramount. The goal of palliative 
care is achievement of the best possible quality of life for patients and their 
families” (World Health Organisation, 1990, p. 11). This definition may denote 
important characteristics of palliative care, it does however not provide an 
understanding of the concept of palliative care. For a critical comprehension of 
the normative meaning of palliative care it is imperative to make an ‘historical 
detour’. A journey back in time can provide insight in the original motivations 
of palliative care. And insight in these motivations is in its turn conditional for 
an articulation of the moral significance of current palliative care.
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1.1. History of palliative care
Palliative care has developed from the hospice movement. The origins of 
palliative care are generally situated in the year 1967, when Cicely Saunders 
founded the first professional hospice, the St Christopher’s hospice in 
Sydenham, London. However, when Saunders founded St Christopher’s, she 
referred back to organisational forms which originated at the beginning of the 
Christian era and to hospices which were established at the end of the nineteenth 
and the beginning of the twentieth century. In her view, the continuity between 
the modern hospices and the hospices of the early Christian era is larger than the 
discontinuity: “Although at first we had only sketchy knowledge of hospice 
history and little conscious connection, today’s principles are a modern 
development of aims comparable to those of the hospices of the early Christian 
era” (Saunders, 1994a, p. 43). Modern palliative care can and should be 
understood in the light of these older hospices (Phipps, 1988).
The Latin word hospes signifies ‘host’ as well as ‘guest’. From this word 
originated the word hospitalis, signifying ‘kindness/friendliness’. Hospitalis 
thus refers to the feeling of the host towards his guests. Another word referring 
to hospes is hospitium. The meaning of the word hospitium was originally the 
same as the meaning of hospitalis but gradually hospitium started to refer to the 
place where the feelings of ‘hospitality’ are experienced (Saunders, 1996).
In the fourth century AD, the church in the orient had already established 
a number of so-called xenodochia (Greek for hospitium) which intended to give 
care to pilgrims and other travellers. The caregivers in these houses based their 
initiatives on the text in the gospel of St. Matthew (25;35): “For I was hungry 
and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and you gave me something to 
drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in ... I was sick and you looked after 
me ... I tell you the truth, whatever you did for one of the least of these brothers 
of mine, you did for me.” It was on the seven works of grace that the xenodochia 
based themselves (Goldin, 1981).
At the end of the fourth century, the xenodochia were introduced in the 
Occident where the term hospitium became customary. These hospitia, or 
hospices, were founded along the pilgrimage roads and, like the xenodochia, 
they intended to provide shelter and care for the pilgrims on their way to the 
holy cities. In the beginnings, these hospices did not have a medical function but 
gradually medical care for the pilgrims, who were often injured, started to 
become more important. Many hospices started to be frequented by people who 
were living in the neighbourhood and were in need of medical care. Thus, 
medical care became an integral part of hospice care. Like the xenodochia, the
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hospices derived their inspiration from the bible, especially from the seven 
works of grace.
These hospices were to flourish until the time of the Reformation when 
many hospices were dissoluted and only small numbers were reinstated on a 
secular basis (Clark and Seymour, 1999). The flourishing time of the hospices 
turned into a time of decay. Beginning from the age of the Enlightenment, new 
hospitals were founded. Medicine became a positive science and the hospitals 
proliferated with a strong interest in scientific advancements. Focus was on 
acute and curable diseases. Chronic illness, terminal illness, and care for the 
aged were hardly given attention. The poorer parts of the population were also 
not admitted in the new hospitals. In the middle of the nineteenth century, an 
important development took place in reaction to the care provided in the 
hospitals.
The Irish Sisters of Charity, an active religious order led by mother Mary 
Aikenhead, were in their hospitals in Dublin occupied in the care for the ill, 
among whom there were also people suffering from chronic and terminal illness 
(Kerr, 1993). Twenty years after the death of Mary Aikenhead, in the year 1879, 
their first hospice, specifically designed to meet the needs and wishes of the 
dying, was founded in Dublin and was named Our Lady’s Hospice for the 
Dying. In this hospice, medical care was provided only to a limited extent. 
Especially nursing care and spiritual guidance were focused on. Historical 
research has shown that pain and symptom treatment was primarily considered 
as a means to obtain the higher goal of spiritual reconciliation or, if necessary, 
religious conversion of the lapsed patients (Humphreys, 2000).
Because of the charisma of this hospice, the establishment of other 
hospices in the United Kingdom followed like for example St Joseph’s Hospice 
in London (1905) and St Luke’s House for the Dying (1893). These hospices 
were founded by people from the middle and upper class and were intended to 
provide care for the ‘respectable dying poor’. Dying patients from the poorest 
part of the population were admitted only in exceptional cases. An important 
goal of these hospices was to bring the lower class population back in contact 
with the church as many of them had abandoned the official religious 
institutions. Thus, a form of social control was to be re-established on a 
forgotten part of the population (Humphreys, 2000).
Possible criticism on conservative motives behind the foundation of these 
hospices leaves their positive influence on the later historical development of 
palliative care untouched. The hospices did for example not correspond at all 
with the image of a death clinic which had already begun to spread at that time. 
Hospice care showed that the dying are not only dying. First and foremost, the
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hospice caregivers wanted to demonstrate that their patients ought to be seen as 
living fellow human beings. Reports on the daily life in hospices mention for 
example numerous jokes on hospice life (Goldin, 1981).
It was in these hospices where Cicely Saunders worked as a professional 
nurse (Clark, 1998). Later on, she was to learn much on pain and symptom 
control in these hospices. But medical care was still not considered important. 
Focus of attention was on nursing and spiritual care. Only in the 1950s, 
important developments in the area of pain and symptom control started to take 
place. In this time, the first pain clinics originated, and progress was made in the 
areas of (palliative) radiotherapy and chemotherapy. Important publications 
improved the psychosocial care for the dying and their loved ones. In this 
context, the contributions of Elisabeth Kübler-Ross must be mentioned. Based 
on many conversations with dying patients, she induced five phases which 
would characterise the emotional situation of the patients in relation to 
themselves and their social environment: denial, anger, bargaining, depression 
and acceptance. In her publications, she stressed the importance of supporting 
terminally ill people in these emotional situations. Even though according to 
Kübler-Ross it was right to allow for all of these emotions, eventually, she 
considered the emotional situation of acceptance a goal of psychosocial care 
(Kübler-Ross, 1969). Research in bereavement, which was recently carried out, 
showed that also the ‘significant others’ of a dying patient are in need of 
supportive care. Their emotional situations may run parallel to the emotional 
situations of the patient and it is imperative to create room for their emotions too 
(Quartier, 1999). Also the studies of P. Ariès on death and dying contributed to a 
more open awareness of these issues in western society (Ariès, 1974). In the 
light of the above-mentioned developments, the foundation of St Christopher’s 
hospice in 1967 can be better understood.
Two additional factors require attention. First, there was a fundamental 
discomfort in the British hospices with regard to mainstream medicine and the 
care for the dying in the general hospitals. In mainstream medicine, care for the 
dying was still left unconsidered to a large extent. Physicians experienced the 
death of their patients as a personal defeat. When curative treatments were 
ineffective, it was said that nothing could be done anymore for the patient. Only 
few physicians were interested in the progress that was made in the area of pain 
and symptom control. Pain and symptom control were medicine’s stepchild. 
Because the available knowledge in these areas was insufficiently adopted, 
patients were suffering unnecessarily. In most cases, the family was informed of 
the inevitable death of the patient, but the patient him/herself was not informed 
of the prognosis. And even though new knowledge was published on
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psychosocial and spiritual care for the dying, only little attention was given to 
these realms of care. Psychological processes of patients and loved ones were 
hardly addressed. This practice stands in sharp contrast to knowledge of the 
integrative process of the dying and their significant others as psychological 
processes can hardly occur and develop.
Secondly, the British hospices have from the beginnings been 
characterised by a moral discomfort with regard to voices in British society that 
pleaded for a legalisation of euthanasia (Clark and Seymour, 1999). The British 
‘Voluntary Euthanasia Society’ was founded in 1935 but started to flourish in 
the context of the medical-technological progress that was made. The increasing 
membership of this society co-incided with the increasing attention for the 
young hospice movement. The hospices wanted to show that good medical, 
psychological, social and spiritual care could take away or prevent requests for 
euthanasia (Saunders, 1994b). As was shown in chapter 1, the hospice and the 
euthanasia movement both intended to react to the same problem.
Concludingly, the foundation of the first professional hospices can be 
clarified in the light of societal developments, together with fundamental 
discomforts with regard to pleas in favour of legalisation of euthanasia and with 
regard to the curative, activistic paradigm of mainstream medicine.
An important reason why the British hospices started to proliferate so 
rapidly, was the charisma of Cicely Saunders. In the year 1973, six years after 
the opening of St Christopher’s, there were already 25 professional in-patient 
hospices in the UK. The publications of Saunders became well-known in the 
USA and Canada where the psychosocial care for the dying had already gained 
interest because of Kübler-Ross’ publications. Here, the idea of hospices without 
beds which were exclusively designed to provide home care (hospice-at-home) 
originated. In New York, the first teams were founded which were exclusively 
designed at consultation of physicians and nurses in the hospital. In 1977, the 
National Hospice Organisation was founded, which currently has a membership 
of over 1500 institutions. In the year 1975, Dr. Balfour Mount founded the first 
palliative care unit in Montreal, Canada. In the context of bilingual Quebec, the 
term ‘hospice’ was unsuitable because of its specific meaning in the French 
language (referring to institutions for the destitute). At the opening of this unit, 
the term ‘palliative care’ was used for the first time. Almost all caregivers of this 
palliative care unit had received their education at St Christopher’s (Doyle, 
Hanks and MacDonald, 1996).
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1.2. Articulating the moral significance of palliative care
The integration process of palliative care with the formal health care system 
which, as we shall see below, is currently taking place in almost all West 
European countries has led to an increasing ambiguity of the concept of 
palliative care. An oncologist, who meets his patients years before death, is 
likely to use a broader, wider ranging concept of palliative care than a hospice 
physician, who meets his patients only weeks before they die. While care given 
in the context of hospices is mostly limited to the terminal phase, care given in 
the nursing homes is given over a much longer period of time. Hospital care for 
patients with a life threatening disease begins from the time of diagnosis (or 
even before that time). Moreover, in geriatric wards, oncology wards, nursing 
homes and home care services, the provision of palliative care is only a part of 
daily practice. The question arises how palliative care can be demarcated from 
other practices. Is a univoque demarcation possible at all? Apart from the scope 
and demarcation of palliative care, an increasing dissension can be perceived 
with regard to the moral norms and values of palliative care. The ethical validity 
of the values and norms on which there was a consensus in the hospice 
movement is increasingly subjected to debate. In other words, as palliative care 
is integrating in the various health care systems, it is also increasingly required 
to render account of its moral norms and values in the context of the ethical 
debates. Concludingly, the question for the moral significance of palliative care 
is an urgent and important question. But how should this moral significance of 
palliative care be articulated? Which are the main characteristics of palliative 
care and what does history tell us about these characteristics? First of all, it will 
be argued that one main characteristic of palliative care relates to the concept of 
total care. Throughout the history of palliative care, the total needs and wishes 
of a patient have been the criterion for the care given. Palliative care has always 
resisted the reduction of a human being to a physical body. Secondly, palliative 
care cannot be understood without its discomfort with the high-tech, curative 
health care of the past. The lives of the dying need not always be prolonged by 
the technological means available. The process of dying should not be denied. 
Instead, justice should be done to it (Kübler-Ross 1993; Quartier, 1998).
1.2.1. Palliative care as total care
For a long time, the main task of mainstream medicine has been the removal of 
physical illness. Medicine’s dualistic anthropology (see chapter 1) can explain a 
good deal of this preoccupation. The emotional and spiritual suffering of people
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was not considered to lie within the scope of medicine. Patients were seen as 
bodies, not as human beings with a variety of needs.
This anthropology is contradictory to the anthropology of palliative care. 
As indicated in chapter 1, palliative care has been characterised by a Christian 
anthropology throughout its history. Palliative care conceives of man as a unity 
of physical, emotional, social and spiritual needs and possibilities. The 
acknowledgement of this variety of needs and possibilities can already be found 
in the text of St Matthew where the physical, social and emotional needs of 
people are situated in a spiritual framework. Also in the first hospices for the 
dying, man was conceived of as a unity of body, mind and soul even though 
eventually ‘soul care’ was considered the most important form of care 
(Humphreys, 2000). In the modern hospices, pain and symptom control is no 
longer considered to be instrumental for reconciliation of the soul. Instead, good 
pain and symptom control are considered conditional for the quality of life of 
patients.
The variety of needs and wishes of people constitutes the nucleus of 
palliative care. And because it is acknowledged that there comes a time when 
life prolongation is no longer important, or even desirable, the quality of life of 
the people receiving palliative care is the sole criterion for the decisions taken. If 
cure is impossible and if life prolongation is deemed futile, what remains is to 
let the patient live until (s)he dies. This implies that the medical realm of care 
should be fully integrated with the other realms of care. The goals of medical, 
psychological, social and spiritual care have become the same. Since so much of 
medicine has underestimated the latter three realms of care, especially these 
realms merit attention. Psychological, social and spiritual care require 
professional input. Psychologists, social workers and pastors are members of the 
caregiving team who are just as important as the physician or nurse.
Understanding the concept of total care requires however four critical 
remarks. First, the informal care given by the loved ones of the patient is at 
times more important than the professional care. Care given by informal carers 
should be given opportunity in palliative care, but without obligating family 
members to provide such care. Often the patient appreciates this care and for the 
loved ones of the patient it may give a sense of meaningfulness. The provision 
of informal care may also facilitate the bereavement process. Second, 
psychosocial and spiritual care require the autonomous consent of the patient, 
just as the provision of medical care does. Just like the physician needs the 
patient to consent before administering a treatment, the other professionals in the 
team also require the patient’s consent and cannot provide care, no matter how 
well intended, without the permission of the patient (Randall and Downie,
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1996). Third, it has to be noted that the idea of total care does not imply that the 
team is morally responsible for the patient’s total well-being. Many patients are 
only to some extent capable of reaching an emotional, social and spiritual state 
of well-being (van Duijn, 2000). This may for instance be explained by the 
personality of the patient or by a lack of informal caregivers. If a state of well­
being cannot be reached for the patient, this can be hard to accept for the team. 
But it does not imply that the team would be accountable if some problems 
cannot be solved. In this context, a fourth remark ought to be made. In palliative 
care, the concept of well-being is ambivalent. Despair and hope, anger and 
courage, acceptance and denial, often go together. Research on the writings of 
Kübler-Ross indicated that the ‘phases’ of the dying process are not 
chronologically ordered but alternate (Quartier, 1999). It would perhaps be more 
accurate to speak of ‘aspects’ instead of ‘phases’. Total care does not imply that 
this ambivalence should be eliminated. Total care instead aims at supporting 
patients and loved ones in order to make the range of ambivalent emotions 
which occur tolerable. Well-being of patients and loved ones can be considered 
as a goal of palliative care, it does however not mean that all suffering should be 
eliminated.
Concludingly, total care at the end of life implies the integration of the 
medical, the psychological, the social and the spiritual realms. Man, considered 
as a unity, is in the centre of care. It is essential to provide room for the range of 
ambivalent emotions of patients and loved ones. This ambivalence should not be 
eliminated.
1.2.2. Acceptance of death
As mentioned above, the motivations of the modern hospice movement can be 
clarified if one situates them in their historical context. Crucial for the history of 
palliative care were the 1960s when on the one hand enormous technological 
progress was made in the field of medicine and when, on the other hand, the 
Voluntary Euthanasia Society flourished in the UK. With both, the hospices felt 
a moral discomfort. They wanted to provide an alternative. Death in 
technologically driven modern medicine was looked upon as a defeat of the 
physician. Cure and life prolongation were the primary goals of medicine. In 
reaction to this kind of medicine, the Voluntary Euthanasia Society pleaded for 
legalisation of euthanasia. The motivation of the young hospice movement can 
be seen as an intermediate position. On the one hand, nothing is done anymore 
to unnecessarily prolong life and keep the patient artificially alive with 
extraordinary treatment. On the other hand, intentional shortening of life is
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rejected. According to the hospice movement, death is considered as a part of 
life. Probably, Christian assumptions lie behind what is called the acceptance of 
death. In Christian philosophy and theology, an essential ground structure of life 
has always been the principle of hope without which human life is hardly 
possible (Moltmann, 1966). Hope for an afterlife, the awareness that life is not 
ended at the moment of death, can provide a good ground for acknowledging 
that death is a part of life. Acceptance of death in palliative care, in the sense 
that at a certain stage of illness, nothing is done anymore to hasten or postpone 
death, is congruent with the Christian tradition and can be clarified from this 
tradition.
The Christian foundations of the hospice movement also provided a basis 
for the rejection of euthanasia. Man as God’s image may not have his/her life 
ended by another human being. Man has been given stewardship over God’s 
creation. He has not been given governance, he is not in charge. Eventually, he 
will have to render account of his deeds to God. Euthanasia is considered a 
violation of man’s stewardship. It is interesting to see how Saunders, in her 
critique of euthanasia, refers back to the early Christian hospices and to the 
spirituality of the first hospices for the dying (Saunders, 1960). Life, also the life 
of the dying, is according to Saunders essentially a pilgrimage. No physician or 
nurse can be ever able to determine when a pilgrimage has come to an end. 
Essentially, our pilgrimage is aimed at reconciliation and reconciliation can take 
place only hours before death. Whereas pilgrims, in the literal sense, were cared 
for in the early hospices, the new hospice movement cares for pilgrims and 
pilgrimages in a more metaphorical, figurative sense. Whether or not this 
argument against euthanasia is ethically valid can be questioned.
2. Empirical dimensions of palliative care
The concept of palliative care can only be properly understood in the context of 
a concrete practice. Understanding the philosophy and the original motivations 
of palliative care is one thing, but it is more difficult to relate these motivations 
to a concrete practice in which a concrete patient with concrete needs and 
wishes is central for a concrete team of caregivers. Concepts such as quality of 
life, human dignity and acceptance of death are not well equipped to solve the 
ethical dilemmas that occur in daily practice. Moreover, in order to clarify the 
concept of palliative care, it needs to be situated in the context of a concrete 
society. The concept of palliative care is not only influenced by the health 
services of a specific country, also political, social, cultural and economical
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factors are at stake. Palliative care is not a univoque concept but a concept that 
can adopt a variety of practical and theoretical forms which can be made 
explainable through research in the societal context of the practice in which the 
concept is used.
2.1. Organisational forms of palliative care
The historical origins of palliative care can be found in the hospice movement. 
Since 1974 however, palliative care has been increasingly integrating in already 
existing institutions of the formal health care system. In the beginning of the 
1980s, palliative care was introduced on the European continent. The historical 
development of palliative care in various European countries has proceeded in 
similar ways, starting with individual, isolated initiatives which after some time 
gained cultural and political interest and acceptance. The history of palliative 
care in Germany for example has recently been summarised by Kirschner 
(Kirschner, 1996). It is reflective of the history of palliative care in many other 
European nations. In 1971, a documentary on the young British hospice 
movement was broadcasted. In the debate that followed the term ‘death clinic’ 
was used to denote hospice and the impression was that hospices would isolate 
the dying from society. In 1978, a questionnaire demonstrated that no less than 
92 % of the respondents rejected the foundation of separate institutions for the 
care of the dying. Palliative care should be given more attention in order to 
achieve a dignified dying process for patients. But it should be done in the 
context of acute hospitals and home care, not in the in-patient hospice. The 
rejection of hospices by the majority of the German population can be explained 
through insufficient interaction with experiences from hospices abroad. What is 
perhaps more important however is the mistrust felt by many physicians towards 
the new concept of palliative care as the hierarchical structures of general 
medicine, together with its tendency to actively treat patients, were questioned 
by the hospice caregivers. The introduction of the hospice concept relied 
therefore on individual initiatives of strong personalities. In 1983, the first 
palliative care unit was founded by miss Jonen-Thielemann, with the help of the 
German Cancer Society, at the University hospital of Cologne. The unit counted 
only five beds and was situated at the top floor of the hospital. In the mid 80s, 
some further initiatives were developed but all in relative isolation. Because of 
these initiatives, gradually an attitude shift started to take place in German 
society. The concept of hospice became increasingly accepted. In the beginning 
of the 1990s, the German Health Ministry supported the foundation of 12 
palliative care institutions. In 1996, the first congress of the German Association
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for Palliative Care (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Palliativmedizin, established in 
1994) was organised in Cologne, close to the University hospital where it all 
began. In 1996, Germany counted 26 palliative care units, 30 hospices, 268 
home care services, and 183 hospice initiatives (Illhardt, 1999). Clearly, 
palliative care in Germany has developed at rapid speed. However, whereas the 
UK in 1996 counted 60 palliative care institutions per million inhabitants, 
Germany only counted 7.
In the Netherlands, developments in palliative care have profited from 
social and political support only since the beginning of the 1990s. The first 
hospice to open its doors in 1991 was the Johannes Hospitium in Vleuten. The 
debate on hospice and palliative care has been analogous to the debates in 
Germany. In the same year in which the first hospice was established, an article 
was published in the journal of the Dutch Medical Association which reflected 
the opinion of many Dutch physicians. The author stated that hospices and 
separate palliative care institutions did not meet the needs and wishes of patients 
and loved ones. Instead of separate institutions, palliative care should be 
integrated in the formal health care system (Coene, 1991). In the years 
following, some initiatives, depending on individuals, were developed. In 1994, 
the hospice Rozenheuvel in Rozendaal opened its doors. This hospice gained 
wide public interest in the Netherlands and abroad (Enklaar, 1999).
When palliative care was introduced on the European continent, a variety 
of organisational forms was adopted. Thus, the first palliative care units were 
established together with home care services, hospices, and consulting teams. 
Almost all European countries have official associations for palliative care by 
now. In 1988, the European Association for Palliative Care (the EAPC) was 
established which currently has over 15.000 members. If one overlooks the 
history of palliative care on the European continent, the development has been 
enormous. In Belgium for example, the first palliative care unit was established 
in 1985. At the end of the 20th century, Belgium counts 50 palliative care units, 
spread all over the country (Broeckaert, 1999). Italy counted in 1995, 150 
palliative care units (SICP, 1995). The Netherlands counted in 1997 6 
professional hospices, 3 palliative care units in nursing homes, one palliative 
care unit in an oncological clinic, 1 palliative care unit in a hospital and 23 small 
units in homes for the elderly (NIVEL, 1997). In 1994, the Dutch Association 
for Palliative Care, the so-called Netwerk Palliatieve zorg voor terminale 
patiënten in Nederland, was established. Most palliative care organisations and 
institutions are member of this association. Self-evidently, the UK surpasses all 
European countries with its 218 hospices and a total of 3185 beds (Clark, 1999).
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2.2. Conceptualisations of palliative care
The variety of institutions providing palliative care goes hand in hand with a 
variety of conceptualisations of palliative care. It is likely that people working in 
a home care service look upon palliative care differently than people working in 
a hospital or a professional hospice.
The media debates on palliative care in a variety of western European 
countries reveal many similarities. On the one hand it is argued that medicine 
has changed during the last decades. More attention is now given to the variety 
of needs and wishes of the patient. The limits of medicine are more and more 
acknowledged. Death is said to have become accepted as a part of life which 
does not always have to be postponed. Especially within mainstream medicine, 
it is argued that palliative care has already become an integral part of medicine. 
But on the other hand, it is also argued that mainstream medicine still 
undervalues the care for the terminally ill, that mainstream medicine continues 
to favour a curative and activistic paradigm, that the idea of total care is still 
insufficiently present in the hospitals and nursing homes and that pain and 
symptom control are underestimated areas of expertise. This argument would 
imply that medicine does still need impulses from outside centres of expertise 
which, through consultation and education, can be used to improve palliative 
care in the formal health care system.
The development of palliative care is still rapid in many countries, 
especially in the context of the formal health care. In 1979, there were already 
policy documents in Sweden, rejecting the establishment of independent 
hospices. Swedish physicians were critical of the religious foundations of the 
British hospices (Valverius, 1999). In Spain, a hospice movement is non­
existent, although many of the Spanish pioneers had received their education in 
British hospices (Gracia and Núñez Olarte, 1999). The UK is an example of a 
country where palliative care has been integrated in the mainstream health care 
to a large extent. In 1987, palliative medicine became an official medical 
specialty. What followed was a growing influence of the National Health 
Service on further developments in palliative care. This has initiated a debate on 
the ‘specificity’ of the concept of palliative care (Clark and Seymour, 1999). 
Many people working in the area of palliative care were and are afraid of an 
increasing medicalisation of palliative care which would not do justice to the 
original motivations of the hospice movement. They are afraid that mainstream 
medicine, with its focus on cure and intervention, will neutralise the philosophy 
of palliative care. Others are afraid of a secularisation of palliative care in which 
most attention is absorbed by medicine and in which spirituality becomes an
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underestimated dimension of care. They state that the original charisma of the 
hospice movement, characterised by a strong spiritual calling and a strong 
commitment to the humane care of the dying, has gradually become subject of 
bureaucratisation, medicalisation and rationalisation. Palliative care is said to be 
in danger of becoming a technique for professional empowerment (Bradshaw,
1996).
The integration of palliative care in the national health care systems has 
had at least three important consequences. First, the association of palliative care 
with terminal care, so characteristic for hospice caregivers, is decreasing. The 
scope of palliative care has widened. Most physicians use a broad concept of 
palliative care, starting from the time of diagnosis (see chapter 3). A minority is 
critical, stating that palliative care has shifted the attention away from death 
(Biswas, 1993). Second, demarcating palliative care from other health care 
practices has become increasingly difficult and problematic. This invokes the 
issue of the (moral) ‘specificity’ of palliative care. Third, the consensus on 
ethical norms and values underlying palliative care is decreasing. Whereas 
within the hospice movement a consensus existed on issues such as the validity 
of the double effect principle, the rejection of euthanasia, the conditions under 
which medical treatment becomes futile etc., current palliative care is not only 
integrating in the health care systems, it is also more and more required to 
involve in the ethical debates within which its values and norms are subject to 
critique. Clear-cut normative statements do no longer suffice and valid 
arguments are required.
As mentioned above, one of the normative dimensions of palliative care 
tells us that nothing should be done to hasten the death of the patient. This 
normative statement can also be found (even in the indicative mood) in the 
definition of the WHO. The question is how this statement can be corresponded 
with the liberal Dutch euthanasia policy. The majority of Dutch physicians is of 
the opinion that a further development of palliative care can prevent or take 
away many requests for euthanasia, and that this is one reason why further 
development is imperative, but that in situations of force majeure, euthanasia 
need not be excluded from palliative care (see also chapter 8). It is too simple to 
condemn palliative care in the Netherlands for this reason. Not only because 
also in the Netherlands people are critical of euthanasia, but also because many 
institutions that do not exclude euthanasia can principally provide 
compassionate palliative care. (Lack of) empirical evidence does not allow to 
conclude that the Netherlands are subject to a ‘culture of death’. Instead, an 
open debate, based on adequate arguments, should be aimed at (Wils, 1999).
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Be that as it may, in this aspect Dutch palliative care distinguishes itself 
from all other countries. This explains why only since recently, in the context of 
an increasing political and societal interest in the further development of 
palliative care, international co-operation in the field of palliative care has been 
developed. Dutch physicians, taking part in international conferences, were 
often forced to render account of their view on euthanasia. The debate on 
euthanasia and palliative care was extremely polarised and hardly open for 
objectivity. Currently however, an increasing openness can be discerned. It is 
widely accepted that palliative care in the Netherlands is not absent and of 
relatively good quality. A token for this acceptance is the decision by the board 
of the EAPC to organise its conference of 2003 in the Netherlands. Moreover, it 
is more and more acknowledged that euthanasia is secretly practised in many 
countries. Whereas palliative care in the Netherlands can profit from the help 
from experiences of other countries, other countries may learn from the 
relatively open euthanasia debate in the Netherlands.
Conclusion
Within a span of thirty years, palliative care has developed rapidly world-wide. 
The further development of palliative care will create important challenges for 
many medical specialties. The number of institutions is not of much importance 
in this respect. From the origins of modern palliative care, it has always been 
acknowledged that the number of hospices is not important. The ultimate goal 
has always been the integration of new knowledge and attitudes within 
mainstream health care. St Christopher’s was the first hospice with an interest in 
education and consultation; this interest has been embraced by the world-wide 
hospice movement. Indeed it is true that, if palliative care is to develop further, 
education, consultation, research and proliferation of research results are 
essential. The future for palliative care will depend on this kind of initiatives. 
The normative dimensions of palliative care, which have for a very important 
part been developed within the hospice movement, should however, also in the 
context of a large variety of health care organisations, maintain their 
normativity.
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CONCEPTS AND ETHICS OF PALLIATIVE CARE
A EUROPEAN COMPARISON
Introduction
As part of a European Commission funded project on palliative care ethics 
(Pallium project), a survey was sent to participants of the Congress of the 
European Association for Palliative Care (Geneva, 1999). The survey aimed to 
identify the views of palliative care experts on the concept(s) of palliative care. 
The assumption underpinning the survey was that the concept of palliative care 
is not as univoque as is implied in the literature. Rather, diverging ideas on the 
aims, scope, values, and norms of palliative care might be expected, as well as 
different opinions on the position of palliative care in the context of the health 
care system. In this chapter, the results of the survey will be presented and 
analysed.
The project of which the survey forms a part brings together colleagues 
with expertise in medicine, ethics, the social sciences, and the humanities from 
countries with different health care systems and approaches to palliative care. 
The participating countries are the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
Germany, Sweden, Belgium, and Spain. The project aims to describe, clarify, 
and compare various approaches to palliative care. Although palliative care 
services are now developing across Europe, there is still a scarcity of 
comparative data, particularly relating to questions of ethics (Clark et al, 2000). 
Variations in health care systems in different countries imply that the 
organisational and institutional forms of palliative care may differ considerably 
(hospices, nursing homes, hospital-based palliative care units). In addition to 
these organisational differences, views may also vary on the concepts of 
palliative care, as well as on the underlying moral values and moral norms. Such 
differences and variations require better understanding if the future development 
of palliative care in Europe is to be successful. Apart from extensive literature 
research in national and international debates on palliative care, empirical 
research is necessary to articulate, analyse and compare the views of experts as 
regards good palliative care. In the following section, the methods of the study 
will be described, together with relevant demographical and professional data of 
the respondents. In the second section, the results of three conceptual queries 
will be pointed out: terminology, definitions, and the situation of palliative care 
in the context of society and medicine. Results relating to values and norms in
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palliative care will be discussed in the next section. Finally, the results will be 
evaluated and discussed.
1. Comparative study
Methods
The survey sample was based on the European and Israeli delegates who 
attended the sixth Congress of the European Association for Palliative Care 
(EAPC), held in Geneva from 22 to 24 September, 1999. At the congress, the 
survey was announced by a member of the Board of the EAPC. Delegates who 
did not want to receive the survey were asked to inform the Organising 
Committee. The EAPC provided the researchers access to the addresses of those 
delegates who had not informed the Organising Committee of their objection. 
The survey was sent in a French version to the French and Swiss participants, 
and in an English version to all other participants. It was distributed to 2,174 
European and Israeli delegates of the conference. From the third of November 
1999 until the fourteenth of January 2000, 782 questionnaires were returned of 
which 14 were unusable. This made a response rate of 35.3 %.
The questionnaire consists of five sections. It starts with questions relating 
to the demographic and professional data of the respondents (age, profession, 
institutional setting, nationality, sex). Next come two questions concerning the 
definition of palliative care. Subsequently, the respondents are confronted with 
25 statements to which they could agree or disagree (5 points Likert-scale). The 
fourth section presents 18 moral notions which respondents are invited to rank 
according to their perceived importance for palliative care. Finally, the 
questionnaire presents 14 morally relevant acts, which the respondents are 
invited to consider.
The results from the total number of questionnaires are presented below, 
with occasional reference to the seven Pallium countries, considered as a group.
Demographic and professional data
Questionnaires were mailed to 44 European countries and also to Israel (total 
45). Questionnaires were returned by respondents from 32 countries. The 
majority of returned questionnaires represent a limited number of countries: 56.1 
% of the questionnaires were received from three countries: Switzerland (21.5 
%), France (20.3 %), and the United Kingdom (14.3 %). Belgium, Sweden,
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Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Israel, and Ireland contributed 
together 23.2 % of all respondents. The Pallium countries represent 33.9 % of 
the respondents.
Two thirds (66.3 %) of the respondents were female. The age of most 
respondents (89,7%) was between 30 and 60 (with 41.5 % between 40 and 50). 
Almost a half (46.7 %) of the respondents had a background in medicine, 31.6 
% in nursing, 5.9 % in other health care practice and 12.6 % had a different, 
unspecified background.
2. Conceptual queries in palliative care
Terminology
The respondents typically describe their daily work as ‘palliative care’ (43.1%), 
‘palliative medicine’ (17.7 %), ‘supportive care’ (10.3%), and ‘palliative 
terminal care’ (3.9%). Only 0.9 percent use ‘terminal care’ to characterise their 
work, while 18.9 % use different terms. Respondents from the Pallium 
countries have even more preference for the labels ‘palliative care’ (49.8%) and 
‘palliative medicine’ (24.2 %); indeed only one respondent prefers ‘terminal 
care’ (0.4 %).
Apparently, the respondents agree that the scope of their professional 
fields is wider than just the terminal phase, as argued in the literature 
(Ahmedzai, 1993). This is also shown by the fact that the majority of 
respondents agree with the statement that palliative care begins from the time of 
diagnosis (59.8 % total, 67.2 % Pallium countries) and by the fact that a 
minority agree with the statement that in palliative care nothing is done to 
prolong life (34.9 % total, 20.4 % Pallium countries). Just under a half (44.4 %) 
hold that palliative care begins when cure is no longer possible.
Definitions of palliative care1
In 1987, when palliative medicine was recognised as a medical specialty in the 
United Kingdom, the following definition was developed: ‘palliative medicine is 
the study and management of patients with active, progressive, far-advanced 
disease for whom the prognosis is limited and the focus of care is the quality of 
life’ (Doyle et al, 1996, p. 3). Three years later, the World Health Organisation
1 The respondents were explicitly informed that the survey questionnaire would use the term ‘palliative care’, 
irrespective o f  their answers with regard to the terminology they use.
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developed a definition of palliative care, not only meant for medical doctors but 
also for other members of the caregiving team: ‘palliative care is the active, total 
care of patients whose disease is not responsive to curative treatment. Control of 
pain, of other symptoms, and of psychological, social, and spiritual problems is 
paramount. The goal of palliative care is achievement of the best quality of life 
for patients and their families’ (World Health Organisation, 1990, p.11).
In the survey respondents were invited to identify the definition they use, 
with the two definitions quoted here provided in a footnote. The majority (67.2 
%) of those responding use the WHO definition of palliative care; 15.8 % use 
the UK definition of palliative medicine, and 14.5 % use other definitions. In the 
Pallium countries, 75% use the WHO definition.
Palliative care in the context of medicine and society
The survey invited responses to 24 conceptual statements. These statements 
were ordered at random, though, based on an interpretation of responses, they 
can be divided into three domains: integration, medicalisation, bureaucratisation.
- Integration
The statement that palliative care should be fully integrated within mainstream 
health care is accepted by most respondents: 84.3 % agree or strongly agree. At 
the same time, over a half (53.4%) disagree about whether palliative care should 
be an alternative to mainstream health care, with almost a third (31.6 %) 
agreeing or strongly agreeing. A variety of views exists however about whether 
palliative care should retain a degree of independence from the health care 
system (6.4 % strongly agree, 27.7 % agree, 28.8 % disagree, and 18.4 % 
strongly disagree). At the same time, more than half of the respondents (52.7 %) 
accept that palliative care entails specific values, other than mainstream health 
care.
- Medicalisation
Various recent publications have addressed the issue of medicalisation of 
palliative care (Bradshaw, 1996; Clark and Seymour, 1999; Field, 1994). Do 
experts in the field also have the idea that palliative care is transforming into a 
medical discipline in which multi-facetted problems of patients are approached 
with a medical paradigm? Around one half (51.9 %) of the respondents agree 
that palliative care is becoming medicalised in his or her country, with just 15.6 
% disagreeing. One half (50.5 %) agree that the role of the nursing profession is 
generally underestimated in palliative care, whereas 30.4 % disagree. The idea
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that the autonomy of professionals other than the medical doctors is threatened 
in palliative care has been observed by James and Field (James and Field, 1996). 
Despite the fact that only a minority of the respondents (31.6 %) have a 
professional background in nursing, only 18.7 % of the total agree with the 
statement that the role of the medical profession is overestimated whereas 55.0 
% disagree or strongly disagree. The belief that the primary goal of palliative 
care is the achievement of the best quality of life for the patient is almost 
universal in the sample (97.8 %) as is the belief that medical, psychological, 
social and spiritual care are of equal importance (92.4 %). Both of these sets of 
responses reflect the respondents’ resistance to medicalisation.
- Bureaucratisation
In the literature, the potential danger of bureaucratisation of palliative care - the 
process of transforming individual action into rational, administrative and 
hierarchical institutions -  is discussed (James and Field, 1992). Only a minority 
of 21.4 % agree with the statement that palliative care is increasingly 
bureaucratised due to regulations from the health care system, whereas 37.8 % 
disagree or strongly disagree, with 39.2% who ‘didn’t know’. Apparently, 
bureaucratisation and medicalisation do not go hand in hand.
3. Values and norms in palliative care
As was shown, the majority of respondents take the view that palliative care 
implies a specific set of values, different from other health care practices (52.7 
%). Yet only 13.0 % agree with the statement that palliative care entails a 
religious set of values. Only 14.3 % respond that palliative care should do so. A 
rather larger minority (30.6 %) hold that palliative care has a surplus value 
compared to mainstream health care. Apparently, for most respondents, the 
specificity of the values of palliative care is not based on religious beliefs and 
the majority hold that palliative care cannot claim a moral surplus.
In addition the respondents were presented with 18 moral notions and 
asked to rank their importance. The notions were selected because of their 
prevalence in the literature on palliative care as well as in the medical ethical 
literature in general. Notions with connotations of communitarianism (for 
instance sympathy, solidarity and compassion) were combined with notions that 
are often used in the libertarian tradition (for instance autonomy and 
nonmaleficence). Respondents were invited to indicate whether they thought the 
notions were extremely important, important, quite important or not important
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for palliative care practice. The majority of notions are considered extremely 
important or important. As Table 1 shows, the ranking of the notions according 
to the degree of importance is different.
Table 1: The importance of moral notions in palliative care
Ranking of moral notions as important and extremely important 
(% of respondents)
Quality of life (97,5)
Human dignity (96.2)
Acceptance of human mortality (92.7) 
Total care (91.3)
Nonmaleficence/to do no harm (84.3) 
Authenticity (84.1)
Autonomy (81.0)
Empathy (80.7)
Beneficence/to do good (78.2)
Hope (74.7)
Solidarity (64.9)
Compassion (64.7)
Prudence (64.2)
Holism (63.1)
Justice (61.9)
Love (50.7)
Sympathy (40.8)
Sanctity of life (30.8)
Finally, the respondents were presented with 14 acts and were asked whether or 
not each of these acts could be a component of palliative care. It was noted on 
the questionnaire that even if the act would be conceived of as a means of last 
resort, to be used in exceptional circumstances only, the act should be 
considered as a possible part of palliative care.
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- Active euthanasia
Only 5.3 % of the respondents can conceive of situations in which euthanasia 
could be performed in palliative care. Interestingly, 15.4 % agree that the 
intentional shortening of life by raising opioid doses could form a part of 
palliative care, whereas 36.5 % of respondents accept that the intentional 
shortening of a patient’s life by withdrawing treatment could be part of palliative 
care (Diagram 1).
Diagram 1: Life shortening medical decisions
Percentage of respondents agreeing or disagreeing with life shortening medical 
decisions being part of palliative care (Euthanasia = active euthanasia, opioids = 
intentional shortening of life by raising opioid doses, withdrawal = intentional 
shortening of life by withdrawing treatment).
9Ü
8Ü
7Ü
6Ü
5Ü
4Ü
3Ü
2Ü
1Ü
Ü
euthanasia opioids withdrawal
□yes  
□  no
- Terminal sedation
Distinctions have been made between terminal sedation for refractory pain, 
terminal sedation for relief of mental suffering, and dehydration in the heavily 
sedated patient. Terminal sedation for refractory pain can be part of palliative 
care according to 79.3 % of the respondents. Approval of terminal sedation for 
relief of mental suffering is less marked however, accounting for 62.9 %, 
whereas dehydration in the heavily sedated patient is approved of by 46.0 %
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which is still more than the 28.8 % who disapproves of this practice within 
palliative care (19.5 % did not know with 5.7 % missing) (Diagram 2).
Diagram 2: Terminal sedation
Percentage of respondents agreeing or disagreeing with terminal sedation being 
part of palliative care (refr pain = terminal sedation for refractory pain, ment. 
Suff. = terminal sedation for relief of mental suffering, dehydration = 
dehydration in the heavily sedated patient)
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- Withholding and withdrawing treatment
The vast majority of the respondents make no moral distinction between 
withholding treatment and withdrawing treatment. The difference between the 
respondents who do not consider the withdrawal of life prolonging treatment 
without the consent of the competent patient a part of palliative care and the 
respondents rejecting the withholding of life prolonging treatment without the 
consent of the competent patient is 1.6 %. Only a minority agree that life 
prolonging treatment can be withheld or withdrawn without the consent of the 
competent patient (7.6 %; 8.3%). More respondents (19.4%) can conceive of 
situations in which life prolonging treatment is withheld without the knowledge 
of the incompetent patient’s family. These findings indicate the importance of 
autonomy in palliative care (the notion of autonomy itself was considered 
extremely important or important by 81.0 % of respondents). To the statement 
that in palliative care, it is sometimes necessary to overrule the patient’s
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autonomy in the patient’s own interest, 60.8 % disagreed or strongly disagreed, 
whereas 18.9 % agreed or strongly agreed. For the Pallium countries 
disagreement with this statement was lower (47.6 %) and agreement was higher 
(29.8 %), whereas withholding treatment without proxy consent was considered 
a potential part of palliative care in 29.4 % of the Pallium-countries respondents. 
Interestingly, the respondents from the Pallium countries also were more likely 
to accept situations in which treatment is withheld or withdrawn without the 
consent of the competent patient (11.3 %; 11.7 %).
It is remarkable that over 20 percent of the respondents accept that dehydration, 
withdrawing the ventilator, and withholding the ventilator should not be part of 
palliative care. For the Pallium countries these three percentages are respectively 
20.5 %, 13.6 %, and 15.5 %. (Diagram 3)
Diagram 3: Withholding/withdrawing treatment
Percentage of respondents agreeing or disagreeing with 
withholding/withdrawing treatment being part of palliative care (dehydr. = 
dehydration; withhl vent = withholding the ventilator; withdr vent = 
withdrawing the ventilator; withdr wc = withdrawal of life prolonging treatment 
without the consent of the competent patient; withhld wk = withholding life 
prolonging treatment without the knowledge of the competent patient; withhld 
wkipf = withholding life prolonging treatment without the knowledge of the 
incompetent patient’s family).
9Ü
dehydr withhl withdr withdr withhld withhld 
vent vent wc wk wkipf
□ yes
□ no
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4. Discussion
For many respondents, palliative care is now the term of preference to denote 
their professional realm. Palliative medicine, a term which denotes a medical 
specialty, and not so much the multi-disciplinarity of palliative care (Doyle, 
1993), is probably mostly used by the medical professions. But, taken the 46.7 
% of respondents with a medical background into consideration, the term 
palliative medicine is still only used by a minority of medical doctors.
The vast majority of the respondents think that palliative care should be 
integrated within the mainstream health care structures. Palliative care should in 
other words be delivered in the context of hospital wards, nursing homes, 
general practice, home care services and so on. Paradoxically, according to a 
substantial amount of respondents of this group, integration of palliative care 
does not mean that palliative care should not be an alternative to mainstream 
health care. Neither does integration mean that palliative care would not entail 
specific moral values, other than the values of mainstream health care. 
Apparently, adherence to a specific set of values of palliative care can go 
together with integration in the mainstream health care system. In this respect, 
notions such as authenticity and hope may be clarifying (see chapter 6). It 
should be noted that (re-)integration of palliative care has been a goal of the 
hospice movement from the beginning. From 1967 (when Cicely Saunders 
established St Christopher’s Hospice in London), the main goal has always been 
to transfer the hospice philosophy back into the wider health care system 
(Saunders et al, 1981).
Adherence to specific values of palliative care is also demonstrated in the 
identification of moral notions. Notions such as quality of life, acceptance of 
human mortality, and total care are considered important or extremely important 
by over 90 % of the respondents whereas for instance the four general moral 
principles of biomedical ethics (autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and 
justice) are all ranked considerably lower. Three out of the four notions which 
are evaluated as most important (quality of life, total care, acceptance of human 
mortality) all refer to the definition of palliative care of the WHO and can be 
said to reflect a specific characteristic of palliative care. For the majority of the 
respondents, this specificity does not imply a moral surplus in comparison to the 
values that prevail in the context of mainstream health care, - a finding that has 
been argued for by others (Randall and Downie, 1996).
Lower ranked notions reflect more general views of good medical 
practice. Notions that are considered less important (lower than 60 %) reflect 
either emotions with connotations of the private sphere (love, sympathy), or
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notions with explicit connotations to the Christian tradition (sanctity of life) 
(Hamel and Lysaught, 1994). Notions with less strong, perhaps implicit 
connotations to the Christian tradition (human dignity, hope, prudence) are rated 
variably. This finding is corroborated by the small percentage of respondents 
who believe that palliative care implies an explicitly religious set of values.
Wider concerns within palliative care are expressed through the fact that 
many believe that palliative care is medicalising (51.9 %) and that the role of the 
nursing profession is underestimated in palliative care (50.5 %). When we 
consider that 97.8 % see the best quality of life for the patient as the primary 
goal of palliative care, that 92.4 % think that medical, psychological, social and 
spiritual care are of equal importance, and 97.5 % think that the notion of quality 
of life is important or extremely important, it becomes clear that the supposed 
process of medicalisation touches at the heart of palliative care. After all, 
medicalisation implies an overestimation of the medical realm at the cost of 
other realms included in the concept of total care and in the idea of quality of 
life.
With regard to moral norms in palliative care, it is striking that for a 
substantial number of the respondents, intentional life shortening decisions can 
be part of palliative care. According to the majority of this group, active 
euthanasia is not one of these. However, at the same time, slightly more than 
10% of the respondents agree that there is a crucial moral difference between 
active euthanasia and the intentional shortening of life by raising opioid doses, a 
difference that is refuted in the literature (Crul, 1999). More than 30 % perceive 
a crucial moral difference between active euthanasia and the withdrawal of 
medical treatment with the intention to shorten the life of the patient. The 
question here is on what moral basis can specific life shortening decisions be 
included in palliative care, and active euthanasia excluded.
With regard to terminal sedation, refractory pain is for more respondents 
an acceptable motive for its use than mental suffering. Dehydration in terminal 
sedation is common practice in some countries, but less common in others. No 
less than 28.8 % of the respondents indicate that, even in the most extreme 
circumstances, dehydrating the terminally sedated patient cannot be part of 
palliative care; an issue that was extensively discussed some years ago (Craig, 
1994; Ashby and Stoffell, 1995; Craig, 1996). An underlying argument may be 
that the practice seems hard to justify with the principle of double effect; it 
carries at least the suspicion of resembling ‘slow euthanasia’. A similar 
argument can be raised against terminal sedation for relief of mental suffering. If 
we assume that it is difficult to assess refractory mental suffering, terminal 
sedation may easily be considered a disproportionate treatment, also not
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defensible by the principle of double effect (Billings and Block, 1996; Mount, 
1996; Portenoy, 1996).
Withdrawal and withholding of medical treatment, whatever the nature of 
the treatment, are considered to be a potential part of palliative care by the 
majority. Yet, it is remarkable that a substantial 20 % of the respondents do not 
consider the withdrawal/withholding of the ventilator and of nutrition and 
hydration a part of palliative care. Perhaps, withdrawal of these medical 
treatments is associated with an inhumane death, even though in the literature, 
little support can be found for this association (Brody et al, 1997; Andrews et al, 
1993). Another possibility is that hydration and nutrition are considered 
components of essential care and not medical treatment. 
Withdrawal/withholding of these treatments may thus be considered as causing 
death which, according to some, might from a moral point of view be identical 
to euthanasia.
The patient’s informed consent and the incompetent patient’s proxy 
consent are for most respondents conditional upon the morality of 
withholding/withdrawing treatment, even though absence of proxy consent (if 
the patient is incompetent) is considered a possible part of palliative care by 
more respondents than absence of the competent patient’s consent; this is in 
agreement with the literature (Farsides, 1998; Scott, 1999; Osuna, 1998). Moral 
differences between withholding and withdrawing of treatment are negligible. 
However, more respondents from the Pallium countries could conceive of 
situations in which the autonomy of the patients and their proxies is overruled, 
even though there is no significant difference regarding the importance of the 
notion of autonomy as such. It is possible that the moral significance of 
autonomy and informed consent is different in the southern and northern 
Pallium countries (Privitera, 1999; Gracia and Núñez Olarte, 1999). If not, the 
unlikely conclusion must be that, considering the nationality of the respondents, 
autonomy is of special moral significance in France and Switzerland.
Conclusion
This European survey identified diverging views on the concept(s) of palliative 
care. Consensus exists on only very few issues. Clarity regarding the scope of 
palliative care (when does palliative care begin?) is currently absent. Issues such 
as the medicalisation of palliative care require further attention. There is also a 
lack of clarity with regard to the moral norms in palliative care. Though it seems 
easy to draw the line between active euthanasia, increasing pain medication and
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withdrawal of treatment, further analysis is necessary to unveil and weigh the 
intuitions and arguments that underlie the perceived different moral evaluations 
of these practices. What is the moral relevance of intention for the morality of 
these acts? What does the passive -  active distinction amount to in practice and 
what are its moral implications? Fundamental ethical debates on medical 
decisions at the end of life can potentially create more clarity in such issues than 
is currently the case.
Autonomy is a moral notion that is widely adhered to in palliative care, 
but more research into the relevance of autonomy as a guiding principle in 
everyday practice is necessary. Important differences seem to exist across 
Europe. The question is whether informed consent is as fundamental for practice 
as it seems to be in theory. Do patients have to be informed that the treatment 
they receive is palliative? Should ‘false hope’ be eliminated from palliative 
care? Is there a duty to know? Such questions are only examples of questions 
that should receive more attention.
In many countries palliative care has initially been developed through 
individual action, inspired by religious commitment, outside the context of 
mainstream health care (Clark, 1998; Clark, 1997). Even though, as we have 
seen, there was an idea of re-integrating the hospice concept into mainstream 
health care from the beginning, the relation with mainstream health care was 
mainly antithetical. The hospice concept implied a criticism of the values of 
mainstream health care. From the results of the survey, it has once again become 
clear that palliative care is changing. Most respondents feel that palliative care 
should be fully integrated into mainstream health care. The religious 
commitment, so pervasively present in the beginning, is still important, but only 
for a minority of present-day practitioners. Yet, most respondents do adhere to a 
specific set of values for palliative care. Integration of palliative care does not, 
according to many, mean that the hospice philosophy is going to be neutralised. 
In many countries, caregivers in palliative care will have to find a way to keep 
doing justice to their innermost motivations in the context of institutions that are 
part of the mainstream health care systems.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CONCEPT OF PALLIATIVE CARE 
IN THE NETHERLANDS
A shorter version of this chapter has been accepted for publication as*:
Janssens MJPA, ten Have HAMJ, The concept of palliative care in the 
Netherlands. Palliative Medicine (accepted for publication).
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THE CONCEPT OF PALLIATIVE CARE
IN THE NETHERLANDS 
Introduction
At present, palliative care is at the focus of interest in the Netherlands. With the 
help of recent financial input from the government, efforts are being made to 
improve expertise, expand educational activities and establish regional networks 
in which the primary, secondary and tertiary health care settings co-operate. Six 
university centres have been selected that will play a crucial role in the further 
development of palliative care. These centres employ co-ordinators and 
palliative care teams that work intra- as well as extramural. Some teams will 
have beds at their disposal, others focus on consultation. Within these centres, 
undergraduate and postgraduate educational programmes will be developed. The 
development of hospices will not be stimulated by the Ministry of Health but 
some existing hospices will continue to exist as integrated institutions in the 
formal health care system. Palliative care units inside the nursing homes will be 
further stimulated. At least on first sight, the future for palliative care in the Ne­
therlands seems to provide reason for optimism.
Important choices regarding the future development of palliative care have 
been made. The organisational structures through which palliative care will 
develop for the next years have become clear. Some are happy with the choices 
that have been made, others are sceptical. In this context, we can speak of an 
emerging public debate on palliative care. And it is worthwhile to investigate 
whether in this public debate different conceptions of palliative care can be 
distinguished.
There is broad agreement on some characteristics of palliative care. 
Palliative care is interdisciplinary, total care. The loved ones of the patients are 
involved in the caregiving and are supported after the death of the patient by 
bereavement services if necessary. Death is said to be accepted as a part of life 
by the caregivers and not something to be avoided or postponed at all times. It is 
acknowledged that there comes a time when life prolonging efforts become 
futile.
Yet, many disagreements also exist, particularly on the acceptability of 
euthanasia in the context of palliative care. But, it can be argued that even 
though disagreement on whether (and if so, under what conditions) euthanasia 
can be part of palliative care is by far the most debated topic, there are also other 
important disagreements; disagreements relating to the scope of palliative care,
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the moral status of palliative care, the history of palliative care and appropriate 
organisational contexts for the provision of palliative care.
In this chapter, the concept(s) of palliative care in the Dutch debate are 
examined. In the following paragraph, some issues of palliative care on which 
there is a consensus will be explored. In the second paragraph, different views 
on the concept of palliative care will be analysed. In the third paragraph, it will 
be discussed whether these differences imply different concepts of palliative 
care or whether there is reason to argue for a single concept of palliative care. 
The conclusion is that, in spite of important and interesting disagreements, the 
consensus on the concept of palliative care is in fact larger than may appear on 
first sight from the often polarised debates in the Dutch media. It will be argued 
that, in the light of this polarisation, the Dutch debate on palliative care has 
become somewhat blurred and is in need for a reassessment of the internal goal 
of palliative care, namely the achievement of the highest possible quality of life 
of patients and their loved ones.
1. A consensual basis
Most definitions of palliative care in the Netherlands are based on that 
developed by the World Health Organisation (World Health Organisation, 
1990). In 1996, a definition was developed by a working group on palliative 
care: “Palliative care is the continuous, active, integral care for patients and 
loved ones by an interdisciplinary team at the time that from a medical point of 
view cure is no longer an expected outcome. The primary goal of palliative care 
is the highest possible quality of life for the patient as well as for his loved 
one(s). The patient is approached as an equal and responsible partner. Palliative 
care responds to the physical, psychological, social and spiritual needs and is 
extended to bereavement support” (Working group on palliative care, 1996, 
unpublished). Other definitions differ only to a small extent.
Comparison with the WHO definition brings small, but yet noteworthy, 
differences to the surface. Use of the term ‘interdisciplinary’ reflects, better than 
the term ‘multidisciplinary’, the necessity to co-operate and negotiate within the 
team and resist fragmentation. The statement by the WHO that aspects of 
palliative care are also applicable earlier in the course of the illness in 
conjunction with anticancer treatment is deleted. Assumably, the working group 
which developed this definition choose to demarcate palliative care as clearly as 
possible. Yet, the definition does not say whether there is a difference between 
the time in which it is decided that cure is no longer an expected outcome and 
the time in which the primary goal of palliative care becomes the highest quality
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of life. It neglects the question whether there is an intermediary phase in which 
prolongation of life is a viable criterion, even though the disease itself has beco­
me incurable. Another noteworthy difference with the WHO's definition is that 
the Dutch definition states that the patient is approached as an equal and 
responsible partner. This may well reflect something of the relatively liberal 
moral climate in the Netherlands in which autonomy, control over oneself and 
individual decision- making are deemed highly important. The Dutch definition 
acknowledges that family members do not necessarily have to be the most 
important persons for a patient and speaks of loved ones (naasten, literally the 
ones closest to the patient) instead. Finally, while the WHO states in an 
elaboration of its definition that palliative care neither hastens nor postpones 
death, this statement is absent in the Dutch definition. One reason for this may 
relate to the Dutch euthanasia debate. As we shall see below, many participants 
in this debate hold that the active hastening of death should not categorically be 
excluded from palliative care (Janssens and Gordijn, 1998).
The Dutch Association for Palliative Care, the so-called NPTN (Netwerk 
Palliatieve Zorg voor Terminale Patiënten in Nederland), acknowledges that a 
variety of definitions exists and that it will have to develop a working definition 
in the future. But it describes the following seven characteristics of palliative 
care (NPTN, 1997).
Palliative care for terminal patients:
1. Addresses the whole human being and his/her intimate surrounding
2. Is provided to persons in the final phases of life
3. Makes the dying process as tolerable and dignified as possible for the patient 
and his/her loved ones; in the perspective of the approaching end of life, the 
fostering of peace becomes more and more important
4. Is situated in an adequate material environment which offers a feeling of 
safety and comfort
5. Lasts for a short period of time
6. Entails integrated (para)medical, nursing, psychosocial and pastoral care and 
support by professional and voluntary caregivers
7. Makes use of scientific results and experiences in the area of palliative care 
for terminal patients.
Elaborating on these characteristics it is stated that “palliative care for terminal 
patients is the continuous, active, integral and personal care for patients in their 
last phases of life and for their loved ones. The primary goal of care is the 
supporting of patients and their loved ones in affirming or achieving the highest 
possible quality of life. The patients and their loved ones are partners in care,
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with a responsibility of their own” (NPTN, 1997, p. 4). This statement (it is not 
considered a definition) is very similar to the definition mentioned above. Note 
that the term ‘responsibility’ occurs again and that patients are called partners in 
care.
The NPTN acknowledges that there are three phases in the treatment and 
care for patients who are eventually to become terminally ill. The first phase is 
the diagnostic, curative phase. The second phase is that in which symptoms 
together with the underlying incurable disease can be treated. This leads into the 
third, terminal phase. The NPTN aims at the development of care for terminal 
patients but does not address the question whether palliative care as such can 
cover a wider area of care. This is why it is called the Network for Palliative 
care for terminal patients in the Netherlands. In most cases when the NPTN 
speaks of palliative care, there is an additional qualification, like palliative care 
for terminal patients or palliative care in the terminal phase. An important policy 
statement on palliative care from the Minister of Health to the Dutch Parliament 
was also called ‘Palliative care in the terminal phase’ (Ministerie van 
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, 1996). Another commonly used term is 
‘palliative terminal care’. This term is used by the so-called semi-governmental 
commission ‘Care Research in the Netherlands’ (Zorgonderzoek Nederland, 
ZON) (ZON, 1997) but also for example by the Dutch Association for Nursing 
Home Care (Nederlandse Vereniging voor Verpleeghuiszorg, NVVz) 
(Nederlandse Vereniging voor Verpleeghuiszorg, 1998). It can be concluded 
that, because the area of care covered by palliative care remains still in the open, 
the Dutch prefer to limit this area of care by using the adjective ‘terminal’. 
Basically, this use of the term is in line with a proposal of an ethical framework 
for palliative care that was published in the British Medical Journal in 1991 
(Ashby and Stoffell, 1991). The authors distinguish between a curative, a 
palliative and a terminal mode or phase. The curative mode is the phase of 
therapeutic intervention, the palliative mode is characterised by a trade-off 
between measures aimed at improving the quality of life and measures aimed at 
life prolongation. The terminal mode is the phase in which death is inevitable 
and imminent. It is admitted that precise points of transition may not always 
occur. Some unclarities remain. It is for example not always easy to determine 
when a patient has arrived in the terminal phase of the disease trajectory and 
serious mistakes may be made if one attaches a stringent ethical framework to 
each phase (Ashby and Stoffell, 1995).
As mentioned above, palliative terminal care in the Netherlands has 
become of topical interest in health care policy. The NPTN gives six reasons for 
the increasing attention paid to palliative terminal care. First, there has been a
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growing acknowledgement that palliative care has been an underestimated area 
of expertise. Education and training have been insufficient, a shared vision on 
palliative care has been lacking and openness on the side of caregivers for the 
problems of dying patients has also been lacking. According to the NPTN, there 
has been a recent change in attitudes towards suffering and death. Death is 
becoming less and less a taboo and the realities of suffering are more and more 
acknowledged in public debate. A second reason why palliative care has gained 
public interest relates to the increasing awareness that there are limits to the 
curative capacities of modern medicine. A shift is taking place from acute 
medicine to chronic care. Because of the increase of technological possibilities, 
processes of incurable diseases last longer and the duty to relieve suffering, 
rather than merely treating the disease, is more and more acknowledged. Third, 
due to demographical changes, the number of patients suffering from incurable 
diseases is expected to rise in the future. Social networks are weakening and 
especially the elderly patients are likely to depend on formal care, as care from 
children or relatives can no longer be taken for granted. Fourth, the NPTN 
points to the increased autonomy of patients and their families who expect not 
only medical treatment but also attention for the psychosocial and spiritual 
aspects of their suffering. Respect for autonomy as a principle is said to be 
ambivalent. Overestimating its importance may lead to an underestimation of 
dependency and solidarity with others. But autonomy is still considered an 
important factor that can explain the recent interest in palliative care. Fifth, there 
have been important initiatives and developments in the area of palliative care 
inside as well as outside the Netherlands. Initiatives with regard to pain and 
symptom treatment, acknowledging the multidimensionality of pain, are 
mentioned as well as developments initiated by the European Association for 
Palliative Care. Finally, it is said that the Dutch euthanasia debate has 
underlined the importance of palliative care. The NPTN is referring to the 
emerging consensus that a further development of palliative care can diminish 
the number of euthanasia cases. On the other hand, it is stated that the 
polarisation of the debate has not been very fruitful for the development of 
palliative care. The NPTN itself does not take a stance in the euthanasia debate 
and respects the differences of opinion among its members. The common goal to 
improve palliative care is shared by all members.
It may be true that the vast majority of patients receiving palliative care are 
cancer patients. However, the NPTN sums up three other groups of patients that 
are in need of better palliative care. Apart from terminal cancer patients, these 
are patients suffering from Aids, patients with acute and short lasting 
pathologies and patients with chronical diseases in the terminal stage such as
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Alzheimer patients, patients suffering from strokes, Parkinson patients, patients 
suffering from pulmonary emphysema and patients suffering from cardio­
vascular diseases. To our knowledge, there are no official figures on groups of 
patients receiving palliative care. Evidence from other countries suggests that 
the category of cancer patients is by far the largest; and the most advantaged in 
this respect (Clark and Seymour, 1999).
All in all, it is safe to conclude that currently, the climate for a further 
development of palliative care is favourable in the Netherlands. It is widely 
acknowledged that palliative care has been an underestimated area of care for 
too long. An acknowledgement of the importance of palliative care seems to be 
related to recent changes in attitude. These are associated with a changed 
understanding of the goals of medicine. Apart from cure, relief of pain and 
suffering are getting more attention. The idea of total care has received wide 
recognition. It is widely admitted that there comes a time when curative and life 
prolonging efforts loose their meaning and when quality of life becomes the 
single goal of medical care. On the other hand, there is reason for concern. Even 
though the development of educational programmes, in the undergraduate as 
well as in the postgraduate curricula, is deemed important by all caregivers, 
principles of palliative care are still hardly taught at the medical faculties and 
nursing schools (NIVEL, 1996). Furthermore, it is argued by the chairman of the 
Dutch Patients’ Association that incurable patients continue to be abandoned in 
the context of hospital care (Bruntink, 1999a). The financial budgets for home 
care services are too tight to provide adequate palliative care at home, and 70 % 
of patients thus die in institutions. And, even though the level and the 
knowledge base of Dutch health care is high, there is an emphasis on what can 
be done with technological means, instead of what should be done. It appears 
that there is some ambiguity in the debate. On the one hand it is argued that a 
paradigm shift is taking place. On the other hand, medicine is still criticised for 
its biomedically oriented paradigm. And, even though the principles of palliative 
care are adhered to in theory, there is good evidence that medical practice is 
slow to adapt to the new challenges and reorientations that lie ahead.
In spite of the ambiguity relating to the degree medical practice has 
incorporated principles of palliative care, it can be concluded that there is a 
growing consensus on the contents of these principles. For an important part, 
these characteristics are in line with general characteristics that are also shared 
in the international setting. The following characteristics however, may be seen 
as typical for the Netherlands:
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1. The use of the adjective ‘terminal’ (palliative terminal care, palliative care in 
the terminal phase, palliative care for terminal patients).
2. The statement in the definition of palliative (terminal) care that patients are 
approached as responsible and equal partners, implying that patients should be 
stimulated to make individual decisions for themselves.
3. Absence of a definition that excludes the hastening of death from palliative 
care.
However, there are disagreements relating to other important aspects of 
palliative care as will be analysed below.
2. Issues under debate
As stated above, because there is no consensus in the Netherlands on the scope 
of palliative care, the adjective ‘terminal’ is added. The debate on the scope of 
palliative care will be further analysed below. Second, if we are to take various 
accounts of palliative care by caregivers seriously, it is noteworthy that they 
often describe their work in terms of virtues and emotions or even metaphors; 
notions not often heard in the formal health care. Some people speak in this 
respect of a surplus value. Further interpretation of notions used by caregivers to 
describe their work is imperative and may reveal some disagreements. Third, 
there is a debate on the most suitable organisational context for the provision of 
palliative care, if home care is no longer possible. In this respect, especially the 
status of hospices is under debate. A fourth disagreement concerns the evalua­
tion of the historical development of palliative care in the Netherlands. The 
question under debate is about whether palliative care is a young discipline 
which only recently got the necessary attention, or whether palliative care has 
been part of medical practice for decades. In other words, the disagreement in 
the Dutch debate on the history of palliative care implies an evaluation of the 
quality of palliative care provided up until recently. And fifth, there is the 
national debate on the toleration of euthanasia in the context of palliative care. 
Even though it may appear from the international literature that euthanasia is 
practised in the area of palliative care, also on a national level there are 
fundamental disagreements. It will be argued that these disagreements can partly 
be understood as disagreements on the quality of palliative care.
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2.1. The scope of palliative care
When does palliative care begin? A recent interview with nursing home 
physician M. Smalbrugge which was published in Pallium, one of the Dutch 
journals for palliative care, carried the title: “You can already begin with 
palliative care three or four years before death” (Danhoff, 1999). According to 
Smalbrugge, palliative care is too closely linked with terminal care. The Dutch 
media, which have given a lot of attention to the Dutch hospices (on television 
as well as in the newspapers and magazines) have contributed to this develop­
ment as hospices admit the majority of their patients only in the terminal stages 
of their illness. As a nursing home physician, Smalbrugge sees the patients over 
a much longer period of time. He conceives palliative care as the range of care 
services aimed at the relief of suffering and at making life more comfortable. In 
the following issue of the journal, several replies appeared. According to a 
member of the Working Group on Palliative Care of the Association for 
Oncological Nurses (the working group that developed the definition which was 
analysed in paragraph 1), Smallbrugge's broad definition of palliative care is 
bound to end up in unclarity. Basically, any patient in need of care should 
receive palliative care, if one follows Smalbrugge’s interpretation (Elfrink, 
1999). Another reaction proposes palliative care to be exclusively aimed at the 
quality of life, with a prognosis of 12 months or less (Van Duijn, 1999). 
According to this author, principles of palliative care can be applied in all sorts 
of medical practices but for the sake of conceptual clarity, the concept of 
palliative care should have a limited scope on which, ideally, there is a 
consensus.
Use of the term palliative care appears to lead to unclarity as to the scope of 
palliative care. Professionals working in institutions where patients are seen for 
a longer period of time are likely to broaden the scope of palliative care whereas 
those working in institutions where patients are seen in their last phases of life, 
are likely to use a more limited definition of palliative care. Because of this 
unclarity, the adjective ‘terminal’ is usually added but without defining it in 
terms of time until death.
2.2. The values of palliative care
As outlined in the introduction, palliative care is developing rapidly. Official 
health policy favours the development of palliative care within the framework of 
the formal health care system. Money has been made available for institutions 
outside the formal health care (hospices) to integrate but the proliferation of
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hospices will not be supported by the government. Six university centres will 
co-ordinate the provision of palliative care in the region and co-operate with all 
regional institutions involved in palliative care practice. They have been selected 
because of their educational commitment. It is acknowledged that palliative care 
has been underestimated in the educational programmes for too long. Further­
more, if the expertise in the area of palliative care is to increase, research pro­
grammes will have to be developed and for this, the academic hospitals provide 
the most appropriate context. The main message is that expertise in the field of 
palliative care should proliferate through education and increase through 
research programmes. And, of course, if palliative care is to develop further, the 
establishment of a knowledge base and the dissemination of expertise are 
crucial.
However, practitioners in the field argue that something more is necessary 
for good palliative care. In order to be a good caregiver it is not only important 
what kind of care is provided, but also how the care is given. In order to be a 
good caregiver, one needs specific talents that are impossible to teach explicitly. 
Consider the following quotation: “... In my opinion, good care and good pain 
control are not the same as palliative care. The patient also needs a warm, 
beating heart in his neighbourhood. Someone who gives compassion and is able 
to listen well. Someone who makes clear: you're one of us, we love you, you 
belong and we are there for you ... Some have it, and others don't ... Capability 
and disposition are two different things” (Bruntink, 1999a, p. 19). The director 
of a palliative care centre writes: “It is extremely hard to express the essence of 
palliative care in language ... Within palliative care ... we approach the limits of 
material and physical life ... The wonder of birth, life and death, has all to do 
with mystic ... it is first and foremost experience and emotion” (Van Hooijdonk, 
1999, p. 17).
According to many more palliative care practitioners, palliative care 
requires a specific set of talents. Caregivers in palliative care need virtuousness. 
And, even though it may be possible to teach some virtues, it is impossible to 
teach others. Aristotle distinguished between the intellectual virtues and the 
moral virtues (Aristotle, 1961). The intellectual virtues may be taught. Through 
medical education, students gain knowledge in the scientific fundaments of 
medicine and also develop a degree of professional competence. Moral virtues 
however are developed through experience, over a longer period of time. The 
moral virtues are based on emotions that, through practice, have been developed 
into habits or dispositions. They require not only to act in particular ways but 
also to feel in particular ways. It is noteworthy that such moral virtues are used 
to describe palliative care. Palliative care is said to have a surplus value
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compared to other health care practices (Schotsmans, 1995). The essence of this 
surplus value may well lie in emotions and virtues such as love, empathy, hope 
and compassion.
It may be hard to provide compelling evidence for a surplus value of 
palliative care. The citations mentioned above seem to suggest that caregivers in 
palliative care do look upon palliative care as an area of care which entails 
different, broader moral values than regular health care. If that is the case 
indeed, palliative care would require a moral language that is different from 
standard medical ethical notions such as autonomy, informed consent and 
beneficence. Apart from knowledge and skills, palliative care would require that 
the caregivers are virtuous persons who are emotionally involved in the care for 
their patients. Others hold, often implicitly, that there is no reason to attribute a 
specific moral status to palliative care. It is in line with this understanding that 
palliative care can be explained by already existing medical ethical notions.
2.3. History of palliative care in the Netherlands
When did the development of specialist palliative terminal care begin in the 
Netherlands? In 1975, plans were implemented to improve the care for 
terminally ill patients in the nursing home ‘Antonius Ysselmonde’. With the 
financial help of the city of Rotterdam, together with the foundation ‘Voorbij de 
laatste stad’ (beyond the last city, established in 1972 and aimed at improving 
terminal care in the Netherlands) and, in a later period, the Dutch Health 
Insurance Council (Ziekenfondsraad) various aspects of terminal care (the 
adjective ‘palliative’ was not used at that time) were investigated. These 
included patients’ experiences in the transition phase from hospital to nursing 
home, bereavement support, nursing care in the terminal phase, psychosocial 
and spiritual aspects of care, necessity of the continuous availability of at least 
one bed and the need to create a homelike atmosphere. At that time there was a 
taboo on the issue of terminal care. Terminal care was associated with ‘dying 
hospitals’ and a governmental policy was absent. In 1985, F. Biesenbeek, at that 
time the Director of Intramural Health Care, Nursing Home Care and Care for 
the Elderly of the Dutch Ministry of Health, called the period after 1975 a period 
of reversal; a period in which the dying process had become more in the open. 
After 1975, death and dying had been decreasingly considered as a taboo and 
society had started to acknowledge its duty to care for the terminally ill 
(Biesenbeek, 1985). The social process of individualisation, the prolongation of 
dying processes because of medical technological innovations and the 
euthanasia debate were mentioned as factors and signs that can explain why
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death and dying had become more and more in the open. Hospitals had started to 
acknowledge their duty to provide adequate terminal care; contacts with the 
primary care sector were of increasing importance to see whether patients could 
be transferred back to their homes. In the late 1970s, relations were established 
within this project with St Christopher's hospice and St Luke's hospice where 
some researchers spent time to learn from the developments in the UK. It is 
remarkable that both English hospices were called nursing homes by 
Biesenbeek. The project ended in 1985. In a report of the project it is stated that: 
“Good terminal care practice requires specific attention and skills in all health 
care contexts. The last ten years, interest has been growing in various settings; 
voluntary groups have been established, a number of nursing homes, hospitals 
and other institutions are occupied in terminal care. Dying and care for the dying 
are out of the taboo-atmosphere, partly because of many publications on the 
subject” (Bruning and Klein Hesselink, 1985, p. 131). After 1985, initiatives 
were developed to stimulate home care services in co-operation with Antonius- 
Ysselmonde. In 1993 the first palliative terminal care unit in a Dutch nursing 
home was opened in Antonius-Ysselmonde. The opening of this unit can be 
understood in the light of the preceding 20 years in which much experience had 
been gained in the area of terminal care.
In the early 1990s, time apparently came for palliative terminal care to 
mature. Two years before the opening of the unit mentioned above, the first 
high-care hospice had opened its doors, the Johannes hospice in Vleuten. In 
January 1994, the Hospice Rozenheuvel, one of the most renowned Dutch 
hospices, started its services. Many institutions were to follow in which 
specialist, multi-disciplinary palliative care was provided. More physicians had 
educated themselves in the area of palliative care abroad, especially in the UK. 
In 1996, the Dutch Association for Palliative Care was established, uniting the 
recently established institutions. In the same year a policy statement of the 
Minister of Health indicated the need to further develop palliative care 
(Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, 1996). There were two 
reasons for this statement and both reasons had everything to do with the newly 
established hospices. The first reason was the suggestion made by members of 
Parliament that a proliferation of hospices was likely to lead to a reduction of the 
number of euthanasia cases. The second reason related to questions that were 
asked by members of Parliament, after a visit of the Minister to the Hospice 
Rozenheuvel, as to the further organisational development of palliative care in 
the Netherlands. In other words, the proliferation of institutions providing 
specialist palliative care in the beginning of the nineties had required explicit 
policy. It was argued that, even though the general quality of the Dutch health
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care is high, there are insufficiencies in the area of palliative care with regard to 
the expertise (in psychosocial care as well as in pain and symptom treatment), 
with regard to co-ordination between the primary, secondary and tertiary health 
care settings and with regard to the necessary resources (in the light of 
demographical developments). The policy statement initiated a development 
which has led to the current situation in which palliative care is of increasing 
importance.
The reason for this brief historical overview is the question whether 
palliative care in the Netherlands should be conceived of as a young and largely 
underestimated area of expertise in Dutch society or whether the Netherlands 
should be seen as one of the first countries to have explicitly adopted palliative 
care. If we consider the developments of the last five years, it is safe to conclude 
that palliative care has been on the increase. Yet, it can also be argued that from 
the time of the establishment of the first nursing homes in the end of the 1960s, 
a valuable amount of experience has been gained in the care for the dying. 
Again, the debate on the historical development of palliative care in the 
Netherlands is not without bias. Physicians affiliated with nursing homes will 
point to the important role which nursing homes have played for a long time. 
Yet, especially professionals in the recently developed palliative care institutions 
have good reason to point to the deficient expertise and the lack of attention for 
palliative care in educational programmes and they can draw support from the 
above mentioned statement of the Minister. The question may seem to be 
theoretical, or speculative but two debatable issues need to be put under 
consideration. First, an important justification for the existence of independent 
in-patient institutions providing specialist palliative care is found in the 
supposed inadequacy of palliative care in the formal health care institutions. 
And second, caregivers from nursing homes argue that hospices are unnecessary 
because their experience is sufficient to provide excellent integral palliative 
care. A citation from a newspaper article (called: “it’s pouring with morphine in 
those hospices”) which was published in response to an interview with the 
Medical Director of Hospice Rozenheuvel (Brandt, 1999) illuminates the bias of 
the debate: “In the Netherlands there exists no group of physicians with such 
intense experience with deathbeds and the palliative care involved as the nursing 
home physicians. Moreover, these experiences of the last thirty years are eagerly 
interpreted and passed on in the context of the professional educational 
programme. That’s why it is so annoying if Zylicz speaks of the Netherlands as: 
‘The country where support in dying has only now obtained recognition’ ” 
(Keizer, 1999, p. 8). Needless to say that the author is a nursing home physician.
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Whether palliative care in the Netherlands should be seen as a young 
discipline or as an old discipline may be hard to establish. But the debate on the 
history of palliative care in the Netherlands reflects the diversity in the use of the 
term ‘palliative care’, perhaps more than other debates. People working in any 
specific profession are situated in a history, a tradition which has preceded them. 
The situatedness of a specialised profession in a historical context partly justifies 
the existence of that profession. And because there are at least two histories of 
palliative care, professionals may feel that the justification of the existence of 
their profession is being challenged.
In line with this outlined debate, one more important disagreement on the 
concept of palliative care will be pointed out.
2.4. Organisational context of palliative care
There is consensus that palliative care should be provided at the home of the 
patient if possible. Projects on the use of medical technology at home have 
received support from many practitioners (Reith, 1999). Currently, the Dutch 
Parliament is discussing a proposal to make care leave possible. The proposal 
states that for a period of ten days, this care leave will be paid for according to a 
percentage of the caregiver's salary. Discussions arise when home care is no 
longer possible, for example because the informal caregivers are burnt-out or 
because relatives are practically unable to provide care at home.
It is rather obvious that these discussions are somewhat biased and 
ideological in character. One's views on the ideal place of palliative care seem to 
depend on the institution one works in. And especially in the light of the 
financial input from the government into the development of palliative care, one 
may even speak of a ‘tribal war’ (Bruntink, 1999b). In the Dutch health care 
system, nursing homes have played an important role for a long time. Since 
1989, nursing home medicine has been a distinct medical specialty. The Dutch 
Association for Nursing Home Care (Nederlandse Vereniging voor 
Verpleeghuiszorg) declares that the provision of palliative and terminal care has 
been regarded as one of the central functions of the nursing homes since they 
were founded in the late 1960s (Verwey et al, 1998; Baar, 1998). Based on the 
concept of integral care, a long development of specialisation and differentiation 
of care has been taking place in the nursing homes. And one of these 
differentiated areas of care has been palliative terminal care. Recently developed 
knowledge and skills in the area of pain and symptom control have been put into 
practice. The principles of hospice care have been adopted in the context of 
nursing home medicine. This experience has led to an attitude of acceptance of
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death as part of life and an acknowledgement of the variety of patients' needs 
and wishes. Also the patients’ loved ones are actively involved in the caregiving. 
“The culture of care is present in the nursing homes. Not only potentially but 
also in reality. And more than in other health care institution” (Bruntink, 1999c, 
p. 10).
Hospices in the Netherlands vary to a large extent. Due to many initiatives 
of volunteers, a large number of so-called low-care hospices, often called 
almost-at-home-homes, have been established recently. They depend on private 
funding, the general practitioners of the patients continue to be responsible for 
the medical care, nurses from the region are sometimes called in to provide 
nursing care, and the volunteers, most of whom have followed introductory 
courses in providing home care, carry some responsibility for everyday patient 
care. Their aim is to care for patients for whom home care is (temporarily) not 
available and for whom hospital care is disproportionate. On the one hand they 
may fill a gap in the Dutch health care system as professional home care 
services are suffering from tight budgets and rising demands. On the other hand, 
it can be argued that questions remain as to the quality of care given in these 
low-care hospices. There is almost no evaluation of the care given by these 
hospices whereas especially the psychosocial and spiritual problems of their 
patients may be extremely complex. In this respect, it would be crucial to assess 
whether patients are in need of professional care which may be impossible to 
provide in the context of a low-care hospice. It is remarkable that reports given 
by people working in the low-care hospices reflect the importance of broad 
notions, not often heard in the context of formal health care: “Warmth, attention 
and love: that's what it is all about” (Bruntink, 1999d, p. 9).
The number of the so-called high-care hospices is relatively small and 
currently there is no increase. The discussion about the role of high-care 
hospices in the Dutch health care system is of present interest but unfortunately 
rather polarised. People working in high-care hospices often justify their work 
by pointing to shortcomings in the Dutch formal health care system. According 
to them, Cicely Saunders' justification of the necessity of high-care hospices is 
still actual. According to Saunders: “We had to move out so that attitudes and 
knowledge could move back in” (Saunders et al, 1981, p. 4). Hospice physicians 
point to the lack of attention for palliative care in the educational programmes. 
Knowledge and skills in the area of pain and symptom management are said to 
be insufficient. Medicine is still too eager to treat and prolong life instead of 
letting the patient be the guide. Many institutional contexts in the formal health 
care system are said not to be adapted to the provision of palliative care. Some 
years ago, it was for example argued that the institutional context of the nursing
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home is insufficiently suitable to provide palliative care. The bed occupancy rate 
is high which makes the capacity for crisis-admission limited. Patients often 
have to wait for weeks until they can be admitted to the nursing home. 
Furthermore, it was argued that in the nursing homes, terminal patients have to 
share rooms with chronically ill patients with a longer life expectancy (Zylicz, 
1993).
The debate on the best place to provide palliative care is mainly a debate 
between caregivers from nursing homes and caregivers from hospices. People 
working in hospices still point to the underdevelopment of palliative care in the 
formal health care setting, thereby not only referring to nursing homes but also 
to hospitals and general practice (Enklaar, 1999). And apart from the quality of 
patient care, they see the high-care hospice as an excellent centre of expertise 
from which knowledge, skills and attitudes can be disseminated and integrated 
into the formal health care by way of education and consultation. The suggestion 
of hospice physicians that the quality of palliative care is deficient in the formal 
health care institutions is refuted by nursing home physicians. As mentioned, 
they claim the longest experience in the field of palliative care. Experiences with 
palliative terminal care units inside nursing homes are said to provide evidence 
for the superfluousness of hospices.
In the meanwhile, the largest financial resources are now mandated to six 
university hospitals. Not surprisingly, academical physicians (especially 
anaesthesiologists and oncologists) have not much interfered with the debate on 
the best locations to provide palliative care as their ‘Centres for the 
Development of Palliative Care’ (Centra voor de Ontwikkeling van Palliatieve 
Zorg) will have to become co-ordination centres taking into account all 
organisations involved in palliative care in the region. Apart from co-ordinating 
the provision of palliative care in the region, they will employ palliative care 
teams. Again, it is questioned by people outside the context of the hospitals 
whether the hospital environment is the suitable context to provide palliative 
care. Be that as it may, if one acknowledges that expertise in palliative care 
should increase and proliferate it seems sensible to take university hospitals as a 
starting point.
The debate on the adequate organisational contexts for the provision of 
palliative care is understandable for a country which is only beginning to 
improve and proliferate expertise in palliative care. At the same time it is 
questionable whether this debate serves patients' interests. The Dutch 
Association of Palliative Care rightly does not take a stance and acknowledges 
that adequate palliative care can be given in a number of different institutions 
depending on the personal needs and wishes of the patient. And, even though
83
high-care hospices will be integrated in the formal health care, there is reason to 
believe that also in the future there will be a place for a variety of institutions, 
including hospices, providing palliative care.
2.5. Palliative care and euthanasia
Much thought and debate have gone into the subject of euthanasia and palliative 
care in the Netherlands. In the context of this chapter, let it suffice to point to 
some salient issues in the national debate, and leave the international debate 
aside.
In the hospices euthanasia is not provided but, if patients insist, they can be 
transferred to an institution providing euthanasia. At the time of admittance, 25 
% of patients of the hospice Rozenheuvel issued a request for euthanasia if pain 
and suffering would become unbearable. However, from the 769 patients who 
have been admitted between 1994 and 1998, only three persisted in their request. 
Anecdotal experience from hospice practice suggests that in the context of 
compassionate care the vast majority of requests disappears after some time 
(Janssens et al, 1999).
Most teams in high-care hospices resist the label ‘opponent’ with regard to 
euthanasia. Consider the following citation from a book on hospice experience: 
“Euthanasia is a means of very last resort I will never use. I have the feeling that 
I won't be the same anymore after having crossed that borderline. But I will 
never leave the patient who requests for euthanasia alone and always offer him 
another alternative. If the patient persists in his decision and does not accept my 
alternative, I will help him by referring him to colleagues. The difference 
between administering barbiturates [an accepted means of last resort in hospice 
practice, RJ] and euthanasia is very small. But it is a borderline I will never 
cross” (Enklaar, 1999, p. 95). Non-intended effects of treatments which will 
shorten the life of the patient are under conditions acceptable in hospice 
practice. But euthanasia is considered a ‘Rubicon’ (Enklaar, 1999). Accepting 
euthanasia as an option may hinder the creative process of developing 
alternative palliative modalities. In this respect, it is significant that whereas 
terminal sedation is heavily debated abroad, it is hardly a topic in the Dutch 
debate. Moreover, accepting euthanasia may be dangerous in the light of the 
often so ambiguous and multi-layered euthanasia requests of patients. Often, in 
the context of good communication, euthanasia requests may amount to 
something very different than a request to have one's life ended (Zylicz and 
Janssens, 1998).
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Yet, the majority of Dutch physicians consider euthanasia, under condi­
tions, a possible option in the context of palliative care (Van der Maas et al,
1996). If the pain or suffering of a patient becomes unbearable and if all other 
alternatives are exhausted, euthanasia is considered a morally justifiable means 
of last resort. Many will agree that the further development of palliative care is 
very likely to diminish the number of euthanasia cases and that it is imperative 
to provide euthanasia only in the context of good palliative care. Many will also 
agree that the taking of another person's life is at least on first sight prohibited. 
But in cases of so-called force majeure, euthanasia may be the only alternative 
left (see chapter 8). The Minister of Health reflected in her statement (see above) 
the opinion of most Dutch physicians that “euthanasia can be a dignified end to 
good palliative care in the final, terminal phase” (Ministerie van 
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, 1996, p. 9).
In 1997, the Cabinet stated that euthanasia is only justifiable in the context 
of good palliative care (Dutch Parliament, 1997). Much has been done since to 
improve palliative care. The current proposal of the Cabinet to officially legalise 
euthanasia under conditions seems to imply that the Cabinet is now content with 
the level of palliative care in the Netherlands. But, in the context of all efforts to 
improve palliative care, that would be hardly consistent (Jochemsen, 1999). 
Much critique has come especially from nursing home physicians on the 
Cabinet's opinion on the legal acknowledgement of euthanasia-declarations. 
Especially the argument that it is necessarily unclear whether incompetent 
patients still wish to have euthanasia at the very moment in time seems to carry 
weight. The new legal proposal is at this time still to be discussed by the Dutch 
Parliament.
In the context of recent developments in the area of palliative care, the 
national debate on the acceptability of euthanasia has become rather polarised. 
In a reaction to a newspaper article which was critical of euthanasia (Janssens,
1997), it was stated that the author “... had hit thousands of caregivers right in 
the face” (Van Dam, 1997, p. 8). In a reaction to another article (Brandt, 1999), 
it was said that the author makes his colleagues look like fools with a number of 
‘insulting’ remarks on euthanasia policy in the Netherlands. The author stated 
that the hypocrisy rises to the top if hospice physicians deny that high doses of 
morphine amount to the same as euthanasia (Keizer, 1999). What is at stake in 
this debate is not only the question whether euthanasia is an option in palliative 
care. Also, physicians who accept euthanasia as an option feel that the quality of 
their provision of palliative care is criticised by people who don't accept eutha­
nasia as an option. They have the impression that the palliative care they provide 
is ideologically described by critics of euthanasia as being less creative and as
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insufficient in the search for alternatives. They argue that the palliative care they 
provide is being judged and criticised as insufficient because they do not reject 
euthanasia from the outset.
Whereas the debate appears to be on the morality of euthanasia, on second 
sight an evaluation of the quality of palliative care is also at stake. Again, hospi­
ces do justify themselves by pointing to the inadequacy of palliative care in the 
formal health care system. And indeed, they elaborate on the popular view that 
the further development of palliative care may diminish the number of 
euthanasia requests. On the other hand, many professionals in other health care 
settings claim to have acquired expertise in palliative care over the last decades. 
They argue that palliative care can never take away all euthanasia requests.
The polarisation of the national euthanasia debate has a lot to do with an 
evaluation of the quality of palliative care, or health care in general. This is not 
to say that differences in opinion on the acceptability of euthanasia do not 
matter. But they alone cannot explain the polarisation.
3. Evaluation: Concept or concepts of palliative care?
What is a concept? According to MacIntyre, concepts derive their meaning from 
practices (MacIntyre, 1984). And, in MacIntyre's view, practices essentially 
entail a teleological structure. They are aimed at the realisation of a goal that is 
internal to the practice. Institutions are instrumental and are aimed at the 
realisation of external goals of practices such as money and status. They sustain 
practices and they are the bearers of practices. But, in contrast to institutions, 
practices are exclusively aimed at goals internal to themselves. If we adopt this 
teleological line of thinking, it would follow that if there would be a consensus 
on the internal goal of the practice of palliative care we would be able to speak 
of one concept of palliative care; if there would be disagreement we would have 
to speak of different concepts of palliative care. All definitions of palliative care 
would hold that the internal goal of palliative care is the highest possible quality 
of life of the patient and his/her loved ones. Palliative care is defined in terms of 
the patient's and his/her loved ones’ well-being.
In MacIntyre's teleological views, internal goals of practices cannot be 
achieved without exercising virtues that enable us to achieve these internal 
goals. In paragraph 2.2., this was acknowledged and a distinction was made 
between the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues. Some people hold that 
provision of palliative care requires not only the exercise of intellectual virtues 
but also the exercise of the moral virtues which are formed through many past
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experiences and which cannot be taught at school (Bruntink, 1999a; van 
Hooijdonk, 1999). On second thought, it may be impossible to distinguish the 
two. Aristotle himself has bridged the distinction by pointing towards the 
intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (Aristotle, 1961). Without practical 
wisdom we would not be able to discern the moral good from the moral evil in a 
particular situation. Practical wisdom provides the link between the moral 
virtues on the one hand and the morally right application of these virtues in a 
concrete situation on the other hand. Practical wisdom is the intellectual 
deliberation that decides how the moral good can be achieved in a concrete 
situation. Thus, the moral virtues such as courage and justice cannot be 
conceived without the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom 
needs to be distinguished from the other intellectual virtues such as science and 
professional competence exactly because of its connection with moral practice. 
We can possess the intellectual virtue of professional competence but if we do 
not know how and when to apply it in the right way, it is of little use. 
Intellectual as well as moral virtues are crucial for good palliative care.
Even though the two sets of virtues invoke one another, we have to 
acknowledge that professionals in palliative care use different notions to 
articulate their expertise. Some hold that palliative care cannot be described in 
ordinary language. They use metaphoric terms like ‘mystic’, ‘wonder’ and 
‘power’ to denote their motivations as caregivers. Christian virtues like hope and 
love are also mentioned. Others limit themselves by the use of descriptive 
language. But these differences in language are not sufficient to conclude that 
different concepts are at work. All caregivers share in the goal of achieving the 
best possible quality of life for their patients. And in doing so nobody can do 
without certain dispositions that are aimed to achieve this end.
If we bear in mind the debates analysed in earlier paragraphs, it may seem 
as if the external goals of palliative care have become central whereas the 
consensus on the internal goal has become forgotten, or blurred. MacIntyre 
writes that external goods are characteristically objects of competition. The 
more someone has of them, the less there is for other people. A sceptical recent 
editorial put it this way: “It seems as if over the heads of the patients a tribal war 
is being fought. ‘We are better than they are ...’ It is understandable that such 
debates belong to the initial phase but ... palliative terminal care should be there 
where the patient is” (Bruntink, 1999b, p. 2).
Concludingly, there may be more consensus on what palliative care is than 
some participants in the debates are willing to admit. And indeed, if palliative 
care is to develop further through co-operation an acknowledgement of this 
consensual basis is imperative.
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Conclusion
There is reason to be optimistic about the future of palliative care in the 
Netherlands. Until recently, co-ordination, co-operation, education and 
consultation have been given insufficient attention. Therefore, from the so- 
called Centres for the Development of Palliative Care expertise will be increased 
through research and proliferated through under- and postgraduate educational 
programmes. Co-ordinators attached to these centres will, in co-operation with 
regional cancer centres, improve the co-ordination between all sorts of settings 
involved in the provision of palliative care so that regional networks are 
established. Palliative care teams affiliated with a variety of institutions will 
have to disseminate their expertise through consultations in the context of 
primary, secondary and tertiary care settings.
This does not mean that there are no obstacles to be dealt with. From an 
international perspective, palliative care in the Netherlands has developed in 
relative isolation, partly due to mutual reproaches with regard to the liberal 
euthanasia policy. International affiliation, a.o. through co-operation with the 
EAPC, has only recently been established. Furthermore, it may be difficult to 
introduce more intensive educational programmes in specialist palliative care. 
More room for palliative care means less room for other topics and competition 
is to be expected. Convincing arguments will have to be provided and, 
especially because some claim to have taught (principles of) palliative care for a 
long time, this may be harder than would appear on first sight.
I have argued that there is more consensus on what palliative care is than 
may appear from the debates in which at times external goals appear to be 
central instead of the internal goal. The internal goal of palliative care is the 
highest possible quality of life of the patient and his/her loved ones. Palliative 
care is multidimensional because the needs and wishes of patients and their 
loved ones are multidimensional. If it can no longer be provided in the home of 
the patient, it can be provided in the context of a variety of institutions by a 
variety of professional caregivers. For the future of palliative care, it is 
imperative to keep the needs and wishes of the patient and his/her loved ones in 
mind.
Note
* Differences with the published version:
Even though the structure and the main message has remained the same, all paragraphs of this
chapter are more extensive than the paragraphs of the article. The main reason for this
concerns the number of citations from the literature on palliative care in the Netherlands.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE NOTION OF PAIN
This chapter is a revised combination of two published articles*:
Janssens MJPA, ten Have HAMJ, Pijn in het morele en publieke debat. 
Wijsgerig Perspectief. 1997/1998: 38; 48-54.
Janssens MJPA, ten Have HAMJ, Die niederländische Debatte über Schmerz 
und Schmerzbekämpfung in den Niederlanden. Philosophische Grundlagen und 
medizinische Praxis. In: Gordijn B, ten Have HAMJ, (eds.), Medizinethik und 
Kultur. Grenzen medizinischen Handelns in Deutschland und den Niederlanden. 
Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog; 2000; 197-224.
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THE NOTION OF PAIN
For a long time, pain has been a stranger inside the realm of medicine. Medicine 
did not pay much attention to pain and pain treatment. As pointed out in chapter 
1, medicine was mainly occupied with cure and life prolongation, sometimes 
with the help of disproportionate treatments. While the developments in curative 
medicine were taking place at high speed, new developments in the area of pain 
treatment were rare. Pain was considered a physical defect caused by an 
underlying disease or by medical treatment itself. The presence of pain required 
medical intervention in order to remove it. Thus, pain was situated in a medical- 
technological framework. Medical ethics did not pay much attention to pain and 
symptom management either. As it was occupied in securing the autonomy of 
patients, perspectives on the total well-being of patients were outside its scope. 
The situation of pain in our culture contains a paradox; whereas pain has 
become situated in a medical paradigm in which it is considered a medical task 
to remove pain, medicine has not paid much attention to this task.
In this chapter it will be argued that the understanding of pain as a 
physical defect is a simplification. Pain constantly escapes from the medical 
framework in which it is subsumed. It cannot be encapsulated in a medical 
realm. Time after time, pain frustrates medical attempts to control it. Pain is a 
mystery.
First, the dominant view on pain will be clarified from a historical 
perspective, going back to the age of Enlightenment. Second, three 
phenomenological perspectives on pain that were developed in the Netherlands 
will be analysed. It will be argued that these perspectives present alternatives to 
the biomedical perspective on pain. Third, the current debates on pain will be 
analysed, again focussing on the Dutch context. In these debates, enriching 
perspectives are beginning to emerge. The debates relate to the area of chronic 
benign pain as well as cancer pain. Fourth, proposals to further broaden the 
current understanding of pain and pain management will be discussed. Within 
these proposals, pain is said to carry potential meaning. Medicine can be one 
possible perspective to approach pain, but more perspectives are necessary for 
good patient care. Finally, it is concluded that one of the major challenges of 
medicine today is to adopt and implement this broader view on pain in everyday 
practice.
Introduction
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1. Pain in biomedicine
Before Enlightenment, pain was situated in an encompassing socio-religious 
framework together with perspectives on life and death (Rey, 1993). It was a 
framework that provided meaning to pain and suffering. For instance, pain could 
be understood in relation to the pain and suffering of Christ. Pain could lead to 
purification or reconciliation for committed sins. Within this transcendent 
framework, pain and suffering were potentially acceptable as a part of life. And 
their acceptation was facilitated as the understanding of pain and suffering was 
shared by a community of people.
At the beginnings of the Enlightenment, the self-understanding of the 
human subject changed. The subject became an ‘I’-sayer, a self-possessing self, 
self-satisfied, creating, or pretending to create, its own norms and values. Wils 
has pointed out three changes that took place in the Enlightenment period (Wils,
1996). First, a process of individualisation of perspectives on life and death 
started to originate. The community no longer shared ideas on pain and 
suffering. The individual became bound to decide for him/herself how to deal 
with pain and suffering. Second, due to this process of individualisation, a focus 
on intellectualism can be distinguished which led to a structural feeling of 
insecurity. Third, as a consequence of these changes, the psychological attitude 
of human beings became determined by a permanent cautious attitude and an 
urge for correction and improvement. Illness and death were to be avoided at all 
cost. Apart from the scientific language of medicine, they could no longer be 
communicated. Possibilities to attribute meaning to pain, illness and death 
disappeared. Rather than accepted, illness and death had to be conquered with 
the help of medicine. Medicine indeed provided the discourse within which 
communication about pain was possible; a dualistic discourse within which the 
socio-religious aspects of pain disappeared. Pain was conceived of as a physical 
evil.
The origins of the dualistic biomedical model can be situated at the 
beginnings of the period of the Enlightenment. The well-known picture of 
Descartes of the angelic boy holding his foot near the fire is illustrative for the 
modern concept of pain (Crul, 1999). In this theory, pain is a demonstrable 
bodily mechanism. The nerves at the place of the injury send out the pain signals 
to the brain. In the brain, the pain sensation originates which subsequently 
stimulates an adequate reaction (e.g. withdrawing the foot from the fire). Within 
this model, pain is a sensation that is directly caused by external stimulations. 
The site of the injury can be pinpointed; the pain sensation cannot be conceived 
of without a concrete, painful bodily site. Pain is thus a symptom of bodily
92
defects. It is detectable and almost takes the form of a substantial entity. The 
corollary of this view of pain is that the removal of pain is considered the 
exclusive task of medicine. It is therefore remarkable and perhaps paradoxical 
that in the 1960s and 1970s, the years in which the knowledge and expertise in 
various medical specialties increased drastically due to technological 
innovations, efforts to improve pain treatment were relatively scarce (Crul,
1997). Publications on pain treatment in the leading medical journals were rare. 
Medicine was occupied with diagnosis and cure and medical ethics was 
occupied with securing the autonomy of the patient through the development of 
ethical guidelines and protocols.
The dualism that has underlied the biomedical paradigm since the 
Enlightenment has had important implications for the understanding of pain. 
Three characteristics can be pointed out. First, the paradigm leads to an 
overestimation of somatic aspects of pain and an underestimation of 
psychological, social and spiritual aspects. The personal and historical 
experience of pain cannot be rendered account of. Second, it is considered 
common-sense that pain requires medical treatment. Pain is something that must 
be removed as soon as possible. It is an obstacle to a meaningful life. The 
underlying, implicit ideal is a life free from pain. A third symptom is 
paradoxical: the biomedical paradigm makes it harder for medicine to become 
successful in removing pain. It is as if pain itself withdraws from the medical 
domain through laws of its own that do not respond to the biomedical approach 
(Morris, 1991). Especially chronic pain seems to resist medicine’s urge for 
control, more than other forms of pain. People suffer from chronic pain, 
sometimes without the presence of a detectable physiological pathology. 
Chronic (benign) pain thus challenges our belief in the capacities of modern 
medicine and in the biomedical paradigm.
Pain has become medicalised. Nowadays, pain only seems to be 
understandable and communicable within the medical domain; here, pain is 
understood as a ‘negativum’, an evil that must be removed. The medicalisation 
of pain presupposes the ideal of a life free from pain. But, as will be argued in 
this chapter, the urge to ban pain from life is hubris and, moreover, it is 
counterproductive. The more we intend to remove pain through medical 
treatment, the more pain escapes itself from our urge to be in control and the 
more it befalls us in ways that are incompatible with the biomedical paradigm.
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2. Phenomenological perspectives
In chapter 1, it is argued that it is the main task of medical ethics to reveal moral 
meanings that have remained hidden, for example because dominant discourses 
exclude them. Let us now in this line of thinking attempt to identify and explore 
perspectives on pain outside the dominant biomedical perspective. This can be 
done by analysing the views of three representatives of the phenomenological 
philosophical tradition in the Netherlands (FJJ Buytendijk, JH van den Berg and 
W Metz). Some of their views have regained relevancy in the current Dutch 
debate on pain and pain treatment.
2.1. The views of FJJ Buytendijk
In 1914, FJJ Buytendijk (1887 -  1974) became a lecturer in general biology at 
the Amsterdam Free University. Five years later, he got a chair in physiology at 
this University. In 1925, he moved to Groningen and became professor of 
physiology. During these years, his interest in psychology increased. Through 
contacts with the German phenomenologists Scheler and Plessner, he began to 
affiliate more and more with the phenomenological school. His idea was that a 
synthetic knowledge of living phenomena was to be developed from 
psychological research, rather than physiological experiments. In 1946, he was 
appointed as professor of general and theoretical psychology at the universities 
of Nijmegen and Utrecht (Dekkers, 1985).
In 1943 he published his book Over de Pijn (Buytendijk, 1943). It is a 
synthesis of physiology, psychology, and phenomenology. The structure of the 
book illustrates the synthetic character. It begins with a general philosophical 
elaboration of the problematic aspects of pain. The second part of the book 
discusses the physiology of pain. In the third part, the pain experience with 
animals is analysed. And in the last part, a phenomenological analysis of pain is 
sketched out. The philosophical analyses of the first and the final part of the 
book provide the framework for physiology and psychology.
Buytendijk points out that modern man suffers from an algophobia. Pain 
only appears under the perspective of fight. Medicine is held responsible for the 
control of pain. The presupposition is that pain has to be taken away through 
medical interventions. This algophobia of modern man makes it difficult to 
reflect on the meaning of phenomena. Buytendijk calls the modern, dominant 
perspective on life a bourgeois, conventional attitude. The real questions with 
regard to the meaning of phenomena such as pain are no longer taken into 
account. While the emphasis is on impersonal objectivity, hardly any attention is
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paid to the metaphysical, religious and moral dimensions of the problem of pain. 
However, the experience of pain itself appeals to us with a particular urgency to 
reflect on its nature and meaning. According to Buytendijk, not experiences of 
lust or happiness which fulfil us immediately, not the feelings of unease which 
come from outside and force us to react actively and appropriately, not mental 
suffering which is characterised by a relative vagueness and unclarity, but only 
the experience of physical, persistent pain almost forces us to reach out for a 
deeper meaning. Exclusively in physical pain, Buytendijk argues, we are 
experiencing the radical separation between our personal and corporeal being: 
“My hand is hurting, my head is hurting” (Buytendijk, 1943, p. 29). In agreement 
with his friend Max Scheler, Buytendijk emphasises that continuing pain takes 
away our metaphysical ease (‘Leichtsinn’) and forces us to ask for the meaning 
of this evil (malum). Whereas acute pain makes modern man ask for its relief, its 
conquest, continuing, chronic pain urges man to ask for redemption.
According to Buytendijk, insight in the problematic nature of pain cannot 
be gained without a more detached physiological and psychological method. 
Physiology can give pain its proper form, amidst other phenomena of life. The 
psychology of pain is discussed, particularly regarding the question whether 
pain should be conceived of as an affection (a body part being touched), or a 
feeling (a more general situation of being). He admits that pain has 
characteristics of both but with regard to severe and persistent pain, the apparent 
dichotomy must be transcended. This kind of pain does not only concern our 
body but also our person and in a deeper and more intense way than other 
affections and feelings. That is why we usually speak of ‘suffering’ pain. 
Suffering pain is a typically human phenomenon because it implies a 
relationship. In persistent pain, this relationship is characterised by feelings of 
helplessness and powerlessness towards the pain. The presence of pain forces us 
to answer the question for its meaning while at first sight no answer can be 
given. Still, it is in this relational aspect of pain that the potential meaning of 
pain can be located, a meaning of an existential, metaphysical nature. It can take 
the form of heroism or of equanimity but Buytendijk seems to indicate that these 
attributions of meaning are imperfect; pain asks for a fuller, deeper meaning. He 
thus argues that only when the pain sufferer is situated in the context of the 
solidarity of a community, such meaningful perspectives can originate. The pain 
of one person is transformed into a symbolic reflection of the situation of 
existential despair of all people. The pain sufferer is brought closer to 
him/herself in his/her fragility and participates in the situation of despair of the 
entire community. And acknowledging this general despair is the starting-point 
for the promise of a better world.
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At the close of his book, Buytendijk presents an account of a (possible) 
Christian perspective on pain. In this view, pain acquires the deepest meaning in 
relation to the forgiving love of God who allows man to proceed on his/her 
Calvary.
2.2. The views of JH van den Berg
The neurologist JH van den Berg (born in 1914) regularly met with Buytendijk 
at the time the latter lectured in Utrecht (1946-1957). Although Van den Berg 
was a professor at Leiden University, he belonged, together with Buytendijk to 
the so-called Utrecht School, which was characterised by its phenomenological 
methods in psychology (Dekkers, 1985).
Van den Berg became well-known because of what he called 
‘metabletika’ (metabletics, or the study of changes). He is interested in historical 
texts which at one time in history seemed to contain self-evident meaning but 
astonish the modern reader. Such texts reveal changes in human existence. 
Metabletically significant texts indicate changes in the reality of life itself (Van 
den Berg, 1959). The booklet Medische macht en medische ethiek (Medical 
power and medical ethics) that was discussed in chapter 1, can be seen as an 
example of metabletics.
In another publication, Leven in meervoud (Life in plural), Van den Berg 
describes the changes which took place at the end of the eighteenth century. Van 
den Berg shows that through these changes, man has become alienated from 
him/herself. He argues that from the end of the eighteenth century onwards, a 
process of increasing pluralities has taken place in human existence; a division 
of labour (Marx, Durkheim), a division of the human psyche (origins of 
psychiatry), a division of matter (origins of modern natural sciences). From this 
time onwards, it is no longer possible to speak of a single self of man. Man has 
fallen apart into a plurality of identities. His experiences in the social context 
have become ‘paratactical’ which means that social experiences have become 
chaotic, incoherent. We have become determined by a plurality of social 
contacts. With each contact corresponds a specific identity. Van den Berg 
explains the origins of modern psychiatry and psychology at that time through 
the necessity of a variety of identities. Paratactical experience has moreover 
caused the development of psychosomatic illnesses. In this context Van den 
Berg also mentions pain: “When the paratactical relation between two or more 
people has taken the shape in which the ... proper self of one of the participants 
is more or less avoided, pain originates in him. Headache, backache, stomach­
ache, pain in the limbs, all this, although not at the same time, is the price for the
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abandonment of the proper self” (Van den Berg, 1959, p. 247). In the nineteenth 
century, the intensity of pain increased because at that time life was already 
lived in plural. The alienation and the chaotisation which took place in this 
century, explain the increase in the intensity of pain. The division of labour has 
led to estrangement on the side of the labourers with regard to the product of 
their labour. The more labour became divided, the more painful pain became. In 
other words, if one only would be able to devote oneself to an object, and to 
resist alienation, pain would become less intensive. As an example, Van den 
Berg cites Kant who suffered from gout but was able to suppress the sensation 
of pain by “a strong devotion to an arbitrarily chosen object, whatever it may 
be” (Kant, 1959; Van den Berg, 1959, p. 186). He also points to situations of 
war, in which soldiers had become immune to pain because they could devote 
themselves to anything that belonged to the enemy.
In 1778 hypnosis was made public in Paris by the Viennese physician 
Mesmer. In Paris, a group of researchers was established under his supervision. 
Within this group it became rapidly known that hypnosis can create a situation 
of insensitivity to pain. But only in the year 1829, the first surgical operation 
was carried out under (Mesmerian) hypnosis. In the year 1799, the narcotic 
effect of laughing gas was made public and in the year 1818 the narcotic effect 
of ether. But it took until 1845 before a surgical operation under ether narcosis 
and a surgical operation with laughing gas was first carried out. “Why not 
earlier?” Van den Berg asks. The answer is that there was no need. Because only 
between 1780 en 1840 the intensity of pain started to increase. In other words, 
narcosis and hypnosis were not carried out yet because only in 1780 the 
processes of alienation, chaotisation and pluralisation of human existence 
originated.
2.3. The views of W Metz
In 1964, W Metz (1909 -  1995) wrote a thesis entitled Het verschijnsel pijn. 
Methode en mensbeeld van de geneeskunde (The phenomenon of pain. Method 
and anthropology of medicine) (Metz, 1964). Although Metz was not a 
philosopher by training, he was teaching medical philosophy at the Amsterdam 
Free University from 1976 to 1982. His publications were inspired by 
phenomenology.
In his thesis, Metz argues that for the last three centuries, medicine has 
been determined by a specific scientific paradigm. Its anthropology and 
methodology have been adopted from the natural sciences. Medicine has 
become nothing more than applied natural science. The basis of this medical
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anthropology is derived from Cartesian philosophy. The separation Descartes 
made between ‘res extensa’ and ‘res cogitans’ and the separation between a 
scientific world, in which all thinking is objective, and a subjective world, in 
which it is impossible to distinguish between truth and non-truth, has created a 
radically dualistic theoretical framework with wide ranging consequences for 
medicine. According to Descartes, the body can be situated as an object in the 
scientific world. Since Descartes, the body has received a scientific status. And 
later on, in the early period of modern psychology, also the soul was attributed a 
scientific status.
This development however, in which more and more dimensions of 
human life become situated in a scientific framework, is according to Metz 
nothing more than a speculative philosophical hypothesis that, when applied, 
unavoidably leads to flaws. These flaws can be illustrated by looking at the area 
of pain and pain management. If one considers man in this area as a solitary, 
physical entity and excludes the influences of the societal context, the failure of 
the physiological perspective will reveal itself. For how can pain without any 
detectable physiological cause be explained in such a paradigm? This problem 
makes clear that physical pain cannot be fully understood within a dualistic 
paradigm. The phenomenon of pain indicates that medicine is not a science but 
an art, based on experience. Medicine should be understood from the 
perspective of the ‘Lebenswelt’, the ‘life world’, of people; the pre-scientific 
world that we experience in everyday life. Pain management should take the 
person who is suffering from pain as its starting point. Then, it will become clear 
that the experience of pain is always characterised by isolation. The social 
context of the person in pain has fallen apart. The body is left alone. For a 
dualistic, physiological medical anthropology, the social isolation of the person 
suffering from pain is considered unimportant. An experience-based medicine 
however shows that the character of pain alters when the social context of the 
person in pain alters. The experience of pain should thus be situated in the 
intersubjective world. Intersubjective contacts situate the body in the life world 
and as such, they are incompatible with pain. Restoring social contacts abolish 
isolation and, thus, pain. With Metz, social and physical pain are more or less 
the same. Experience-based medicine aims at restoring the damaged relation of 
the person suffering from pain with his/her life world. In doing so, the most 
important therapeutical instrument is the physician -  patient relationship itself. 
In the 1980s, Metz was a consultant in an outpatient pain clinic. In his contacts 
with patients suffering from chronic pain, he discussed their life histories. Time 
after time it showed that the histories of their pains, were also part of the 
histories of their lives. Pain therapy should therefore explore the life histories of
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the patients, not the physiological causes of the pain (Metz, 1997/1998). Other 
experiences of Metz come from the time he was working in a neuro-surgical 
clinic. There, it became once more clear to him, that the lives of pain patients 
had already disintegrated before pain struck them. Almost every patient had 
difficulties with his/her partner. With Metz, pain and life history are two sides of 
the same medal.
For the current debate on pain and pain management in the Netherlands, the 
importance of the works of Buytendijk, Van den Berg, and Metz can hardly be 
underestimated. Even though important differences in views can be pointed out 
among them, they did provide a new anthropological orientation in medicine. 
This anthropological orientation received much interest from the end of the 
1940s (Buytendijk) until the end of the 1960s (Metz, Van den Berg). Recently, 
this orientation is re-emerging in the debates.
3. New interest
In 1979, the leading Dutch medical journal (Nederlands Tijdschrift voor 
Geneeskunde) published a contribution of an outpatient pain clinic physician 
(Groen, 1979). It is reminiscent of the philosophy of Metz. In the article, the 
author described his experiences with many patients suffering from chronic pain 
and their partners. He found that almost all patients dominated their partners 
before the pain first occurred. Existing marital problems were denied by the vast 
majority. In various conversations, it appeared that the marriages of the partners 
were based on ‘external’ arguments (sense of duty, tradition, reputation). Mutual 
feelings of love were hardly ever mentioned. The patients were obsessively 
compulsive, and dominant. The beginning of their pain usually co-incided with a 
problem in the private, mostly marital, situation; a problem that can be 
characterised as a defeat in the self-maintenance of the patients. All patients had 
a history of invasive medical treatment at the time they were referred to the pain 
clinic. In this history, they had become disappointed in their physicians whom 
they initially had admired so much. In this disappointment, the one-sidedness of 
modern high-tech medicine showed itself. The author strongly recommended 
more research in the areas of psychology, anthropology and communication.
Two years later, another remarkable article was published on pain 
management and cancer (Crul, 1981). It was a plea for more intensive education 
in pain management in medical curricula and for a better integration of pain 
specialists in oncological departments and in hospital care in general.
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Furthermore, the author advocated the establishment of hospices as intermediate 
institutions between the home of the patient and the general hospitals. Also, 
hospices could enhance pain management directing attention towards the whole 
person of the patient. To our knowledge, this was the first time that attention to 
the hospice movement was given in an influential medical journal in the 
Netherlands.
Two more years later, the book of Sporken (see chapter 1) was published in 
which it was argued that the growing number of chronic patients necessitated the 
adaptation of the medical paradigm. The first challenge to medicine should 
become the acceptance of human finitude. This critique facilitated the rise of 
more comprehensive perspectives on pain and pain management.
The above publications were at that time not given much attention. In the 
subsequent years, a public debate on pain and pain management did not take 
place. Pain management was to remain medicine’s stepchild. The innovative 
ideas that came forth out of the anthropological tradition in medicine were not 
disseminated. Modern medical ethics, with its interest in autonomy, originated 
and went hand in hand with a technologically oriented medicine. In 1986, the 
Dutch Health Council published a report on pain treatment (Dutch Health 
Council, 1986). It rightly observed a lack of interest in the area of pain 
treatment. Pain treatment in health facilities was inadequately organised. 
Anaesthesiologists were only marginally occupied in the area of pain treatment. 
Chronic benign pain was said to be overtreated while acute pain was 
undertreated. Because of a lack of interest and a lack of insufficient 
interdisciplinary co-operation patients suffered unnecessarily from pain. The 
Council’s recommendations to improve pain treatment in the Netherlands were 
not followed as in 1993 the same bottle necks were observed by State Secretary 
Simons of the Ministry of VWS (Health care, Well-being and Sports), in a letter 
to Parliament (letter no ZZT/Z, 931288)
Still, at the beginning of the 1990s, (theoretical) interest in alternative 
perspectives on pain increased, in medical ethics as well as in medical 
philosophy. For example, various recent publications have interpreted pain as an 
experience (Ten Have, 1996; Crul, 1996; Morris, 1991). This interpretation, 
reminiscent of Buytendijk’s views, allows for an innovative and broader 
understanding of pain. To understand what an experience is we can refer to the 
German philosopher Gadamer. In his Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and 
method) he discerns ‘Erfahrung’ from ‘Erlebnis’ (‘experience’ from ‘the 
subjective impression of an event’; a distinction that is hard to make in English 
vocabulary) (Gadamer, 1978). Erlebnis does not originate in relation to the
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world but has its place in consciousness. It refers to itself. On the other hand, 
Erfahrung relates to something or someone from the outside coming up to us. 
Erfahrung originates in relation to someone or something else, acknowledging 
its integrity or identity. This ‘someone’ or ‘something’ comes at us in the form 
of a question to which we are invited to answer and give meaning to. Erfahrung 
implies a question-answer logic; it takes the form of a conversation. Openness 
for what/who comes to us is required. After all, a conversation cannot take place 
if we don't allow this ‘other’ to speak out for itself. Erfahrung always comes up 
to us as mediated by tradition. It is by Erfahrung that we eventually come to 
know ourselves (Van Tongeren, 1988). Self-knowledge, sometimes seen as the 
ultimate goal of philosophy and theology, requires that we interpret and sensitise 
our Erfahrungen.
To interpret pain as an experience (Erfahrung) is thus not without meaning. 
It implies that pain is seen as individual (after all, Erfahrung takes place in the 
individual subject) and at the same time as mediated by a tradition. Pain is a 
culturally shared phenomenon and yet, it throws us radically back to ourselves. 
Pain is time-bound, place-bound and at the same time irreducibly individual- 
bound. Pain is at the same time in- and outside ourselves. As such, pain can 
enhance the understanding we have of ourselves. Pain incites us to provide a 
meaningful interpretation. The apparent clarity of our daily life is radically put 
into question by the experience of pain. Pain challenges us and drives us out of 
our seemingly obvious, self-evident existence. The way we have always known 
ourselves suddenly becomes endangered when we are in pain. Experiencing pain 
we are incited to interpret it and thus give meaning to ourselves as being-in-the- 
world.
The burgeoning understanding of pain since the early 1990s, especially focused 
on understanding and management of chronic benign pain and cancer pain.
3.1. The debate on chronic benign pain
In 1992, Menges, professor of medical psychology at the Amsterdam Free 
University, introduced in his book Over pijn gesproken (Speaking of pain) new 
perspectives that have been rather influential (Menges, 1992). The starting point 
of Menges is that all kinds of pain have a physical, mental and social 
component. Therefore, even acute pain should be treated interdisciplinary. After 
all, every chronic pain came up as acute pain. Interdisciplinary pain 
management from the beginning can prevent acute pain from becoming chronic. 
For the prevention of the ‘chronicisation’ of pain, the general practitioner should
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be primarily responsible. Interdisciplinarity in the area of pain management 
prevents medicalisation as well as psychologicalisation of the pain problem. It is 
not self-evident that chronic benign pain is of a strictly psychological or social 
nature. Menges criticises the above-mentioned publication of Groen arguing that 
the prototypical chronic pain patient does not exist. Menges admits that pain can 
only really be comprehended if it is approached in the context of the total 
existence of the patient. And it can only be treated if the health professional 
feels committed to the patient.
Two years before the publication of his book, Menges supervised a thesis 
on chronic pain management, written by Vrancken (Vrancken, 1990). The 
author had done qualitative research in 8 pain clinics in academic hospitals. 
These clinics are, according to Vrancken, the sites where medicine is most 
radically confronted with the boundaries of its theory and practice. She raises 
the issue whether, in the light of the complexity of the pain problem, the pain 
team is able to apply strategies that are different from the dominant ones in 
medicine. The hypothesis is that on the basis of everyday practice in pain 
clinics, different concepts can be constructed within different theoretical models. 
Vrancken distinguishes a dualistic, physiologically oriented model, a 
behavioural model, a phenomenological model, and a so-called consciousness 
model. In the dualistic model, the physician does acknowledge the importance 
of psychological and social aspects but does not involve him/herself in the 
management of these aspects. The physician focuses on physiological aspects 
and their causal explanations. The behavioural model intends to change the 
behaviour of the patient in order to make him or her able to cope better with the 
pain problem. In this model, the physician is not concerned with the existential 
suffering of the patient. The phenomenological model underlines the philosophy 
of Metz and approaches the patient in his or her lifeworld. Its first priority is not 
to control the pain but to restore the patient’s relationship with his or her life 
world. In the consciousness model, pain management is considered a process to 
help people reflect on their existence.
The qualitative research of Vrancken shows that, in spite of a variety of 
theoretical models, medical practice is to a large extent determined by a 
pragmatic approach (what works?). The discrepancy between theoretical models 
and everyday practice is called, ‘the pain of medicine’. In the final part of her 
thesis, Vrancken pleads for a practice which is based on the phenomenological 
together with the consciousness models. These models articulate the underlying 
suffering of the patient and help the patient reflect on him or herself in his or her 
existential crisis. Not only are these two models best capable of pain relief for 
the patient, they can also potentially relieve the ‘pain of medicine’.
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In 1994, the above mentioned Secretary of Health, Simons, designated 
four academic hospitals with a regional function to improve the treatment and 
prevention of the chronic benign pain syndrome. In the year 1997, Crul became 
the first Dutch professor of pain and pain treatment. Het got his chair at the 
academic hospital in Nijmegen which is one of the four designated centres. In 
his inaugural lecture, he demonstrated that pain and pain treatment are still 
medicine’s stepchild (Crul, 1997; 1981). This underestimation of pain can be 
explained because pain cannot be accommodated in the Cartesian framework 
through which medicine is determined to a large extent. Crul states that 
expertise in pain management is insufficient. Inadequately treated acute pain 
unnecessarily becomes chronic. Pain treatment is hardly given any attention in 
the medical curricula. Pain treatment in new-borns is largely underestimated 
because of the mistaken idea that new-borns would not experience any pain. 
Also post-operative pain is insufficiently treated. The consequence is the 
formation of a ‘pain-memory’ which leads to an increased susceptibility to pain 
which in its turn leads to psychological problems, e.g. anxiety and fear.
In the same year as Crul, Zuurmond also was appointed as professor of 
anaesthesiology, specifically with regard to pain treatment, at the Amsterdam 
Free University.
Even though the perspectives of the above publications are divergent, they 
do reflect a consensus that adequate management of chronic benign pain 
requires a different approach than the traditional Cartesian, dualistic one. 
Chronic benign pain leads medicine towards its boundaries like no other disease 
or symptom. Chronic benign pain will never be adequately manageable within a 
medical framework but instead necessitates an interdisciplinary approach. But 
again, medical practice is slow to adopt to this understanding.
3.2. The debate on cancer pain
In the Netherlands, the number of cancer patients will increase due to ageing of 
the population. Better diagnostic procedures, together with better curative and 
life prolonging treatments, will increase the life expectancy of cancer patients. 
Such developments make the issue of quality of life of cancer patients extremely 
urgent. Pain is a symptom that can severely harm the quality of life of patients.
A 1989 quantitative study delineates the problems with regard to the pain 
management of hospitalised cancer patients and cancer patients at home, with a 
prognosis of two months or more (Dorrepaal, 1989). In the clinic (the research 
was conducted in a clinic specialised in oncology), 45 % of patients suffered 
from pain. In 54 % of these cases, pain treatment was evaluated as insufficient.
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Often, too small amounts of analgesics were administered. In 1989, physicians 
as well as patients still feared the side effects of analgesics and physicians were 
reluctant to administer high doses. 49 % of patients coming home from hospital 
decided to decrease the dose of analgesics. 16 % of the patients at home suffered 
from pain (patients with complete tumor remission and patients with a life 
expectancy of two years or more also were included in the research group). 
About 18 % of the patients to whom analgesics were provided, were advised to 
take them on an as needed basis. This practice has been criticised in the 
literature for a long time. In 1963, Saunders already resisted the pattern that 
patients would have to ask for pain relief (Clark and Seymour, 1999). Dorrepaal 
found also that pain management was unsatisfactory in 47 % of the ambulant 
patients. Exchange of information between the medical specialist and the 
general practitioner was also evaluated as insufficient. Many patients did not 
even have contact with their general practitioners and only communicated with 
their medical specialists. The latter did not inform the patient’s general 
practitioner. Dorrepaal concludes on the one hand that specialists should 
exchange more information with the general practitioners and that on the other 
hand, the general practitioners and patients should take more initiatives to 
communicate with each other. Also the psychosocial consequences of cancer 
pain should be more fully acknowledged.
Since 1989, when this thesis was published, many things have changed 
(Van den Toorn, 2000). Prejudices with regard to the use of analgesics have 
diminished, at least on the side of the professional medical community. Actions 
to improve the communication between primary and secondary health care are 
currently under research. To facilitate the co-ordination of cancer pain 
management, the so-called integral cancer centres play an important role. Expert 
consulting teams provide consultations in the home of the patient or in the 
hospital. Many hospitals have developed in- and outpatient initiatives to 
improve pain management. New technological applications in the house of the 
patient have received wide recognition (Van Boxtel, 2000). When the four 
centres for treatment and prevention of chronic pain were established in 1994, 
this was done because of insufficiencies in the treatment of benign pain whereas 
with regard to the treatment of cancer pain fewer problems were noted. 
According to recent estimations, 80 % of all cancer pain can be controlled (Crul,
1998).
The growing interest in palliative care has led to increasing interest in 
psychosocial and spiritual aspects of pain management. It can be argued that the 
inclusion of these non-physiological aspects of pain in the total pain concept is 
not so much a widening of the Cartesian understanding of pain, but rather a
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different understanding of pain. The concept of total pain, contrary to the 
Cartesian concept of pain, interprets pain in the context of the life world of the 
patient. The concept of total pain thus challenges the traditional biomedical 
understanding of pain, since it locates pain in the larger perspective of the 
human life.
4. Perspectives for the future
Interestingly, and perhaps paradoxical to what has been said above, it has also 
been argued that the concept of total pain still contains fundamental traits of the 
Cartesian concept of pain. According to Lanceley, “ .. the division of pain into 
components and categories of physical, social, mental or emotional pain, as if 
each were on a different plane of experience, is stark evidence of the 
intractability of Cartesian thinking amongst even the most sophisticated of 
clinicians’’ (Lanceley, 1995, p. 154). Pain in cancer care is said to be still 
approached as an obstacle that should be eliminated in order to allow for a 
meaningful dying process. Not much attention is given to the meaning of pain 
for the patient. Palliative care challenges the traditional organic model as it 
locates pain in a larger perspective but basically, the biomedical model is 
maintained. Also in palliative care, pain management seems synonymous with 
pain treatment. Apparently, if one follows Lanceley, palliative care stands 
midway between a traditional dualistic concept of pain and a burgeoning post­
modern meaning-centred concept of pain. It is possible to argue that the holistic 
concept of pain in palliative care is in need for a radicalisation, in the direction 
of a post-modern understanding of pain. According to the latter understanding, 
pain management should not exclusively be interested in pain control. 
Sometimes the pain of a particular patient does not ask for an activistic 
approach, but for passively allowing the patient to be the guide. This post­
modern concept in which the meaning of pain is recognised may in the future 
well be adopted by caregivers in palliative care.
According to Lanceley, it is imperative to listen closely to the narratives of 
patients. These narratives may reveal wider perspectives on pain that currently 
are still underneath the surface, also in cancer care and palliative care. Then, 
medical pain treatment occurs as one possible perspective on pain. The multi­
dimensionality of pain will be revealed. The mystery of pain will not be solved 
but acknowledged. Refraining from pain treatment will occur as an option to be 
considered. For many patients this will enhance the understanding of
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themselves. It will enable them, even in terminal illness, to develop themselves 
further, giving meaning to their pain and to their lives.
If we listen very closely to the narratives of chronic pain-patients we can 
discern a new non-dualistic vision of pain. Most patients objectify their pain as 
something outside themselves as illustrated in the phrase: ‘It hurts’. But some 
patients, often after having had a period of objectifying their pain, eventually 
come to see their pain in identification with their own selves (Lanceley, 1995). 
Narrating their experience in vivid symbols and images, they, consciously or 
unconsciously, attribute meaning to their pain. Narratives shape the self-under­
standing of patients. They are the mediation through which patients understand 
their ‘being-in-the-world’. Meaningful experience cannot do without narratives. 
Moreover, narratives are the condition of possibility for meaningful experience. 
Jackson cites a patient: “I believe the snake is me... My God, I can talk to it... I 
was afraid of it... But the pain is me” (Jackson, 1994, p. 205). Taking these 
narratives serious, one can find indications for the need of a more meaning- 
centred, instead of a biomedical, approach to pain management.
However, as stated in the introduction, pain seems an experience too 
diffuse, too many-sided as to encapsulate it into a cultural framework or into one 
meta-narrative. The post-modern era can allow pain to “serve multiple purposes 
and hold multiple meanings beyond its basic function as a signal of tissue 
damage” (Morris, 1991, p. 279). The biomedical model will remain one among 
many explanatory models. But apart from this model, pain can be given various 
existential, religious, social, psychological, literary and poetical meanings. None 
of them will eventually exhaust the experience of pain but together they can 
shed light on the many meanings pain can entail. Therefore, hermeneutical 
research, re-introducing unheard voices and discovering hidden areas in which 
pain is not stripped of its meaning, is paramount.
Conclusion
There is much to be done to improve our understanding of pain and pain 
treatment. But it can be argued that since the last decade more and more 
attention has been paid to this area. Expertise in pain management will further 
develop. Through consultation and education, expertise will be disseminated. In 
the literature there is nowadays consensus that the Cartesian biomedical 
paradigm has failed.
In searching for alternatives, the phenomenological tradition has not lost its 
relevance. After all, the ‘pain of medicine’ has not been relieved yet. Still, a 
discrepancy exists between ethical and philosophical theories and medical
106
practice (Vrancken, 1990). In medical practice, pain continues to occur with 
images of battle, as pointed out by Buytendijk. Medical treatment is regarded as 
the primary means of pain management. Interdisciplinarity is often only 
underlined when medical treatment fails, instead of acknowledging its 
importance from the beginning of the process as emphasised by Menges. Even 
the concept of total pain is also, and in spite of its intentions, illustrative of the 
Cartesian paradigm, as it distinguishes between four relatively separate realms 
of care.
If that is so, new understandings of pain, that have hardly been articulated 
yet, should be proposed; understandings that allow for other ways of dealing 
with pain than only medical intervention (justified as that may be under many 
circumstances). Narrative approaches have been proposed which certainly allow 
for meaning giving and receiving. Perhaps, research in ways of dealing with 
pain in the pre-Enlightenment era can be fruitful in revitalising old and forgotten 
perspectives. Innovative theoretical research (for example Morris) has shown 
how in our society pain has more meanings, even positive meanings, than may 
appear at first sight.
Relief of the ‘pain of medicine’ seems one of the major challenges for 
future medicine. Acknowledging interdisciplinarity and potential meanings of 
pain in theory however, is something different from changing everyday practice 
according to these points of view. Even though much progress has been made 
recently, medical practice is still slow to adopt to the new challenges lying 
ahead. A continuation of the debates on possible understandings of pain is 
therefore imperative as many innovative perspectives have already been 
proposed during the last few decades. Also in the future, pain will remain a 
mystery but acknowledging this mysterious character of pain will prevent 
medicine from hubris. Pain and the possibilities and impossibilities of pain 
treatment have confronted medicine with its boundaries. Relief of the ‘pain of 
medicine’ implies an acknowledgement of these boundaries.
Note
* The first article is a philosophical and theological critique on the medicalisation of pain. In 
contrast to this chapter, it does not focus on the phenomenological tradition. The second 
article is an analysis of the Dutch debate on pain and pain treatment and a description of the 
organisation of pain management in the Netherlands. This chapter pays less attention to the 
organisational aspects. The chapter can be considered a critique on the medicalisation of pain 
and pain treatment, based on the work of Dutch philosophers and physicians. It contains 
excerpts from both articles.
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CHAPTER 6
THE NOTIONS OF RESTRAINT 
AUTHENTICITY AND HOPE
A slightly modified version of this chapter was published as*:
Janssens MJPA, Zylicz Z, ten Have HAMJ, Articulating the concept of 
palliative care. Philosophical and theological perspectives. Journal of Palliative 
Care 1999; 15(2): 38-44.
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THE NOTIONS OF RESTRAINT, AUTHENTICITY AND HOPE
Introduction
In the Oxford Textbook of Palliative Medicine palliative medicine is defined as 
“the study and management of patients with active, progressive, far-advanced 
disease for whom the prognosis is limited and the focus of care is quality of life” 
(Doyle, Hanks and MacDonald, 1996, p. 3). Defining palliative care adequately 
is not easy; many conceptual distinctions are made among, for example, 
palliative care, palliative medicine, hospice care, terminal care, and palliative 
care services. One useful way to examine the concept of palliative care is to 
consider it as a philosophy of care or an approach (Robbins, 1998). Both for 
people who are dying and for those who look after them, our understanding of 
palliative care can be enriched by identifying and examining the notions that 
play an important role in this philosophy of care.
This chapter examines three notions that, though not absent in the debates 
on palliative care, have not been given the attention they deserve. By situating 
these notions in the philosophical and theological traditions from which they 
originate, we can enhance our understanding of palliative care.
Palliative care is total care. The person of the patient is at the centre of care. 
This means that not only the medical but also the psychosocial and spiritual 
needs and wishes of the patient must be addressed during the period of care 
(Saunders, 1967; Twycross, 1996).
In this chapter, the distinctions between the medical, psychosocial and 
spiritual realms of palliative care will be examined. Inherent to the medical 
realm is the notion of restraint, derived from the Hippocratic tradition. Inherent 
to the psychosocial realm is the notion of authenticity which is specified within 
the philosophical tradition of existentialism, and to the spiritual realm the notion 
of hope, a central virtue in the Christian tradition. the notions will elaborated on 
within the context of a paradigm case from hospice practice.
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Case report
A woman of 58 years was suffering from a small-cell lung carcinoma. When the 
patient was informed of her diagnosis, the first thing she said to the oncologist 
was that, when her suffering became unbearable, she would want to have eutha­
nasia, which is under conditions tolerated in the Netherlands.
In the sixth month after the diagnosis, she contacted a hospice physician. 
She asked for information about hospice care in order to make arrangements for 
the future. She was told that euthanasia was not performed in the hospice but 
that, independent of her decision, the carers would never abandon her. If she still 
preferred euthanasia, in spite of all efforts of the interdisciplinary team, she 
would be discharged to a hospital where euthanasia would be provided. Her 
treatment program at the time was aimed at a cure and, though she knew that 
chances for a cure were limited (6 % long term survival).
The woman, a lawyer, had been extremely busy throughout her life. Her 
marriage had failed and she was divorced. She had two daughters, one of whom 
lived with her ex-husband and the other with her. However, her relationship with 
both her children was very detached. The sisters had not seen each other for 
years.
Thirteen months after the diagnosis, the woman was admitted to a 
university hospital with pain in her back. Metastases in the brain and spinal 
column were diagnosed. A course of radiotherapy and chemotherapy aimed at 
life prolongation and the palliation of symptoms were initiated.
Sixteen months after the diagnosis, the woman decided to discontinue 
chemotherapy and, at her request, she was admitted to the hospice. At the time 
she was using opioids and suffering from dyspnea, constipation, and nausea. It 
appeared that the dose of opioids was far too high. Her dose was decreased and 
her symptoms were alleviated. Corticosteroids were prescribed to alleviate the 
headache and nausea.
Because she was then paraplegic, she had to let others take care of her. This 
made her very unhappy. She felt guilty toward the caregiving team and she 
became very demanding and unreasonable toward her children. Her caregivers 
tried repeatedly to reassure her that they enjoyed looking after her and that she 
had no reason to feel guilty. During this period she did not talk about dying and 
she refused to meet the pastoral worker.
One morning, the hospice physician entered her room and, like a bolt 
from the blue, she started to cry. She said that she was afraid to die and that she 
felt guilty about her children, whom she had never been able to take care of. She 
also said that she was afraid her children would never see each other again after
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her funeral. From that time on, many things changed. She talked about her 
oncoming death to her children as well as to the pastoral worker. The children 
stopped avoiding each other. Together with them, she arranged her funeral 
service. She started to enjoy the high standard of care she was receiving. She 
even stopped quarrelling on the phone with former colleagues at work. Her 
relations with the people around her improved greatly.
Nineteen months after her diagnosis, she re-established contact with her 
sister, who lived in India. The patient then felt reassured that she had said and 
done all the things she needed to. Apart from fatigue, she did not suffer from her 
symptoms. She had enjoyed her months in the hospice and had accepted her 
fate. During one of her last discussions with the hospice physician, she repeated 
her request for euthanasia. She wanted to die. She was afraid that the dying 
process would be endless and that she would deteriorate slowly. 
The hospice physician proposed an alternative -  that she discontinue the 
corticosteroids. She knew that death would soon follow. She said that she 
needed a day to consider this option. She phoned a school friend, a rheumatolo­
gist, who confirmed the rationality of this option.
She agreed to the proposal and felt relieved. She even asked out loud why 
so few people chose to die this way. Four days after the withdrawal of the 
corticosteroids, she died peacefully in the presence of her daughters.
1. The medical realm and the notion of restraint
Coming up with a simple definition of the notion of restraint is problematic; 
nonetheless, two essential components of such a definition can be formulated. 
First, medical restraint implies the acknowledgement of the boundaries of 
medicine. Second, medicine co-exists with other, equally important elements in 
enhancing the well-being of patients.
In the Hippocratic tradition, restraint was once the physician's virtue. Medi­
cine was understood to obey the laws of nature, not by passively accepting the 
existence of diseases but by acknowledging that, first and foremost, the body 
attempts to bring about its own recovery. Medicine can influence the body's 
mechanisms only to a certain extent. In the Hippocratic tradition, the physician 
is the servant of nature (Zwart, 1996a; Zwart, 1996b) and medicine aims at the 
recovery of the original natural state (Pellegrino and Thomasma, 1981). The 
ethical rule that pervaded Hippocratic medicine was ‘in dubio abstine’ (when in 
doubt, do not intervene).
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Modern medicine seems to have forgotten its Hippocratic roots. It has 
turned away from nature, pretending to be able to control and overrule it. ‘In 
dubio abstine’ seems to have become: ‘when in doubt, act’ (Ten Have and 
Kimsma, 1987). The expansion of medical technology has done much good, but 
the technology can also lead to suffering. Patients with incurable illnesses, 
though they may be surrounded by medical personnel, can be neglected while 
the professionals focus on cures and life prolongation. Such patients experience 
personally the limits of medicine - its inability to control nature. Their situations 
reveal the urgent need for a modification of medicine.
Elements of the Hippocratic tradition can be found in palliative care, 
where the proverb ‘let nature take its course’ is often heard. In palliative care, 
after the curative phase, nothing is done to hasten or postpone death. Palliative 
care focuses on the quality of life; quantity of life is not a criterion in decision 
making. In the progressive disease process of the patient, the criteria for medical 
decisions gradually change until no further attempts are made to postpone death. 
Often, the patient and the physician decide together to stop aiming for life 
prolongation, even when another treatment could add months to a patient’s life. 
Such was the case for the woman described above.
As finding a cure and life prolongation become less and less important, the 
medical realm becomes an integral part of the psychosocial and spiritual realms. 
Adequate pain and symptom control aim at providing as much comfort as 
possible to the dying. Psychosocial and spiritual care have the same aim. The 
boundaries between these three realms are not clear-cut.
When life prolongation is no longer feasible, many varieties of medical 
treatment become futile. For the woman described in the case report, restraint 
was considered mainly for medical reasons related to the adverse effects of the 
high dose of opioids she was receiving. However, often the final criterion 
determining medical futility relates to the wishes and needs of the patient. Apart 
from a lack of effect related to physiology, a lack of benefit as to the personal 
needs and wishes of the patient is an important criterion of futility (Smith II,
1995). Can the patient enjoy his or her remaining life? Is the patient ready to 
die? Is everything said and done with regard to relatives? Does the patient 
accept death? In the light of these questions, it is hard to set guidelines for 
futility of medical treatment in palliative care.
The corticosteroids were effective for the patient described because they 
alleviated her symptoms and prolonged her life. However, the corticosteroids 
became non-beneficial from the woman’s perspective after she went through a 
change of attitude. Her case clearly showed that medical treatment is only one
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aspect of palliative care and that it is intrinsically connected with psychological, 
social and spiritual care.
In palliative care, more than in curative care, the adequacy of medical treat­
ment depends on the needs and wishes of the individual patient. A clear somatic 
indication for medical decision making is often absent. Medical decision making 
in palliative care is part of a multi-dimensional process relating to unique indivi­
duals. A change in the social relationships, psychological moods, or spiritual 
attitudes of patients can lead to changes in medical decisions. The notion of 
restraint illuminates the interrelationship of the medical and the psychosocial 
and spiritual realms. Psychosocial and spiritual aspects often overrule the strictly 
medical point of view.
Medical restraint should not be regarded as a defeat. Restraint opens up 
new possibilities. Patients may finally come to rest after months of mutilating 
invasive treatments. Withdrawing curative or life-prolonging treatment and 
accepting the boundaries of medicine enables the physician to follow the patient 
on his or her way towards death. A kind of passivity on the part of the physician 
can be seen as a way for her or him to be sensitive and responsive to the patient 
as a person (Desmet, 1996). Medical restraint thus points the way to the 
psychosocial realm.
2. The psychosocial realm and the notion of authenticity
It has often been argued that the principle of autonomy is central in palliative 
care (Veatch and Spicer, 1992). However, the principle of autonomy is 
ambiguous.
Its origins go back to the age of the Enlightenment. It was the German 
philosopher Kant who first introduced autonomy into the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment. But for modern medical ethics, the views of the English 
philosopher Mill are regarded as more important (Vedder, 1995). With Kant, 
ethics is impossible if one does not presume that human beings are able to relate 
to themselves. Autonomy, according to Kant, is the capacity of human beings to 
impose the moral law on themselves. Autonomous human beings are no longer 
led by ‘foreign’ heteronomous forces (Kant, 1978). Rather, they set their own 
moral law and have learnt to make choices for themselves. With Kant, autonomy 
is the capacity for self-legislation. John Stuart Mill did not directly address the 
concept of autonomy, but his writings have been extremely influential for 20th- 
century philosophy. He stressed that as long as no harm to others is done, the 
right to independence of the individual is absolute (Mill, 1975). As long as no
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others are harmed, it is illegitimate to interfere with individual actions. The 
individual has sovereignty over himself.
Important traces of the philosophy of Mill can be found in modern medical 
ethics. The rise of medical technology and the physician's power in the late 
1960s led to calls for safeguarding the autonomy of patients (Engelhardt, 1991; 
Zwart, 1995). In this ethical discourse, patient autonomy was a backbone of a 
libertarian ethics. Autonomy and self-determination became synonymous. This 
discourse is at odds with palliative care practice because it is based on mistrust 
between the patient and the physician. In the end, the patient stands alone with 
his or her self-determination (Welie, 1998).
Recently, a broader concept of autonomy has been developed. It includes 
recognition of human vulnerability, dependency, and fragility. Using these 
concepts, an ethics of care that is concordant with the concept of palliative care 
can be constructed (Manschot, 1994). However, in this chapter another approach 
is taken, for two reasons. First, autonomy is rooted in a libertarian tradition that 
is incompatible with palliative care. And second, since the rise of modern 
medical ethics it has been part of a principlist moral framework that primarily 
served to deduce moral guidelines instead of enhancing our understanding of 
moral practices (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994). Therefore, it would be more 
appropriate to approach palliative care with the help of another notion. The 
notion of authenticity is suggested here since it can provide us with a better 
understanding of palliative care practice than the ambiguous principle of 
autonomy.
According to Charles Taylor, authenticity is a child of the Romantic 
period (Taylor, 1992). He has suggested that the initial development of the 
concept was situated in the “... eighteenth-century notion that human beings 
were endowed with a moral sense, an intuitive feeling of what is right and 
wrong” (Taylor, 1992, p. 25-26). In order to be virtuous, we have to look deep 
inside ourselves. We have to learn to be in touch with ourselves, in touch with 
our own originality. This idea was often overlooked by the rational philosophers 
of the Enlightenment.
Concern about the lack of ‘inwardness’ of society was also expressed by 
the predecessor of existentialist philosophy, Seren Kierkegaard. For him, 
passion had disappeared from life and, in consequence, existence had become 
fearsome. We all stand alone, confronted by an absurd, irrational world. Truth 
does not exist in itself but depends on what is true for the person involved. It is 
the subject who will have to shape existence through choice. And, in the process 
of shaping existence, certain stages can be distinguished. In other words, even 
though choices should be individual (‘authentic’) in character, the values from
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which one should choose are pre-existent. Kierkegaard distinguished the estheti- 
cal stage (in which one avoids to make existential choice), the ethical stage (in 
which one realises one’s responsibility for oneself and others) and the religious 
stage (of which the acceptance of Christ as God is the highest form). Despair 
pervades Kierkegaard’s philosophy but, at the same time, there is a concern 
about the irreducible singularity of all human beings. Human beings are driven 
to make the choices that best fit their own existence. Such human beings can 
rightly be called authentic.
The philosophy of the French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre can be 
understood in the light of Kierkegaard. According to Sartre (and contrary to 
Kierkegaard), we live in a world that has no meaning apart from the meaning we 
give to it through choice (Sartre, 1944). “In choosing ways of life, we colour the 
world with values” (Árnason, 1994, p. 229). People who think that the world in 
itself contains meaning are inauthentic, living in ‘bad faith’ (mauvaise foi) as 
they try to escape from the anguish that pervades existence. Authenticity relates 
to the morality of the subject. Morality is created by the individual through 
choice and by commitment to choice. The philosophy of Sartre seems 
problematic because morality cannot be found apart from the individual. In other 
words, with Sartre, freedom seems to be the same as arbitrariness. However, 
Sartre's elaborations on choice and commitment are meaningful in this context.
Apart from the element of choice, the notion of authenticity contains 
another important element to which the German philosopher Heidegger (who 
did not want to be called existentialist) drew attention (Heidegger, 1986). For 
him, human beings are radically contingent, vulnerable, and fragile. When they 
are born, they are thrown into an historical situation that they did not choose. 
Contingent factors such as bodyliness, past, culture, and traditions shape our 
identity, for better or for worse. Authentic human beings are those able to 
endure the tension between the freedom to make choices on the one hand and 
their contingency, fragility, and dependency on the other hand. For example, 
they cannot always avoid illness (because of their fragility) but they can choose 
how to relate to illness. An authentic decision is one in concordance with the 
original identity of the subject as it has evolved in the past, as it is in the present 
and as it will shape itself in the future through the choices it makes.
There are many differences between the authors mentioned above and in 
elaborating on authenticity as a central notion in palliative care we cannot 
entirely avoid some eclecticism. Two ideas are fundamental: First, a person's 
choices are put into the perspective of a person's unique personality. Second, 
apart from the element of choice, authenticity also takes our common fragility, 
contingency, and dependency on others into account (Welie, 1994).
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Authenticity means being at one with oneself, despite all (potential) 
suffering. It means the integration of one’s suffering with one’s existence 
(Manschot, 1994). But a person cannot achieve this on his or her own when at 
the end of life. Palliative care is directed toward the sustainment and fostering of 
a patient's authenticity through the realisation that the caregivers and the patient 
share the condition of dependency and vulnerability as well as the ability to 
make free and authentic choices. An acknowledgement that these traits are 
common to all people can open the way for caregivers to provide compassionate 
care for the most fragile and dependent members of our society. Our solidarity 
with the dying is symbolic of the solidarity of our society in general. The notion 
of authenticity situates the individual in the context of a community. In some 
ways, when we care for the dying we are caring for the society to which we 
belong. Authenticity can be taken as a communitarian concept involving the idea 
of compassionate care.
The dying are no less authentic than the healthy. Exactly because we can 
relate to our radical dependency and to our fragility the dying can be as authen­
tic (or inauthentic) as anyone else. First and foremost, the dying are fellow 
human beings. They experience the condition humaine as anyone else. Only 
after having realised this is compassionate care possible. Compassionate care 
can be called authentic care because it is directed toward the fostering of a 
person’s authenticity. Everyone surrounding the patient, from the physician to 
the secretary, has a role to play in fostering the dying patient's authenticity.
Let us consider the woman described in the case report. The first month of 
her stay in the hospice can be described in terms of autonomy. She wanted to be 
in control of her own death and did not accept the compassionate care of the 
team and her children. At one point, however, she came to a realisation. After 
this, her defensiveness disappeared and she began to accept her dependency on 
others. The woman opened up to her caregivers. At meetings of hospice 
workers, her caregivers expressed astonishment at the woman’s ability to change 
and that she could be so at one with herself.
Many physicians in the Netherlands would have acted on this woman’s 
choice to have euthanasia. Her situation certainly fulfilled the conditions under 
which euthanasia is tolerated. The patient was a competent woman in the 
terminal phase of her disease. In retrospect, however, it may be appropriate to 
question whether her choice was authentic (Zylicz and Janssens, 1998). From 
her reaction to the proposal of the hospice physician it appeared that deep in her 
heart she was afraid of being put to death. She wanted to die but she did not 
want to be killed.
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For our understanding of palliative care, authenticity is a more adequate 
notion than is autonomy. Authenticity encompasses the notions of dependency 
and fragility while leading to the recognition of solidarity, compassion, and love. 
It also encompasses the notion of freedom of choice and points to the respect for 
the personal needs and wishes of the dying.
The notion of authenticity can clarify dimensions of psychosocial care. 
However, authenticity can hardly encompass spiritual care. The philosophical 
tradition of existentialism stated that ‘existence’ is all that is real. Only in 
existence, only in the fact that something ‘is’, truth can be found. Without 
existence there is absolutely nothing. The realisation of this foundational idea of 
existentialism clearly makes life in the face of death absurd and fearsome. Even 
in Kierkegaard's philosophy, religious faith was only conceivable as the 
endurance of meaninglessness. It takes an unexplainable ‘leap of faith’ to 
become religious. Furthermore, faith, according to Kierkegaard, entailed little 
more than a personal dialogue with God. But if that is so, existentialism 
eventually fails because authenticity, together with the notions of freedom, 
dependency and solidarity looses its meaning in the face of existential 
meaninglessness, absurdity and fear. This is why the notion of authenticity 
should be paired with an eschatology that addresses questions on the meaning of 
life.
3. The spiritual realm and the notion of hope
Perhaps, instead of spirituality, eschatology is a more adequate term to address 
the realm of spirituality. Eschatology refers to the things of ultimate importance, 
to what human life is in the end all about. Whereas it used to refer to the 
afterlife, modern theology stresses the importance of the image of the afterlife 
for life on earth. Heaven is not so much something we wait for when we die as it 
is a worthwhile goal to strive for here and now. Real heaven is heaven on earth. 
That is what we finally hope for. In considering hope as a notion that can 
enhance our understanding of palliative care we can connect with modern 
theology within which eschatology plays a crucial, foundational role.
Mortality makes eschatology possible. Because we die eschatological 
questions urge themselves upon us. Whether we like it or not, implicitly or 
explicitly, we have to answer questions relating to the meaning of life, exactly 
because we all live in the face of death. Death forces us to give a final meaning 
to life and to transcend the apparent absurdity and meaninglessness of life in the 
face of death. The ultimate meaning we give to life provides us with hope. Hope
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is thus an existential category. Without hope we cannot live. For Christians this 
existential hope, one of the three gifts of grace attributed to the Holy Spirit, 
relates to God’s kingdom. In it humans find their fulfilment. God's kingdom is 
already present because of the resurrection of Jesus Christ, though it has not yet 
reached its fulfilment. Even Kant, the rational philosopher of the Enlightenment, 
states that humans as a moral species strive for a fulfilment that cannot be fully 
achieved in this world (Kant, 1956). According to him, the ‘unimaginable’ 
fulfilment must be considered in order to live in the ‘imaginable’ unfulfilled 
present.
If hope is an existential category, it can never be completely destroyed by 
suffering, disaster, injustice, or violence. Rather, hope resists suffering. Hope 
liberates (Moltmann, 1966). Dying patients who are suffering from the situation 
they find themselves in and their relatives who face bereavement cannot live 
without hope, no matter how small or how deeply hidden it is. Absolute hopeles­
sness, if it exists at all, is in a way death. Often, loving care from friends and 
relatives can renew a patient’s hope. And compassionate care by professionals 
should be aimed at sustaining and bolstering a patient's hope. The careful 
communication of the truth with regard to a patient's condition is a better basis 
for sustaining hope than is the fostering of illusions (Kodish and Post, 1995).
The seeming contrast between suffering and hope is irrefutably counter­
balanced by many dying patients, who reveal that severe pain, of any kind, does 
not extinguish hope. Consider our patient: Even though statistically the chances 
of long-term survival with small cell lung cancer are 6 %, the woman hoped that 
she would be cured during the first year of her disease process. She stopped 
smoking and did exactly what the doctors told her to do. She began smoking 
again when she heard that her disease was progressing. She opted for palliative 
chemotherapy and radiotherapy to live with an acceptable quality of life for 
another couple of months. During that time, she regularly went to work and 
finished what she had to do. Then, the time came when palliative chemotherapy 
had to be discontinued and she was admitted to the hospice. To the caregiving 
team she seemed detached. She was afraid that her brain metastasis would drive 
her insane, that she would suffocate and die an undignified death. However, she 
did hope to live long enough to see once again her sister, who lived in India.
From the day she showed her grief to the hospice physician, she grew more 
and more ‘authentic’. She was no longer afraid to die. Her request for euthanasia 
could be seen as a paradoxical sign of fear of death. When it was decided that 
the corticosteroids would be discontinued, she felt relieved. Her daughters 
managed well and she died in dignity.
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During the course of her disease, this woman's hope varied in object. Time 
after time she shifted her bounds. Initially, when there was still a small 
possibility for a cure, the main object of her hope was survival. When it became 
clear that she had only a couple of months to live, her hope was founded on the 
quality of remaining life. By the time life-prolonging treatment was withdrawn, 
she felt fear but still had hope, hope for a dignified death and a visit from her 
sister. During the last weeks of her life she expressed concern about her 
daughters; she hoped they would manage well together. Undoubtedly, this 
woman must have had periods when hope appeared to be absent. Still, time after 
time she was able to regain hope and enjoy her life. In this respect, the care she 
received from her children, friends and from the caregiving team was of para­
mount importance.
The fostering of patients' and relatives' hope can be seen as central to 
palliative care because hope is conditional to a life worth living.
Conclusion
It is suggested that medical restraint, authenticity, and hope are notions that can 
enhance our understanding of palliative care. Their meaning has been examined 
in the context of different philosophical and theological traditions from which 
they originated and have related them to the story of a patient.
The notion of restraint emphasises the acknowledgement of the boundaries 
of medicine. In the medical realm of palliative care, the disease process is no 
longer treated and the patient is allowed to die. Furthermore, restraint leads to 
recognition of the multidimensionality of palliative care. The medical realm 
cannot be considered separately from the psychosocial and spiritual realms of 
palliative care. Medical restraint can also be understood as a way of being 
susceptible and responsive to the patient.
The notion of authenticity is proposed as one that is more likely to provide 
a meaningful perspective on palliative care than does the principle of autonomy. 
Within the notion of authenticity patients' choices are understood not as ad hoc 
decisions that have to be met but as choices related to personality and character. 
Furthermore, this notion takes human fragility and dependency into account. 
Those who care for the dying should presume that dying is part of life. The 
dying are fellow human beings. They should be seen as equals, as subjects with 
a need and a right for the best of care. If we deny them this right, we deny a part 
of ourselves, as we are as vulnerable and fragile as the dying and equally
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inclined to make choices appropriate to our personalities. Through palliative 
care, the authenticity of the dying should be fostered.
The notion of authenticity is situated within the tradition of existentialism 
and it is argued that existentialism eventually fails in providing the foundations 
for authenticity. Authenticity loses its meaning in the face of existential 
absurdity and fear. Therefore, authenticity should be paired with an eschatology 
in which the notion of hope is foundational. Hope is an existential category 
without which we cannot live. Even severe suffering cannot extinguish hope. 
Many patients with incurable illnesses and their relatives redirect the object of 
their hope time after time. Hope is one condition of a life worth living. 
Therefore, it should be fostered through adequate palliative care.
These three notions should play a more important role in the debates on 
palliative care. They can provide a means by which those working in palliative 
care can articulate and sensitise their experiences. The notion of medical 
restraint may be relevant to the medical profession in general. And the notions 
of authenticity and hope may be interpreted more generally as virtues that hold 
significance for everyone. However, in the context of the care for the dying, 
there is a particular urgency in understanding them. The dying are members of 
our society. They are just like everyone else, except that they are about to leave 
us. A society that withholds the best possible care for its departing members is 
in danger of losing its cohesion (note that the Latin roots of the word ‘society’ 
refer to ‘fellowship’ and ‘union’). The care we give to the dying is therefore not 
only due care, it is also an illustration of the cohesion and morality of our 
society.
Note
* Modifications in comparison to the published article:
- The title has been changed.
- The notion of authenticity is analysed here in paragraph 2. In the article, a paragraph was 
added whereas the text has remained the same.
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CHAPTER 7
HOSPICE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE NETHERLANDS 
AN ETHICAL POINT OF VIEW
A modified version of this chapter was published as*:
Janssens MJPA, ten Have HAMJ, Zylicz Z, Hospice and euthanasia in the 
Netherlands. An ethical point of view. Journal of Medical Ethics 1999; 25: 408­
412.
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HOSPICE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE NETHERLANDS
AN ETHICAL POINT OF VIEW
Introduction
As part of a research project on palliative care ethics, a two-months' participant 
observation has been made of terminal care practice in the Hospice Rozenheuvel 
in Rozendaal near the city of Arnhem in the Netherlands. In contrast to theoretical 
analysis, this study provided opportunities to experience the intrinsic connected­
ness of moral issues with everyday hospice practice (Ten Have, 1994; Welie, 
1994).
In this chapter, first the organisational context of hospice care in the 
Netherlands will be briefly presented with a specific focus on the Hospice 
Rozenheuvel. Subsequently, several complex moral problems directly and indi­
rectly related to the problem of euthanasia which arose in hospice practice during 
the observation period will be discussed by means of four case reports.
1. Hospice care in the Netherlands
In April 1996, the ‘Network Palliative care for Terminal patients in the Nether­
lands’ (Netwerk Palliatieve zorg voor Terminale patiënten Nederland, NPTN) was 
founded. It is a network organisation with the majority of professional palliative 
care organisations as members. According to the data of this network there were in 
the Netherlands in 1998, 16 hospices of which 2 were in the process of 
establishment (NPTN, 1997). These 16 hospices vary to a great extent in 
professionality; 7 of them are member of the Netherlands Hospice Movement 
(Nederlandse Hospice Beweging, NHB) which is a foundation that unites local 
voluntary ‘hospice-groups’ which care for patients at home. If care at home is no 
longer possible, patients can be taken care of in a so-called ‘almost-at-home-home’ 
(bijna thuis huis). This is a house with a personal atmosphere; it functions as a 
substitute residence where the patient can be as ‘home’ as possible. The general 
practitioner of the patient remains responsible and the family is much involved in 
the care for the patient. Only volunteers are working in these almost-at-home- 
homes. The Netherlands Hospice Movement requires that the houses are not based 
on a religious conviction. It does not take a stand to euthanasia which is deemed 
the responsibility of the general practitioner together with the patient. Obviously,
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from these ‘almost-at-home-homes’ there is no formal information exchange to the 
formal health care system (except for the visits of the general practitioners) but the 
co-operation with the home care services of the region is close. The financial 
sources are private donations. All houses have 3 beds (total of 21). The first 
almost-at-home-home was founded in 1986 in the village of Nieuwkoop.
Apart from these hospices associated with the NHB, there are, according 
to the data of 1998, 5 more ‘low care hospices’. These hospices have a Christian 
foundation and euthanasia cannot be provided inside the hospice. They are 
financed by churches and religious congregations and by private gifts. Their 
aims resemble those of the almost-at-home-homes. The patients do not have to 
be Christians themselves. These five hospices have 27 beds all together. They 
have all been established in the late 1990’s.
In 1999, there were 4 professional ‘high care hospices’ in the Netherlands. 
These hospices have a physician specialised in palliative care (some physicians 
followed specialisation programmes in the UK). 3 out of these 4 hospices provide 
regular consultations to general practitioners taking care of the patients at home. 
Most of their patients suffer from pain or other symptoms and are in need of 
specialist palliative care although temporary relief of the home care situation can 
also be a reason for admission. Even though the hospice physicians do visit the 
houses of the patients for intake, the hospices themselves do not provide home 
care. For their finances, the hospices rely to a great extent on private foundations 
and gifts. All hospices provide family and bereavement support. All professional 
hospices are Christian but patients are never refused because of their religious 
views. These hospices have 29 beds all together. The first of the four hospices was 
founded in 1991 in Vleuten near the city of Utrecht. Of these hospices, the 
Hospice Rozenheuvel is internationally known, not only because of the 
international publications of its physician but also because of its educational activi­
ties which attract a world-wide audience. This hospice was established in 1994 and 
is financed by the Salvation Army. Sometimes one can read in the literature that 
the Netherlands has only one hospice, founded in 1994 (e.g. van Schaik, 1994). 
Even though this is incorrect and does not do justice to the other hospices, it 
reflects the particular status of the Hospice Rozenheuvel. Rozenheuvel comes clo­
se to the model of the British hospices. It is an in-patient hospice with nine beds. 
The hospice physician also offers advice to general practitioners who take care of 
patients at home and to internists working in a nearby hospital. Apart from in- and 
outpatient care, the hospice also co-ordinates international educational and 
research activities. The hospice is affiliated with several foreign palliative care 
associations. Of the other two hospices, one, the hospice Calando, was founded in
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1998 in Dirksland, south of Rotterdam, and one, the hospice Kuria, was founded in 
1992 in Amsterdam.
Apart from these 16 hospices, one children's hospice was founded in 1997. It 
provides place for 8 children who are cared for by specialist nurses, volunteers and 
an educationalist.
Although currently many low-care hospices are originating, the climate for a 
further institutionalisation of high-care hospices is negative. It is argued that the 
Netherlands is in need of a small number of highly specialised professional hos­
pices. These would primarily serve as education and consultation centres for 
nurses, general practitioners and medical specialists (Zylicz, 1994). Thus, without 
becoming a medical specialism, specialists in palliative care would be brought 
forth by education in these hospice centres. These specialists would provide 
consultations to their colleagues in hospitals or primary care-practice. But the 
majority of physicians and policy makers hold that, since the quality of Dutch 
health care is good and since the academic centres have good potentials to provide 
educational activities and co-ordinate further research, there is no need to establish 
separate institutions (see chapter 4).
It is important to realise that all Dutch high-care hospices, including the 
hospice Rozenheuvel, base themselves on a Christian world view and therefore do 
not consider euthanasia as an option in palliative care. In the context of a country 
in which the practice of euthanasia has been accepted by the majority of the 
population (e.g. Dutch Parliament, 1997) they can be seen as a critical minority. 
All hospices want to show that through compassionate palliative care, many (not 
all) euthanasia requests can be prevented or taken away. The maxim that the 
patient's death should neither be intentionally hastened nor uncritically postponed 
is pervasive for hospice practice. In this contribution, an account is given of a 
participant observation in the Hospice Rozenheuvel, in the village of Rozendaal. It 
will be indicated that, even though the maxim is morally crucial for hospice 
practice, its application to everyday practice is not easy and sometimes goes hand 
in hand with mixed, ambivalent emotions.
2. Moral decisions at the end of life in a Dutch hospice
In this section, various moral decisions concerning the above mentioned maxim 
(i.e. not intentionally to hasten, nor uncritically to postpone a patient’s death) 
will be analysed with the help of four case reports. The case reports are helpful 
because they indicate how the maxim is integrated in everyday hospice practice. 
Often, the application of this maxim is problematic and in need of a critical
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analysis. Sometimes, the needs and wishes of the patient are ambiguous. Also, 
differences of opinion between the patient and his/her loved ones can be difficult 
to manage. Ample discussion with the patients and their families cannot always 
neutralise ambivalent emotions for the clinical team.
Case 1: Terminal sedation
A woman of 61 years old suffers from a breast carcinoma with metastases to the 
lungs. She is extremely short of breath. Most of the day she sits in her bed, leaning 
on her elbow, gasping for breath. She also suffers from nausea. Morphine in 
relatively high dose does not seem to be successful anymore. Corticosteroids are 
being added. In the past she had asked for euthanasia several times but her daugh­
ters had always been able to persuade her not to have it carried out.
One morning, she has a perforation of the stomach. An IV infusion with 
omeprazole is administered. That afternoon she keeps on vomiting, while suffering 
from severe dyspnea. The patient is hardly able to speak. The family argues for 
euthanasia. The patient is in severe distress. The hospice-physician discusses an 
increase of sedating drugs. A calm and realistic discussion makes the family 
members change their minds on euthanasia and accept sedation as an option. After 
having said farewell to their mother and wife, the morphine and midazolam doses 
are increased. The patient becomes calm and is not distressed anymore. Also the 
family calms down and appreciates the care and the atmosphere around them. The 
patient dies quietly the next day.
As the patient's lungs had been grossly damaged by the growth of the tumor, it was 
impossible to relieve her dyspnea, without decreasing her conscience. When her 
family asked the hospice-physician to help their beloved, the physician saw no 
other alternative to relieve the patient's suffering than to further increase the 
medication doses. The administration of high morphine and midazolam doses 
alleviated distress but also rendered this patient unconscious. It is in this sense that 
the principle of double effect may apply to this case even though it remains 
questionable (1) whether rendering a patient unconscious in such circumstances 
should be seen as a moral evil and (2) whether the unconsciousness of the patient 
(the supposed bad effect) is the means to achieve the good effect. Terminal 
sedation should first and foremost be seen as a means of relief of refractory (total) 
pain. Taking the patient’s consciousness away is not the physician’s intention.
Terminal sedation used to be associated with the hastening of the patient’s 
death (see chapter 8). Recent research has provided good evidence that in this case
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it is very unlikely that the patient’s life was shortened (Verhagen et al, 1999; 
Ventafridda et al, 1990). This does not mean however that it was an easy task for 
the caregivers to render this suffering woman unconscious. In most cases, also 
here, terminal sedation involves mixed emotions on the side of the patient’s loved 
ones as well as on the side of the caring team. The time to say goodbye is brought 
about by the administration of the sedatives and separated from the moment of 
death. Still, the moral ambivalence and uncertainty of this kind of decisions is 
rather limited.
However, in a small number of extreme cases in hospice practice, terminal 
sedation will almost certainly shorten the patient’s life. And in such cases, it may 
be hard to discern intentions and unwanted side-effects. The next case is 
illustrative in this respect.
Case 2: The limits of palliative care
A 50-year-old homeless man with a history of drug abuse and psychopathology 
had developed a malignant tumour from neurofibromatosis. He was diagnosed 
with a growing sarcoma in the left buttock. He was referred to the hospice at an 
early stage of the disease. The tumor was growing slowly, invading the sacral 
nerves but not metastasising. During a relatively long period morphine, 
carbamezapine, phentanyl, ketamine and buppivaccaine were administered both 
subcutaneously and intrathecally and appeared successful for a while. However, 
his pain returned time after time. This made it almost impossible for the team to 
establish a consistent strategy of pain and symptom management. When in pain, 
the patient was screaming loudly, demanding euthanasia. However, the days the 
pain was absent he explicitly rejected euthanasia. As this situation lasted for 
several months the team, together with the patient, began to burn out. During the 
last days of his life he suffered excruciating pain and sedation was considered. As 
levomepromazine 250 mg/24hours sc was unsuccessful, barbiturates were admi­
nistered but the dose was insufficient to sedate him. He kept suffering from severe 
pain. The dose of barbiturates was increased, which made the last hours of the 
patient’s life bearable. Semi-conscious, he said goodbye to the team and died 
peacefully.
In this case, and contrary to the first case, it is very likely that the high dose of 
barbiturates hastened the death of this patient drastically. From a theoretical 
perspective, the principle of double effect applies here too. The direct effect of the 
administration of the sedative medication is the relief of the patient’s suffering.
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The indirect effect is the hastening of the death of the patient. Furthermore, the 
good effect, the relief of suffering, was immediately caused by the sedation and 
not resulting from the bad effect, the hastening of death. Finally, the administration 
of barbiturates can in itself, independent of its effects, not be considered as morally 
evil (Boyle, 1980). The morality of sedation illuminates the moral meaning of the 
principle of double effect (Cherny and Portenoy, 1994). Proponents of euthanasia 
often argue that in everyday practice, intentions are not so clearly distinguishable 
as the principle of double effect seems to imply. However, in hospice practice, 
where euthanasia is considered as a ‘Rubicon’, the distinction between euthanasia 
and unintentionally hastening a patient’s death is crucial.
The theoretical tenability of the principle of double effect, does not mean that 
this particular case was unproblematic. It put a heavy strain on the caring team. All 
care-givers felt burnt out. Because of the emotional instability and manipulative 
attitude of the patient, it was extremely hard to develop a compassionate attitude 
towards him. In a review carried out afterwards a discrepancy was observed 
between the caring attitude of the team and the psychopathology of the patient. 
The latter required a specific tough approach with which the team members had 
not much experience. Therefore, a clear strategy of care, in order to deal 
adequately with the patient’s needs and wishes, remained absent.
Another problem concerned the intractability of the patient’s pain. This 
intractability did not only come from his clinical picture and his history of drug 
abuse. Also his attitude towards his pain, and by that the character of his pain 
itself, differed radically from one moment to another. Sometimes he appeared to 
be able to tolerate the pain. Other times, especially during the nights, he was scre­
aming for a doctor to come and relieve his suffering, thereby awakening other 
patients.
The team’s inability to deal with this patient’s needs together with the 
intractability of his pain led to the eventual decision to sedate the patient. Even 
though the principle of double effect can justify the decisions taken, it cannot be 
denied that there is an appearance of pragmatism in the attempts to sedate this 
patient. The suspicion arose that the caring team would be quite pleased if the 
sedation hastened the patient’s death. As euthanasia is often criticised as a poor 
solution when there is a shortage of palliative care (Roy and Rapin, 1994), in the 
experience of the caring team this case could be criticised for the same reason. One 
of the main aims of hospice-based palliative care in the Netherlands is to reduce 
the high number of euthanasia cases, through compassionate care. In this case this 
aim was frustrated. This frustration can hardly be explained by moral theory. Only 
by taking into account the practice of palliative care with its range of emotions, 
attitudes and habits, can the problems of this case be understood.
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Case 3: Withdrawing life-sustaining treatment
In chapter 6, the case of the 58-year-old divorced female lawyer, who suffered 
from a bronchus-carcinoma with brain metastasis, was extensively described. Here 
follows a summary. During the first conversation she had with the hospice 
physician, months before she was admitted to the hospice, she stated that she 
wanted euthanasia if her suffering became unbearable. The hospice physician 
informed her gently that although this option was not available in the hospice he 
would never abandon her. If she would persist in her request, she could be 
transferred to the hospital.
At the time of admission to the hospice she was suffering from pain which 
decreased after a short time. After an emotionally difficult period, she started to 
enjoy life in the hospice, saying that for the first time in her life she finally was 
able to get rest. Everyone who spoke to her regularly noticed how well she develo­
ped emotionally and how she became more and more able to give voice to her 
many ‘soul wounds’ of the past. Her relationship with her two daughters grew 
more intense than ever.
However, the time came when her energy started slipping away. She wanted 
to die. Because of increasing headache and nausea a corticosteroid called 
dexamethasone was proposed. She refused it as she was afraid of its life-prolon­
ging effects. Only later, when the symptoms became aggravated, did she agree to 
have corticosteroids. This relieved her suffering. However, she became more and 
more tired. Again, she explicitly requested euthanasia. She wanted to be 
transferred to the hospital. In an emotional discussion with her daughters the 
hospice physician proposed discontinuation of dexamethasone and the control of 
her pain and nausea by alternative measures. She was relieved by this proposal as 
her two daughters both disliked the idea of euthanasia. She died peacefully four 
days later, under sedation.
25 % of all patients admitted to Hospice Rozenheuvel state they want euthanasia 
when suffering becomes unbearable (Zylicz and Janssens, 1998). However, 
between 1994 and 1998, only two hospice patients out of 571 have persisted in 
their wish; they were eventually transferred to the hospital to undergo euthanasia.
In palliative care the assessment of the patient’s reasons to request euthanasia 
is paramount. In this respect the public nature of the Dutch euthanasia debate 
enhances the openness of the communication between the physician and the 
patient with regard to euthanasia. Placing the needs and wishes of the patient in the 
centre requires an absence of taboos. In palliative care, the patient should feel free 
to discuss all relevant concerns with the carers.
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This patient uttered two euthanasia requests to the hospice physician. The 
first one was made well before her admission. It appeared to stem from an urge to 
remain in control and to be independent. This attitude had characterised her entire 
life. Her urge for control and independence clearly remained present during the 
first week of her stay in the hospice. Only when she came to feel at home in the 
hospice did she learn to accept her dependence on the caring people surrounding 
her. She became able to deal with her soul wounds of the past. In these two months 
she never repeated her request for euthanasia. When she felt that everything was 
said and done, she started to deteriorate and began to feel burnt out. A second 
euthanasia request came up but this time for different reasons.
As one of the effects of the corticosteroids was life prolongation it seems 
questionable to regard the administration of corticosteroids as futile from a 
medical point of view. However, futility of medical treatment does not only relate 
to the medical realm but is situated in the larger context of the needs and wishes of 
the unique individual. Medication with the primary function to postpone death can 
be considered futile in palliative care if the patient no longer experiences any 
benefit. The assessment of futility requires extensive discussion with the patient 
and her/his family to find out whether the treatment is beneficial. As this patient 
was burnt out and ready to die it was decided, after ample discussion, to 
discontinue dexamethasone. In her immediate reaction to this decision the patient 
said to the hospice physician: “So I don't have to undergo euthanasia?” It thus 
appeared that she never really wanted to be killed.
Case 4: Euthanasia
A 55-year-old man was suffering from a bladder carcinoma. He had excruciating 
colic pain and constipation. Together with his general practitioner he was seen at 
home by the hospice physician. The hospice physician advised phentanyl 10 
mg/24 hours, which is already a high dose. At the same time efforts were made to 
activate colon movements and treat constipation. When the patient’s pain did not 
diminish the general practitioner, without further consultation, increased the dose 
of phentanyl, which however also increased the colic pain. He did not pay 
attention to the constipation. After several pain attacks the patient requested eutha­
nasia because of his excruciating pain. When the hospice physician was informed 
about the decision of the patient he rushed to the patient’s home. He prescribed ot­
her medication which decreased the cramps. When euthanasia was performed by 
the general practitioner, the patient was almost free from pain.
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His wife and his daughters were opposed to their loved one’s decision. His 
son, however, supported his father’s decision. After the husband’s death, his wife 
got severely depressed. She was cared for by the hospice bereavement team.
This case illustrates the findings of a recent report that evaluated the notification 
procedure with regard to euthanasia (Van der Wal et al, 1996; Van der Maas et al, 
1996; Hendin et al, 1997). According to this study in 88 % of all 3200 annual eu­
thanasia cases the treatment at that time was palliative in character. In 83 % of all 
cases the euthanising physician stated that treatment alternatives were no longer 
available. According to the physicians these patients were suffering unbearably 
and irreversibly. The inability to palliate the suffering of these patients was the 
main reason behind the decision in favour of euthanasia or physician-assisted 
suicide.
As mentioned above, there is a broadly shared acknowledgement that much 
can be improved with regard to palliative care in the Netherlands and this case 
highlights the necessity of this improvement (Zylicz, 1996). Increasing the doses 
of phentanyl by the general practitioner to diminish the colic pain of this patient 
led to a reverse effect. Presumably, if the general practitioner had had better know­
ledge of pain and symptom control (or if he had consulted the hospice physician 
more often) this case of euthanasia could and would have been prevented.
Furthermore, the role of third parties in this case, notably the son of the 
patient, may well have infringed the autonomy of the patient’s request. It remains 
questionable whether, on the day of the patient’s death, just when his pain became 
bearable for the first time in weeks, his euthanasia request was really autonomous. 
The idea that palliative care takes the patient and his/her loved ones as the unity of 
care, may turn out to be an ideal. Not all family members wish to be cared for, and 
not all family relations are close and loving (Janssens and Willems, 2000).
Finally, one other consideration deserves attention. Euthanasia may have 
profound and still unpredictable effects on the bereaved. Following a loved one’s 
death by euthanasia, psychopathological symptoms may well occur in the 
bereaved (Zylicz and Janssens, 1998). The maltreatment of this patient’s pain, 
which eventually was the reason for having euthanasia carried out, was for the pa­
tient’s wife a terrible experience. It illustrates the importance of bereavement 
services by the people who cared for the deceased (Murray Parkes, 1996).
Conclusion
Palliative care practice is pervaded by complex moral problems. In this chapter 
some of these problems, directly and indirectly relating to euthanasia, have been
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discussed. It is important to note that the concept of palliative care was 
developed out of moral motivations. The foundation of St Christopher's Hospice 
in 1967 by Dame Cicely Saunders arose from two moral discomforts (see 
chapter 2). First, there was a moral discomfort with mainstream medicine. Many 
people became aware that care for the terminally ill was seriously underesti­
mated in mainstream health care. Medicine focused primarily on technological 
interventions and repair of bodily disorders. Its main goal was cure. If cure was 
not possible, prolongation of life became imperative. Second, there was a moral 
discomfort with the growing influence of the British Voluntary Euthanasia 
Society which pleaded for the legalisation of euthanasia. Terminal care holds the 
middle between these forces: in principle, nothing is done to postpone or hasten 
death. Life-prolonging treatment, which is potentially harmful for the well-being 
of terminal patients and which can make the acceptance of their situation more 
difficult, is deemed futile. Intentionally hastening death is regarded as dangerous 
and unnecessary since patients’ requests for euthanasia are often ambivalent and 
preventable in the context of good palliative care.
Note
* Modifications in comparison to the published article:
- Paragraph 1 of this chapter focuses on the organisation of hospice care in the Netherlands 
whereas in the published article focus was on the status of palliative care in the Netherlands 
in general (which is the subject of chapter 4).
- Case 1 was added, stressing new insights that terminal sedation in most cases does not 
shorten the patient’s life.
- Case 3 has been summarised in order to avoid overlap with chapter 6.
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TERMINAL SEDATION IN PALLIATIVE CARE PRACTICE 
AN ETHICAL EVALUATION
CHAPTER 8
This chapter has been submitted for publication as:
Janssens MJPA, Gordijn B, ten Have HAMJ, Terminal sedation in palliative 
care practice. An ethical evaluation.
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TERMINAL SEDATION IN PALLIATIVE CARE PRACTICE 
AN ETHICAL POINT OF VIEW
Introduction
For a long time, the ethical debates on medical decision-making at the end of 
life have focussed on the morality or immorality of euthanasia. Since the rise of 
modern medical ethics in the late 1960s, arguments pro and con have addressed 
the patient’s autonomy on the one hand and the physician’s duty to do well on 
the other. Since only recently, more attention has been paid to the question of 
the preventability of euthanasia, especially in the light of further developments 
in palliative care. Evidence suggests that most requests for euthanasia disappear 
when good palliative care is provided (Gordijn and Janssens, 2000). A central 
question refers to what should be done if the suffering of a patient persists in 
spite of good palliative care. Are euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide at the 
request of the patient morally justified in such cases? Should alternatives be 
sought even if the patient has autonomously and repeatedly requested for 
euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide? And if so, what kind of alternatives? 
And what if these alternatives, such as high doses of medication, or withdrawal 
of artificial hydration and nutrition, are likely to lead to a sooner death? Many 
aspects of this ethical debate have remained unclear. Unclear has remained what 
terminal sedation amounts to in the first place. Especially the adjective 
‘terminal’ seems to suggest that termination of the patient’s life may be the aim 
of the physician administering the sedatives. An unresolved issue relates to the 
role of intentions for the morality of our acts and the ethical validity of the so- 
called doctrine of double effect. Unresolved remains also what should be done if 
the patient persists in his/her request for euthanasia when the option of terminal 
sedation is offered. And finally, still unresolved is the issue of withholding 
artificial hydration and nutrition from the terminally sedated patient. Much 
unclarity still circles around the plausibility of moral differences between 
terminal sedation and euthanasia.
In this chapter, the ethical debate on medical decision-making at the end of 
life, particularly with regard to presumed moral differences between terminal 
sedation on the one hand and euthanasia on the other hand will be analysed and 
evaluated (possible moral differences between euthanasia and physician-assisted 
suicide fall outside the scope of this chapter). Both acts are often called ‘means of 
last resort’, indicating that they are only justifiable if a patient’s pain, whether it be 
of a physical, emotional, social or spiritual nature, persists in spite of the best
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palliative modalities. There is broad agreement that terminal sedation as well as 
euthanasia should be prevented through good palliative care where- and whenever 
possible. Debates start when a patient’s suffering becomes refractory.
Basically, three general positions with regard to the morality of the 
application of these means of last resort can be found in the literature. In the first 
paragraph, a summary of these positions will be given. One position holds that in 
palliative care, terminal sedation is the only means of last resort and that 
euthanasia cannot be part of palliative care. A second position holds that in some 
cases, euthanasia can be part of palliative care, even though terminal sedation is to 
be morally preferred. A third position holds that, from a moral point of view, 
terminal sedation is indifferent from euthanasia and that both practices can be part 
of palliative care.
After having summarised these positions, It will be argued in the second 
paragraph that the third position is untenable, referring to two moral beliefs that 
are firmly rooted in the morality of any civil society. The first moral belief tells us 
that intention is a relevant criterion for determining the morality of an act. The 
second belief says that the termination of another person's life is either a prima 
facie or an absolute evil. If one agrees with these beliefs, one cannot hold that 
euthanasia and terminal sedation are morally indifferent. In the third paragraph, it 
is discussed whether terminal sedation can be a better alternative to euthanasia as 
the first and second positions imply. Based on the moral beliefs analysed in the 
preceding paragraph, it will be argued that the use of terminal sedation as a means 
of last resort in palliative care is a morally better alternative for euthanasia. The 
issue of terminal sedation deserves therefore more attention in the debates on 
medical decision-making at the end of life than it has received so far.
1. Ethical comparison of terminal sedation and euthanasia
In this paragraph, the three most widely held positions regarding moral 
comparisons of euthanasia and terminal sedation will be analysed. One position 
accepts terminal sedation as a means of last resort and excludes euthanasia from 
palliative care. Referring to the principle of double effect, it is argued within this 
position that, even if terminal sedation would shorten the life of the patient, this is 
by no means the intended outcome but merely a foreseeable side effect of the 
treatment of refractory pain or suffering. The second position holds that, under 
particular circumstances, euthanasia can be justified as component of palliative 
care. According to this position, the doctrine of double effect has validity in 
justifying terminal sedation (which is therefore to be considered morally preferable
138
over euthanasia) but in some cases of overriding force, active euthanasia should be 
seen as the only humane alternative. The third position holds that terminal sedation 
is morally indifferent from euthanasia and that principally both can be part of 
palliative care. According to this position, the doctrine of double effect is 
untenable for instance because there is no moral difference between intending and 
foreseeing an outcome. The theory that both terminal sedation and euthanasia 
should be excluded from palliative care will not be addressed since recent 
literature holding this theory is non-existent.
1.1. Terminal sedation as the only means of last resort
Sometimes, even the best of palliative care cannot relieve a patient's distress to a 
tolerable degree. It is argued that this almost exclusively happens when the patient 
is imminently dying (Dunlop et al. 1995). In such cases, when all other palliative 
modalities have failed or are no longer successful, terminal sedation can be offered 
as an option. Terminal sedation can be defined as “deliberately inducing and 
maintaining deep sleep, but not deliberately causing death in specific intractable 
circumstances” (Chater, 1998, p. 257). The patient is put to sleep through 
administration of morphine (which is not a proper sedative but can, when given in 
high doses, sedate patients as a side effect), benzodiazepines or barbiturates (which 
are proper sedatives) (Cherney et al. 1994).
In the literature there is some ambiguity with regard to the life shortening 
effects of sedative medication. Ventafridda et al. have argued that terminal 
sedation does not shorten life (Ventafridda et al. 1990). Verhagen et al. even 
indicated that terminally sedated patients may have a longer life expectancy than a 
comparable group of non-sedated patients as the relief of suffering may have a 
positive impact on the often exhausted bodies of the terminally ill (Verhagen et al.
1999). However, Truog et al. have argued that there is at least a risk that life is 
shortened by terminal sedation (Truog et al. 1992). And Orentlicher writes: “In 
most cases terminal sedation shortens the patient’s life by only hours to days, but it 
may shorten life by as much as several weeks” (Orentlicher, 1997, p. 1237). 
Wilson et al. found in interviews with physicians that “many ... considered 
hastening death a possible, if not likely, consequence of administering sedatives 
and analgesics due to their hemodynamic and respiratory depressant qualities” 
(Wilson et al., 1992, p. 953). The literature is not clear as to the life shortening 
effects of terminal sedation. However, taking into account the sometimes 
extremely high doses of pain medication used to render the patient asleep (Zylicz 
and Janssens, 1998), and taking also into account the respiratory depression that is
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often caused by high doses of morphine (Sulmasy and Pellegrino, 1999; Inturissi, 
1990), it seems reasonable to conclude that terminal sedation at least carries a risk 
of life shortening effects. This conclusion supports the ethical literature on 
terminal sedation which has addressed the principle of double effect in justifying 
the administration of high doses of sedatives.
Another ambiguity in the literature relates to the subject of dehydration in the 
terminally sedated patient. In most countries, artificial nutrition and hydration in 
the terminally sedated patient are withheld because they do not serve the patient’s 
comfort any longer. The vast majority of terminal patients who are dehydrated do 
not experience negative effects as long as adequate mouth care is provided 
(Ellershaw et al. 1995). In some cases hydration would even be contra-indicated as 
the negative effects of hydration, such as edema and dyspnea, outweigh the 
benefits. According to some, only in very few cases hydration should be continued 
in the terminally sedated patient, for example because the family requests so 
(Dunlop et al. 1995). Others are used to continue hydration in the terminally 
sedated patient (Morita et al. 1996).
Opinions on dehydration in the terminally sedated patient vary to a great 
extent. Craig for example has stated that policies of dehydration in the terminal 
phase are dangerous from an ethical, legal and medical point of view (Craig, 
1994). She expressed her concern that it is hard to determine whether or not a 
patient is imminently dying. She also suggested that deep sedation and dehydration 
are sometimes initiated where other means of relief of suffering may have been 
effective. One example would be a patient with a reversible confusional state who 
is mistakenly assumed to suffer from terminal delirium. Moreover, she argued that 
dehydration in the terminally sedated patient cannot be justified with the doctrine 
of double effect. If one of the side effects of terminal sedation is that the patient is 
unable to take fluids, this can easily be treated by starting artificial hydration. The 
possibility of the patient dying from a lack of fluids can be prevented without 
causing harm. It is not argued that dehydration would never be an option but, 
according to Craig, a policy of dehydrating terminally sedated patients is at least in 
danger of becoming a cloak for euthanasia. Also others support the view that, 
when a patient is no longer capable of taking fluids because the doses of 
medication have induced sleep, dehydration in a terminally sedated patient is from 
a moral point of view the same as euthanasia (Orentlicher, 1997).
One other issue in the debate concerns the question whether terminal sedation 
to relieve physical pain is morally different from terminal sedation to relieve 
emotional distress in terminal illness. It can be concluded from the literature that 
sedation to treat emotional and spiritual distress is relatively common practice. 
Research conducted by Chater et al. revealed that 10 % of palliative care
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physicians had sedated patients for emotional and spiritual distress (more than one 
reason could be given) (Chater et al. 1998). 14 % of the respondents had sedated 
patients to relieve anguish. Stone et al. found that sedation was indicated for relief 
of mental anguish in 8 out of 30 patients (again, more than one indication could be 
given) (Stone et al. 1997).
Responding to a case discussion presented by Billings and Block, Mount 
gave three reasons why physicians should be more hesitant to provide sedation as 
a means for mental suffering than they are for physical suffering (Billings and 
Block, 1996; Mount, 1996). First, physicians’ understanding of psychological and 
spiritual suffering is more primitive than in cases of physical suffering. Second, 
physicians are generally more uncomfortable in dealing with psychological and 
spiritual distress. Third, the presence of psychological and spiritual suffering does 
not indicate the presence of far advanced physiological deterioration. According to 
Mount, sedation for persistent psychological or spiritual suffering can be morally 
justified if no other modalities are available. Others have expressed similar 
concerns (Cherny, 1998; Rosen, 1998).
The position elaborated on above is based on an adherence to the principle of 
double effect. Intentional hastening of death is considered to fall outside the scope 
of medicine. Pain relief, even to the point that life shortening effects can be 
foreseen, is considered ethically sound as long as the life shortening effects are 
unintended. Artificial hydration and nutrition are considered medical treatments 
which can be withheld if they no longer serve the patient's comfort and if the 
patient's family agrees. Straightforward policies, rejecting the use of artificial 
hydration in a terminally sedated patient, are considered dangerous by some 
authors. The same goes for terminal sedation as a modality to treat refractory 
emotional or spiritual distress.
1.2. Euthanasia as a means of last resort when the option of terminal sedation 
fails
Currently, euthanasia is illegal in all countries of the world. Also in the 
Netherlands, up to now, euthanasia is prohibited by law, even though it is tolerated 
under specific circumstances (Ten Have and Welie, 1996). In the USA, two 
Appeals Courts have held that two state laws banning assisted suicide are 
unconstitutional. This decision was rejected by the US Supreme Court in 1997 
which held that euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide should be distinguished 
from the withdrawal of life sustaining treatment and terminal sedation (Burt, 
1997). In 1995, in the Northern Territory, Australia, euthanasia was legalised for
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some time but this legalisation was fairly rapidly overruled by the Federal 
Government (O’Connor, 1998). Even though the Netherlands are currently the 
only country in the world where there is an official policy of tolerance, it is safe to 
say that euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide also occur in other countries 
(Emanuel et al. 1998; Quill, 1991; van den Akker et al. 1997).
It is remarkable that most people working in the area of palliative care are 
firmly opposed to euthanasia. When Cicely Saunders established St Christopher's 
hospice in 1967 it was partly out of a moral discomfort with tendencies in British 
society in favour of legalisation of euthanasia. The hospice movement which, 
following the establishment of St Christopher's, has spread world-wide has always 
wanted to show that through good palliative care requests for euthanasia can be 
prevented and that requests for euthanasia can be dealt with humanely without 
actually having to meet these requests (Twycross, 1995).
Most, if not all, proponents of euthanasia share a good deal of these views. 
The term ‘proponent’ may even be inadequate. A ‘proponent’ writes: “No one is 
for euthanasia ... They perform or sanction them [i.e. cases of euthanasia RJ] as 
lesser evils ...” (Boisvert, 1988, p. 117) Also ‘proponents’ would admit that 
euthanasia can and should be prevented through good palliative care (Quill, 1991; 
Angell, 1997). They would admit that a well-considered and persistent request 
alone is not sufficient to justify euthanasia and that, if this request can be taken 
away through good care, it is imperative to do so. In the Netherlands, only one 
third of the 9600 annual requests for euthanasia are granted (Van der Maas et al.
1996). Arguably, the opinions of the physicians on the degree of suffering of the 
patient are in most cases decisive, instead of the request of the patient (Ten Have 
and Welie, 1996.)
The debate between ‘opponents’ and ‘proponents’ thus starts only in cases in 
which the best of palliative care has failed to control suffering. Physicians who 
accept euthanasia as a possible means of last resort in palliative care may inform 
the patient of the option of terminal sedation in the belief that this is to be preferred 
over euthanasia. But, even if a physician would prefer the option of terminal 
sedation, this option may not be humane for some patients. Situations of 
overriding force can be conceived of. In such situations, acts which seem wrong at 
first sight become permissible. Quill mentions for example patients with 
uncontrolled bleeding, obstruction from nasopharyngeal cancer, and refractory 
AIDS diarrhoea (Quill, 1997). For the family, it would be an intolerable burden to 
watch their sleeping loved one die in such a degrading way. In practice therefore, 
it may happen that patients suffering from refractory pain and symptoms will 
persist in their request for euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide, even if the 
option of terminal sedation is offered as a better alternative in the opinion of the
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physician. Patients may not want to be put to sleep, knowing that they won't wake 
up anymore. For patients and their loved ones, the moment of farewell is separated 
from the moment of death, sometimes for a period of days or (if hydration is 
started) even weeks.
The decisive argument to consider euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide a 
means of last resort in palliative care, refers to the unbearable and hopeless 
suffering of some patients in spite of adequate palliative care. The presence of a 
well-considered and persistent request only, is not considered decisive for action. 
But if a patient, suffering unbearably and hopelessly, wants to die but refuses to be 
sedated, it can be argued that physician-assisted death is the only humane 
alternative, even if the physician holds terminal sedation as a morally better 
alternative.
1.3. Euthanasia and terminal sedation are morally indifferent and both 
acceptable in palliative care
Against the first and second positions, it is argued that, from a moral point of view, 
terminal sedation is indifferent from euthanasia. Three argumentation strategies 
are used.
From a consequentialistic point of view, it is argued that intentions are by no 
means decisive for the morality of actions. What is decisive, according to 
consequentialists, is the balance between benefits and harms. The act is morally 
praiseworthy if it leads to more benefit or less harm than was the case before the 
act was performed. In an analysis of a case of an old, severely ill woman with 
whom antibiotics to treat a pneumonia were withheld, Singer argues that it would 
be untenable to hold that the doctor who gives the injection is a murderer while the 
doctor who decides not to administer antibiotics is practising good and 
compassionate care (Singer, 1993). In this consequentialistic way of thinking, the 
doctrine of double effect cannot be accounted for. Irrespective of the intentions of 
the actor, irrespective of whether the effects were intended or not intended and 
merely foreseen, the morality of an act is judged according to its consequences. 
According to Singer we have to take equal responsibility for intended as well as 
unintended, foreseen effects. The consequence of terminal sedation is that the 
patient will die in some days, at least if the patient is dehydrated. The consequence 
of euthanasia is that the patient dies within the hour. In both cases, the pain and 
suffering of the patient are relieved. Provokingly, it is also argued that the 
principle of double effect itself implies a disguised adherence to a 
consequentialistic way of thinking. Negative but foreseen side effects of an act
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cannot be unintentional. They should be conceived of as costs proportionate to a 
benefit obtained. But costs can never be unintentional. Before deciding to act, a 
cost-benefit calculation is made which makes it impossible to state that costs are 
unintended (Donagan, 1991). Hastening of death is namely only accepted when 
the quality of a patient’s life is below a certain level. This is in other words, 
according to Singer, not a decision based on acceptance of the sanctity of human 
life, but a decision based on a disguised quality of life judgement (Singer, 1993). If 
that is so, terminal sedation and euthanasia are not morally different.
Similarly, a second argumentation strategy follows the via negativa. In a 
coherent line of reasoning, it is said, the main arguments used against euthanasia 
should also be directed against terminal sedation. Let us consider three arguments 
often used against euthanasia. First, the argument that opening the door for 
physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia is likely to lead to abuse (i.e. the slippery 
slope argument) would also have to be directed against terminal sedation. 
Terminal sedation is mostly considered a means of last resort, only justified when 
good palliative care has failed to relieve pain or suffering. It can be questioned 
however whether the criterion of refractory pain and suffering is not vague enough 
to be widened time after time. Euthanasia is often criticised as ‘an easy way out’. 
Permitting euthanasia may hinder the creative process of finding better palliative 
modalities to relieve suffering (Foley, 1997). But it can be argued that by 
permitting terminal sedation as a means of last resort, the door providing an easy 
way out is already open. In other words, where permission of euthanasia is often 
rejected with the slippery slope argument, the same argument may be used against 
terminal sedation. Terminal sedation and euthanasia are both in danger of 
becoming simple solutions for complex problems that may have been preventable 
by better palliative care. Second, the moral relevance of the so-called passive- 
active distinction, which holds that allowing to die would be morally permissible 
whereas actively shortening the life of a patient would be morally impermissible, 
can be criticised. Terminal sedation is clearly an act and not an omission. Howe­
ver, more difficult to defend is the practice of dehydrating a terminally sedated 
patient. It can be argued that there is nothing passive about deciding to withhold 
hydration in a terminally sedated patient who, as a result of the sedation, is no 
longer able to take fluids. Using the passive-active distinction as an argument to 
oppose euthanasia and condone dehydration in these circumstances can be said to 
be incoherent (Brody, 1995). Third, permission of euthanasia is said to be 
dangerous as requests for euthanasia are in most cases multi-layered. Instead of 
being voluntary, they may be caused by fear of an inhumane dying process, 
depression, pain, or guilt (Zylicz and Janssens, 1998; Chochinov et al. 1995). And 
since the patient’s choice to die is not made freely, it would be wrong for
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physicians to act upon this choice (Campbell, 1999). However, empirical evidence 
suggests that the reasons for terminal sedation are similar (Chater, 1998). If 
euthanasia is rejected by pointing towards the ambivalence of many patients’ 
requests, terminal sedation can be rejected for the same reasons.
The third argumentation strategy used to indicate that terminal sedation is 
indifferent from euthanasia focuses on the patient's autonomy. It is argued that the 
morality of terminal sedation is based first and foremost on the informed consent 
of the patient, and not so much on the intention of the physician (Quill, 1997). The 
autonomous wish of a patient to have life sustaining treatment withdrawn has to be 
met by the physician, irrespective of the latter's intentions. So why, it is argued, do 
these intentions become so crucial if they are related to an act instead of an 
omission? Is not autonomy a more important condition for the justification of 
terminal sedation than the intentions of the physician? In countries where 
euthanasia is not tolerated, terminal sedation and/or dehydration may be the only 
way to meet the autonomous request of a patient to put an end to his/her suffering 
(Sahm, 2000). In these cases, the autonomous wish of the patient to put an end to 
his/her suffering would be decisive, not the intention of the physician. If this is 
crucial, the means through which the patient's suffering is ended are of secondary 
importance. Terminal sedation and euthanasia are therefore said to be principally 
both justified if there is an autonomous request of the terminal patient.
2. Terminal sedation and euthanasia are morally different
It will be argued here that euthanasia and terminal sedation are morally different 
on the basis of the moral value of human life and on the basis of the moral 
relevance of intentions for the morality of our acts.
The view that it is prima facie wrong to take another person’s life is solidly 
rooted in the morality of any civil society. Moral experience, formed and shaped 
by the traditions in which we live, simply tells us that human life has value in 
itself. The act of killing another person is therefore simply a prima facie evil, irres­
pective of its consequences. It does not suffice to base it exclusively on external 
arguments (for instance the slippery slope argument). It is always based on 
deontological arguments too. Advocates of euthanasia will consider the prohibition 
to kill as a prima facie norm (Campbell et al. 1995), whereas some opponents of 
euthanasia will consider it absolute (Boyle, 1991). Both groups will acknowledge 
that there are situations in which one is compelled to choose between two evils e.g. 
letting the patient suffer intolerable pain or shorten the life of the patient. In 
justifying the latter evil, the principle of double effect is crucial for opponents of
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euthanasia but, as will be argued below, its use does not necessarily have to be 
limited to this group only. According to the principle of double effect, harming 
someone is only justified if it is not intended and if their are compelling reasons to 
bring it about. The act itself must be morally right or at least neutral and the evil 
brought about may not be a means for the good effect.
Applying the doctrine of double effect in the context of terminal sedation 
implies that the shortening, or terminating of a person’s life is considered a moral 
evil, independent of the concrete circumstances and independent of the 
consequences. It has to consider the shortening of a patient’s life either a moral 
evil in itself, or a moral evil based on culturally shared norms and ideals that 
define the limit of self-sovereignty (Jennings, 1991). The (im)morality of 
euthanasia does not (only) depend on whether the patient has given his 
autonomous consent or on what the societal consequences will be of a tolerant 
euthanasia policy. If one adopts the doctrine in the debate on terminal sedation, 
then it follows that one considers euthanasia a moral evil independent of the 
concrete circumstances. Boyle even goes a step further arguing that the tenability 
of the doctrine of double effect relies on an absolutist theory (Boyle, 1991). In 
Boyle’s view, the doctrine has to accept absolute, exceptionless norms, prohibiting 
certain harms. The doctrine only acknowledges that situations can arise in which 
the infliction of a prohibited harm is unavoidable and in such situations the 
distinction between intentional harming and unintentional harming serves to limit 
the extension of the prohibition. In this context, it would imply according to Boyle, 
that protagonists of euthanasia, who hold the norm not to kill as a prima facie 
norm, cannot use the principle of double effect in justifying terminal sedation. It 
can be doubted if this is so. It is for most of us not hard to conceive of situations in 
which the taking of another person’s life would be the lesser of two evils. This 
alone would provide sufficient reason to hold the norm not to kill as a prima facie 
norm instead of an absolute norm. Moreover, at least a substantial part of the 
people who hold euthanasia as a means of last resort in palliative care argue that 
euthanasia should be avoided where- and whenever possible through good 
palliative care (Miller, 1995; Quill et al. 2000). According to them, the termination 
of a patient's life is prohibited unless all other alternatives have failed. It is too 
simple to say that for them terminal sedation is not such an alternative under 
circumstances to be preferred to euthanasia. Proponents as well as opponents of 
euthanasia may justify terminal sedation with an appeal to the principle of double 
effect. Also proponents of euthanasia may hold that (1) the taking of another 
person’s life is prima facie evil and that (2) the intention of one's act can play a 
decisive role in evaluating the action from a moral point of view. And thus, it is 
possible to argue that for them, terminal sedation is a preferable alternative to
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euthanasia, even though in the end euthanasia may under circumstances of 
overriding force be considered the only humane alternative.
Against the consequentialistic point of view that terminal sedation should be 
understood as a trade off between the benefits (relief of pain and suffering) and the 
foreseen harms (the shortening of life) and that, thus, the harms cannot be unin­
tended, the following can be argued. Foreseeing an effect of one's act is not the 
same as intending it. If, in retrospect, it would appear that the good effects of one's 
action had not occurred and the bad effects had, one would regret one's act because 
one's intention had not come out. Intentions relate to what one wants to result from 
one's act. One does not want to bring about foreseeable harms but one accepts 
them because a proportionately grave reason is present. It cannot be argued that 
negative effects which one could avoid if it were possible, are part of one's 
intentions.
Consequentialists may also argue that intentions are irrelevant for the 
morality of one's acts in the first place but this argument runs clearly against 
common sense morality. Morality is not a mathematic calculus only concerned 
with maximising goods and minimising harms. Morality is based on moral expe­
rience. And moral experience tells us that it matters whether a good effect of an act 
is intended or just co-incidentally brought about.
One, more practical, objection to the role of intentions in moral evaluation is 
that the intention of a physician can never be assessed by someone other than the 
physician (Cavanaugh, 1996; Thorns, 1998). Physicians who terminally sedate a 
patient can have the intention of shortening the patient's life without anyone ever 
being able to find out. This is true, but only to some extent. In retrospect, the act 
itself can give clues. Was the dose of the sedatives proportionate to the desired 
effect? How fast did the physician increase the dose? Did (s)he assess whether 
pain and symptoms were adequately under control before increasing the dose of 
sedatives? Or did (s)he increase the dose every hour without assessing the patient's 
condition? If the doses were disproportionate or raised without adequate asses­
sment, the condition of proportionality cannot have been met and it would be safe 
to argue that at least one of the intentions of the physician was the hastening of the 
patient's death.
If the taking of another person’s life is considered a prima facie evil, and if 
one can make a moral distinction between intended effects and not intended but 
foreseen side effects, there is a sound basis to evaluate terminal sedation and 
euthanasia differently. But still, one last difficult issue should be raised in this 
context. One could argue that even if terminal sedation can be justified with the 
doctrine of double effect, it is impossible to justify dehydration in the terminally 
sedated patient. This assumption can be criticised. First, if hydration would be
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contra-indicated from a medical point of view because it would cause the patient 
more harm than good (for instance oedema or dyspnea), hydration would clearly 
be malconduct. But let us assume that these adverse effects are not expected to 
occur. In that case, the patient should be informed before the sedatives are 
administered. In the end, the patient decides. But let us now assume that the patient 
is incompetent and unable to consent before being sedated. The wish of the 
patient’s loved ones is important but not decisive. The question to be asked is what 
the reasons are that would justify hydration. Only one reason can be conceived of, 
namely keeping the patient alive even in a situation in which it does not serve the 
patient’s quality of life. In such cases, the decision to withhold hydration is made 
because the lengthening of the patient's life is deemed futile, even if the patient's 
incapacity for oral intake is a direct result from the administered sedatives. It is 
true that the passive-active distinction is ambiguous. Intentionally shortening a 
person's life can be achieved through an omission. But an act can never be seen as 
not lengthening a patient's life (as opposed to shortening a patient's life). An 
omission can. Dehydration is exactly that and therefore it can not be equated with 
intentional hastening death. A possible reason to hydrate a terminally sedated 
patient would be the family's need for time to deal with the oncoming death of 
their loved one (Dunlop et al. 1995).
3. Terminal sedation as an alternative for euthanasia
In line with the preceding paragraphs, it will be argued here that terminal sedation 
as a means of last resort in palliative care is a morally better alternative for 
euthanasia. If intentions matter morally, if terminal sedation is meant to relieve 
pain and suffering and not to shorten the life of the patient, and if the termination 
of another person's life is at least prima facie evil, the practice of euthanasia would 
seem morally indefensible without at least having considered terminal sedation as 
an alternative (Cherny and Portenoy, 1994; Cherny et al. 1994; Byock, 1993). As 
for the Netherlands, there is no hard evidence for stating that terminal sedation was 
or was not considered as an option prior to the 4500 cases of life termination (van 
der Maas et al. 1996). The relative absence of literature on terminal sedation in the 
Netherlands may give clues for stating that the option of terminal sedation is not 
an important issue in decision-making. It seems unlikely that in the above cases, 
terminal sedation was for some reason not possible. It is therefore probably safe to 
assume that in many cases either terminal sedation was not presented as an option, 
or that the patients or their families refused and chose for euthanasia or physician- 
assisted suicide instead. The first practice is problematic. When a patient is
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suffering from intolerable refractory pain or suffering, only few alternatives 
remain. In those cases, even if there is a well-considered and persistent request for 
euthanasia, it is a duty to inform the patient of other alternatives, even if only one 
alternative, i.e. terminal sedation, remains. Experience from a Dutch hospice, 
where euthanasia is not performed but where patients can be transferred to other 
health care settings to have euthanasia carried out, suggests that in such cases, 
patients may opt for terminal sedation. Some want to die but the majority does not 
want to be killed by the team that has cared for them and has grown familiar with 
them (cf. chapter 7). Requests of patients are often ambiguous and do not serve as 
a sufficient basis for euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide to be carried out. 
Often a more authentic request lies behind the request for euthanasia, a request to 
have pain and suffering relieved in whatever manner possible. It is imperative to 
listen closely to the patient and assess whether requests for euthanasia or physician 
assisted suicide are not based on a request for relief of suffering, even if this can 
only be achieved through terminal sedation.
However, some patients may prefer euthanasia over terminal sedation. They 
may consider terminal sedation a degrading way of dying. For their families 
watching their loved one in an unconscious state may be a heavy burden. But, 
even though situations of overriding force may arise in which terminal sedation is 
not a humane option, the autonomous wish of the patient alone is not a sufficient 
basis to carry out euthanasia. The relevance of a physician's intentions together 
with the common belief that it is prima facie evil to terminate another person's life 
may make it impossible for him to meet the patient's preference. These two 
arguments, both entailed in the doctrine of double effect, are central in considering 
terminal sedation a morally better modality than euthanasia in palliative care. All 
other arguments either fail or can rightly be used against terminal sedation as well.
Conclusion
Terminal sedation should be considered as a morally defensible modality in 
palliative care. In daily palliative care practice, it is not often indicated. Only if the 
patient is suffering from intolerable and refractory pain or suffering it is a 
justifiable option. Terminal sedation and euthanasia can and should be 
distinguished from a moral point of view. First, because moral experience tells us 
that it is, at least prima facie, wrong to kill another person or shorten another 
person's life. Second, because intentions are relevant for the morality of one's acts.
It is common practice not to hydrate a terminally sedated person. Arguments 
rejecting this practice eventually fail even though a standard policy dehydrating
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terminally sedated patients is not advisable. If the patient is incompetent and 
unable to give consent to dehydration before the sedatives are administered, it is 
crucial to uphold the distinction between shortening life and not prolonging life. 
For terminally sedated patients, there is no duty to prolong their lives. Artificial 
hydration can be considered a futile medical treatment, to be consented to if 
possible, to be withheld in most cases where consent is not possible. In exceptional 
cases, the family may opt for artificial hydration, for instance if they need time to 
say farewell to their loved one.
If terminal sedation should not be identified with the termination of another 
person's life and if it is morally defensible that termination of another person's life 
is, at least prima facie, wrong, terminal sedation is an acceptable alternative to 
euthanasia. Carrying out euthanasia is morally problematic if terminal sedation is 
not presented as an option. Offering a patient the alternative of terminal sedation 
may take away the request for euthanasia, as many patients do not want to be 
killed. But even if they reject terminal sedation, autonomy alone is not a sufficient 
reason for carrying out euthanasia.
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CHAPTER 9
CLINICAL TRIALS IN PALLIATIVE CARE 
AN ETHICAL EVALUATION
A slightly modified version of this chapter was published as*:
Janssens MJPA, Gordijn B, Clinical trials in palliative care. An ethical evaluation. 
Patient Education and Counselling 2000; 41: 55-62.
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CLINICAL TRIALS IN PALLIATIVE CARE
AN ETHICAL EVALUATION
Introduction
Palliative care has been defined as “the active total care of patients whose disease 
is not responsive to curative treatment. Control of pain, of other symptoms, and of 
psychological, social and spiritual problems, is paramount. The goal of palliative 
care is achievement of the best quality of life for patients and their families” 
(WHO, 1990, p. 11). In an earlier chapter, it was indicated that this definition is 
unclear as to the scope of palliative care. However, for an ethical analysis of the 
conditions of possibility of clinical trials in palliative care, it is important to delimit 
the scope of palliative care. In this chapter, palliative care will be referred to as 
beginning from the time that curative efforts have been deemed futile. And dying 
patients are understood as all those who receive palliative care, acknowledging 
that the time until death may still be quite far away for some of them.
The aim of palliative care is to achieve the best possible quality of life for 
patients and their families. The medical, psychosocial and spiritual needs of the 
patient are indicative for the care given. At first sight, experimental trials on the 
dying seem at odds with the fundamental aim of palliative care. Clinical trials are 
not intended to achieve the best quality of life of the patient. What is more, they 
are only ethically sound if there is a proportionately grave reason present to allow 
for the harms that they may inflict on the participants. It is imperative that the 
medical care for future patients is improved. But improving medical care for future 
patients implies that current participants in trials are exposed to serious potential 
harms. Caregivers in a palliative care setting are faced with a conflict between 
nonmaleficence (not to harm current patients) and social justice (the societal duty 
to improve medical care for future patients). Both options are imperative and 
morally praiseworthy but at the same time they seem mutually exclusive. In this 
chapter however, it will be argued that, on further consideration, the dilemma does 
not necessarily have to occur.
First, it will be argued that both palliative care and codes concerning 
experimental research on human beings historically have come forth out of a moral 
discomfort with mainstream medicine of the late sixties. This short historical 
overview can explain why clinical trials have become so controversial for 
caregivers in palliative care. Second, the apparent dichotomy between the aim of 
clinical trials (enhancement of treatment for future patients) and the aim of
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palliative care (providing the best possible care for current patients) will be 
reviewed by assessing the harms that may be inflicted through participation in 
clinical trials. Third, it will be argued that there is not necessarily a dilemma. For 
some patients, participation in experimental trials can be a meaningful enterprise.
1. Historical origins
By the end of the 1960s, medicine became more and more driven by the 
technological imperative. The increasing role of technology within medicine 
provided physicians with increasing power over their patients. This process, in the 
context of a more and more emancipating society, led to counter-reactions from 
different realms in society (Rothman, 1991). The old professional Hippocratic 
ethic in which the good of the patient was determined by the physician’s views, 
was unable to deal with the new moral questions of modern medicine. In this time, 
historical publications laid several cases of misuse of medical power in the open 
(Pappworth, 1967; Beecher, 1966). Secret clinical trials, in which patients were not 
informed that they were participating in an experimental study, clearly opposed the 
moral conscience of the public. Thus, for the newly established medical ethics the 
principle of patient autonomy became foundational. Patients’ rights had to be 
defended against the risen power of the medical professionals. Codes were 
formulated to protect the patient in experimental clinical research. The new 
medical ethics developed as a counter-reaction against medical technological 
developments.
In this same period, and for very similar reasons, the modern hospice 
movement was founded with the establishment of St Christopher's hospice in 
London in 1967. This movement came forth out of a moral discomfort with the 
care for the dying in mainstream medicine. The rise of medical technologies had 
led to a health care system which focussed on cure. The care for the dying was 
neglected. The first hospices redirected attention to the needs and wishes of the 
dying for whom a lot could still be done. In those days, palliative care developed 
within in-patient hospices, relatively detached from the formal health care 
system and also relatively detached from the new medical ethics which, 
paradoxically, settled comfortably within modern medicine (Zwart, 1995). In the 
years following the foundation of the first hospices, research in pain and 
symptom control played a considerable role in palliative care, as the studies of 
Twycross indicate (Twycross, 1977). The aim of palliative care was to integrate 
an advanced and scientifically sound approach to the development of pain and 
symptom control with compassionate care (Saunders, 1978).
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However, as palliative care developed further, experimental clinical research 
became her stepchild. The idea took hold that this kind of research was at odds 
with the fundamental moral intention of palliative care (Calman and Hanks, 1993). 
Palliative care distanced itself from mainstream medicine because of a perceived 
lack regarding the care for the dying. Hence, the needs and wishes of the 
individual patient set the norm for palliative care practice. Experimental research 
seemed to put that at risk what was at the heart of palliative care.
Only recently, this negative attitude towards experimental research was 
challenged (Thorpe, 1992; McQuay and Moore, 1994). Not surprisingly, this shift 
in attitude coincides with a maturation of palliative care as palliative care is 
increasingly becoming re-integrated with the formal health care system.
2. Clinical trials in palliative care and the duty not to harm
Clinical trials in palliative care carry with them many practical problems. The 
number of potential research subjects is small; patients may die in the course of the 
trial and the number of patients opting out may be high (McWhinney et al, 1994); 
patients may want to die at home instead of being observed in a clinical setting; 
patients may be too weak; carers may be inexperienced in the field of research; 
patients’ differing histories of pain treatment make it hard to assess the effects of 
the experimental treatment (Blackledge and Lawton, 1992). Still, it is acknow­
ledged that these practical problems can be dealt with. Multicentre trials, well 
designed short-term studies and n = 1 trials can provide adequate solutions for the 
practical problems (Calman and Hanks, 1993). Because solutions are available, 
palliative care cannot simply point to practical difficulties in refraining from 
experimental studies. Hence, it is first and foremost an ethical, rather than a 
practical problem. The moral problems of clinical trials in palliative care can be 
put in terms of (potential) harms to the patient. Referring to the concept of total 
care, the violation of the principle of nonmaleficence can occur at three different 
levels: a physical, a psychosocial and a spiritual level.
2.1. Physical harms
Patients participating in clinical trials may be physically put at risk. In phase I 
studies severe suffering or even death may be caused by high toxicity of the 
experimental treatment. A beneficial response (for example tumor reduction) to 
phase I experiments hardly ever occurs. The vast majority of patients suffers more 
from (the side-effects of) the experimental treatment than benefit from it (Holdener
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et al, 1992). After all, in phase I and phase II studies, little or nothing is yet known 
about the side-effects of the experimental treatment. In randomised phase III stu­
dies, patients in the experimental group may well be administered suboptimal 
treatment (Max and Portenoy, 1993).
In short, the physical risks of patients participating in clinical trials are 
considerable. If one presumes that the duty not to harm is paramount in palliative 
care, clinical trials seem incompatible with palliative care.
2.2. Psychosocial harms
Many dying patients in palliative care enjoy their lives. Some even state they 
experience the best time of their lives. The dying process can, for the dying patient 
as well as for his or her loved ones, be an extremely valuable time of personal 
fulfilment. After a long and hard search for meaning, many patients have finally 
accepted their nearing death and are now able to enjoy the small things of life. For 
some patients this can be a revelation they have never before experienced 
(Skinner, 1986). More and more patients are able to die at home, finally having left 
the medical circuit. Facing the end of their lives they are now able to tell the 
narrative of their lives. Only when death is not far, it is possible to see life as a 
narrative, with a beginning, a plot and an end (Ricoeur, 1991).
However, by participating in experimental research, many patients will be 
forced to remain within the medical circuit. If not required to spend their time 
within medical institutions, at least they must be observed regularly within the 
medical institutions. For many patients participation in clinical experimental 
research will diminish the amount of time for themselves and for their loved ones. 
Potentially so valuable, the dying process, may be severely disturbed. Again, this 
confronts us with the question whether experimental trials in palliative care can be 
conducted at all, without sacrifice of the patient’s well-being.
2.3. Spiritual harms
The basis of every spirituality is hope (see chapter 6). Human beings cannot live 
without hope. This is true for everyone, for the dying as well as for the healthy. 
Patients with a fatal diagnosis continuously shift the object of their hope. Initially, 
all hope is directed at cure. Gradually, hope is directed at other objects: life prolon­
gation, quality of life, the visit of a friend, a painless death, the presence of the 
patient's loved ones at the time of death. Hope provides meaning to the lives of 
terminal patients and in palliative care it ought to be sustained and fostered.
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However, false hope, for example hope for cure when no cure can be a­
chieved, can be torturing and a hindrance to a meaningful death. If patients, 
together with their loved ones, cling to their hope for a cure, they cannot at the 
same time prepare for farewell. Many patients engaging in phase I and II experi­
mental studies perceive the information of the physician as a possible chance to 
cure, no matter how clear and univocal the physician's information is about the 
purpose of the experiment. These patients cling to life. Their hope is directed at 
cure which is clearly incompatible with the aim of the trial. This makes it much 
more difficult for patients and their relatives to accept imminent death. It would be 
hubris to state that acceptance of death is an aim of palliative care. For some 
patients, caregivers’ attempts to make them accept their imminent death are 
inappropriate. Be that as it may, fostering a patient’s hope for illusions is at odds 
with good palliative care practice. It may endanger the quality of a patient’s dying 
process. Again, the conclusion that experimental treatment and total care for the 
dying are at odds with each other seems to force itself upon us.
3. An unsolvable dilemma?
In this paragraph, it will be indicated that the dilemma as described above does not 
necessarily have to occur. There is a way out. Principally, the intention of 
palliative care to achieve the best possible quality of life and participation in 
clinical trials do not have to be mutually exclusive. First, it will be indicated that 
the principle of autonomy, as it is understood in the liberal, minimalistic ethics, 
does not suffice in this respect as it cannot render an account of compassionate 
care. Thus, it is also unable to clarify why the dilemma does not necessarily have 
to occur. Recently, the principle of autonomy has been subject to re­
interpretations, for example in the context of the ethics of care. However, instead 
of re-interpreting the principle of autonomy, the notion of authenticity, which was 
already analysed in chapter 6, will be proposed as an alternative. The notion of 
authenticity can, in contrast to the principle of autonomy, render account of the 
human freedom to choose on the one hand and of compassionate care on the other. 
Yet, the notion of authenticity alone is also insufficient. Situating it in the exis­
tentialist tradition (from which it originates) reveals that it cannot explain why we 
would have solidarity. This question (why have solidarity) is central to an ethical 
evaluation of clinical trials in palliative care and can be illuminated by pointing 
towards the notion of hope.
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3.1. Autonomy
In the ninth paragraph of the Declaration of Helsinki IV, the requirement of 
informed consent for experimentation is explicitly stated (World Medical 
Association, 1989; Katz, 1992). Adequate information on the aims, methods, anti­
cipated benefits, potential hazards and the discomfort of the study should be 
provided by the physician involved and patients should be free to abstain or with­
draw from the study. The patient’s autonomous consent is a demand for the 
permissibility of the research. In paragraph ten of the Declaration, it is stated that if 
the patient is in a dependent relationship with the physician, another physician, not 
engaged in the investigation, should obtain informed consent as to not make the 
patient consent under duress.
No one will deny the importance of these statements. Yet, the principle of 
autonomy does not solve our dilemma. As was analysed above, the principle was 
(re-)introduced in modern medical ethics in the late sixties. There, it developed as 
a cornerstone of a minimalist ethics which sought to protect the patients’ interests 
against the newly established power of the physician. In a pluralistic society, 
patient and physician are moral strangers to each other. The doctor-patient 
relationship has become a contract. Trust is absent. Autonomy has thus become 
the reigning moral principle by default (Welie, 1998). If one accepts the presump­
tions of the modern liberal medical ethics, compassionate care is impossible. And 
if autonomy cannot render account of compassion, we would indeed be caught in 
an unsolvable dilemma between our societal duty to improve medical care for 
future patients (social justice) and nonmaleficence.
A second reason for the insufficiency of the principle of autonomy is that 
since the rise of modern medical ethics, autonomy has been part of a principlistic 
framework that primarily served to deduce moral guidelines instead of enhancing 
our understanding of moral practices. It is the latter that is the aim of this chapter.
An ethical evaluation of the use of clinical trials in palliative care requires a 
notion which on the one hand renders an account of the patient’s freedom to 
choose and on the other hand renders an account of compassionate care; a notion, 
in other words, that has practical meaning for palliative care practice.
3.2. Authenticity
The notion of authenticity, as used in the existentialist philosophical tradition, ren­
ders an account of human freedom to choose on the one hand and of human 
vulnerability, dependency and fragility on the other hand (Welie, 1994). Both
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aspects of authenticity have to be taken into account before considering it in the 
context of clinical trials in palliative care.
Human beings are thrown into existence. From the time of our birth on, we 
depend on what was already there before we were born. Our identity is shaped -for 
better or for worse- by numerous contingent factors beyond our control. However, 
we are not totally determined by these factors. After all, we can relate to them. We 
are able to transcend our conditionality by our freedom to choose and to carry on 
and shape traditions to which we belong. We fall ill, but we can relate to our 
illness. In fact, illness provides us with new options that would not have occurred 
had we not fallen ill. Between these options we have to make a choice and 
subsequently engage according to the choice we make. Authentic choices are 
choices in character. Whereas autonomous choices are present decisions which 
principally can be revised anytime, authentic choices are congruent with the perso­
nality of the subject as it has evolved in the past and as it stands open towards the 
future. Authentic choices fit the person who chooses. The autonomy of choices is 
assessed by its reasonability, the authenticity of choices is assessed by ‘intimate 
knowledge’, which has grown in the context of compassionate care for the patient 
and his or her loved ones.
The notion of authenticity can provide a meaningful perspective on the use of 
clinical trials in palliative care. Patients in palliative care are particularly 
vulnerable. They may feel obliged to participate in experimental research because 
of the optimal care they are receiving. Their perceived duty to do something in 
return for the team that has cared so well for them may be inauthentic. It is 
important to note that the dying are not necessarily more or less authentic than the 
healthy. Even though the dying are particularly vulnerable and dependent on the 
care of others, their authenticity does not necessarily have to diminish. First and 
foremost, they are equal living fellow human beings who, however, happen to be 
dying. Healthy persons are in their daily lives as authentic or inauthentic as dying 
patients. But since the dying are facing the end of their lives, a time which is for 
many a time of reconciliation with themselves and their loved ones, authenticity is 
of special value to them. In palliative care, authenticity should be sustained and 
fostered so that patients are given the room to make choices congruent with their 
innermost personality.
Acknowledging the fact that not only the dying are dependent and vulne­
rable but that we all are vulnerable and in need of care, may well create room for 
participation in a clinical trial. Thus, authenticity can render a better account for 
solidarity than autonomy can. “An invitation to a dying person to take part in a 
research project, even though it may not provide any benefit for himself, can 
create a good opportunity for contributing something of value to society as well
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as achieving a degree of personal satisfaction” (Thorpe, 1992, p. 224). Engaging 
in an experimental clinical study out of solidarity with future patients can be an 
authentic choice, congruent with the personality of the patient. It may provide 
new meaning to the patient’s life. The patient participates in favour of the 
community of which (s)he is a part. It creates the possibility for the dying person 
to keep a social role in a community that seems to evolve away from them.
Authenticity excludes momentaneous decisions discongruent with the 
patient’s personality. For a choice to be authentic it should be made in character. 
At the same time, authenticity illuminates the dependency and vulnerability that 
we all share and can thus account for solidarity with future patients.
Not all patients receiving palliative care should be asked to participate in 
clinical trials. Authenticity does not require the patient to participate. All that 
needs to be shown here is that authenticity is a notion which is equipped to 
evaluate the use of clinical trials in palliative care.
However, in the existentialistic tradition, authenticity cannot adequately deal 
with ultimate questions of life and death which particularly force themselves upon 
the dying. In the philosophical tradition of existentialism, existence is all that is 
real. Without existence there is absolutely nothing. This idea clearly makes life 
absurd and fearsome in the face of death. Anxiety or absurdity as basic conditions 
of life seem hardly concordant with solidarity and compassion. Authenticity alone 
is not enough to solve the dilemma. In the end, it appears to be unable to answer 
the question why we should have solidarity.
3.3. Hope
Human life is finite. Therefore, ultimate questions concerning the meaning of life 
urge themselves upon us. In other words, our mortality requires an eschatology. 
Death forces us to give an ultimate meaning to life and thereby transcend the 
apparent absurdity and meaninglessness of life in the face of death. For some 
people, this ultimate meaning may remain implicitly present in the way they live 
their daily lives and in the things they deem important. Others have explicitly 
reflected on what they deem of central importance to their lives. But the answers 
we give to the ultimate questions of life, no matter how implicit, do provide all of 
us with hope. Without hope, we cannot live. The dying who suffer from the 
situation they are in and their loved ones who face bereavement cannot live 
without hope, no matter how small or how concealed it may sometimes appear. 
Together with authenticity, hope can be seen as a central notion in palliative care.
Hope is always connected to an object, something that is hoped for. As 
mentioned above, hope for illusory cures should not be sustained or fostered in
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palliative care. For example, participation in a phase I or II trial as a way of 
beating the odds is potentially harmful for the patient and his or her relatives 
(Kodish and Post, 1995).
But of course, hope can also be directed at obtainable objects or events: a 
good quality of life, the visit of a friend, the presence of the dying's loved ones at 
the time of death, etc. This kind of hope is extremely important in palliative care 
and conditional for a meaningful life. It is this kind of hope that should be 
sustained and bolstered in palliative care.
In addition to hope for obtainable objects or events, hope can also transcend 
the immediately visible. Hope does not necessarily have to refer to obtainable 
objects. It can, for example, refer to personal fulfilment, knowing that absolute 
fulfilment cannot be obtained here and now. This hope often comes forth out of 
contrast experiences. It is a kind of hope that resists undeserved suffering. It does 
not deny the existence of suffering but it situates the suffering here and now in the 
larger perspective of a better future. The object of this ‘eschatological hope’ is 
what in the Christian tradition is called the Kingdom of God or ‘Heaven on earth’. 
According to the German theologian Moltmann, hope is the grounding structure of 
life (Moltmann, 1966). Hope in the Christian tradition is ultimately aimed at the 
establishment of the Kingdom of God, not primarily in the afterlife but here and 
now, in the resistance to all human suffering.
This eschatological hope has been of central importance for the Christian 
tradition. Obviously, it does not only regard Christians but is of universal 
significance. And even though theologians may explain it by referring to notions 
that are not acceptable for everyone (e.g. Kingdom of God, Heaven on earth, etc.), 
these Christian notions can be translated into universal notions (e.g. personal 
fulfilment, resistance to suffering, solidarity etc.).
In the context of this chapter, hope can provide a meaningful perspective. 
Patients may, in the context of good care, be able to share in this hope. Their unde­
served suffering and (premature) death can, without denying it, be situated in a 
hopeful perspective on a better future and hence acquire meaning. This hope not 
only renders an account of solidarity with future patients; what is more, solidarity 
and hope evoke each other. From the contrast experience of their suffering some 
patients may experience hope for a better future in which future patients can be 
treated better and will need to suffer less. Thus, participating in clinical trials may 
sustain and bolster hope for these patients (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine 
of Faith, 1980). And as such, clinical trials can be part of palliative care.
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Conclusion
The main question of this chapter was whether clinical trials can be compatible 
with palliative care. First, the origins of the problem have been sketched. Palliative 
care initially stepped out of mainstream medicine because of a moral discomfort 
with the routine care for the dying. Optimal care for the dying has always set the 
norm for palliative care practice. At first sight, experimental research seems at 
odds with palliative care as it potentially endangers the physical, psychosocial and 
spiritual well-being of the dying. However, upon closer observation this does not 
always have to be the case. Two moral notions have been proposed which both 
evoke each other and have the potential to bring together social justice (better 
treatment for future patients) and nonmaleficence (or what’s more, compassionate 
care for the individual patient). The first notion is the notion of authenticity which 
renders account of the freedom of the patient to choose and of solidarity with 
future patients. Many dying patients can, in the context of compassionate care, 
make an authentic choice, a choice in character, to participate in a clinical trial. 
However, solidarity with future patients does not appear out of the blue and needs 
to be further explained. Authenticity alone is insufficient and needs to be paired 
with an eschatological perspective. This perspective can be provided by the notion 
of hope. Hope is foundational in palliative care because it is conditional for a mea­
ningful life. Hope can be directed at obtainable objects but it can also be of an 
eschatological character. This eschatological hope refers to hope for a better 
future, a future in which patients can be better treated for their disease. For some 
patients, but not for all, this kind of hope may be fostered through participation in 
experimental research. An ethical use of clinical trials requires some selection, 
based on an intimate knowledge. Not all patients should be asked to participate. 
But some patients’ lives may gain meaning by participation in clinical trials. If that 
is so, clinical trials can be part of palliative care.
Note
* Modifications in comparison to the published article:
In order to avoid overlap with chapter 6, a small number of sentences regarding the notions of 
hope and authenticity have been deleted.
162
CONCLUSION
PERSPECTIVES FOR PALLIATIVE CARE
163
164
CONCLUSION:
PERSPECTIVES FOR PALLIATIVE CARE
The conclusion of this thesis will focus on four future challenges that face 
palliative care in the nearby future. In the various studies of this research 
project, suggestions have been formulated and directions have been proposed to 
meet these challenges. Further research will be necessary to meet these 
challenges.
The first challenge regards the articulation of the specific set of values 
palliative care is said to entail. Since palliative care is increasingly organised in 
the context of a variety of medical practices, articulation of the moral aspects 
through which palliative care can be demarcated from other practices has 
become an urgent requirement. The findings that were discussed in chapters 2, 3 
and 4 are relevant in this respect. Second, moral notions used in the debates on 
palliative care are in need of more thorough historical, philosophical and 
theological analysis if new enriching perspectives on palliative care practice are 
to emerge. Based on the theoretical methodology formulated in chapter 1, and 
based on the analyses of the moral notions that were discussed in chapters 5 and 
6, future research needs to be carried out. Third, the debates on moral dilemmas 
in palliative care need to be broadened by addressing alternative palliative 
measures for euthanasia, and assessing what patients really mean when they 
request for euthanasia. At the same time, in the context of a pluralistic society, 
different opinions should be allowed to co-exist. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 intended to 
provide prolegomena for such debates. Finally, a wider issue of palliative care 
merits attention. This issue relates to current attitudes towards death and dying. 
It was marginally addressed in chapters 6 and 9. It is argued that the hospice 
movement and the subsequent development of palliative care have been both 
symptomatic and stimulative for a new attitude towards death and dying that is 
nowadays occurring in many Western countries. In the direct confrontation with 
death, many of us have learnt to acknowledge that death and dying provide us 
with potential to give and receive meaning in life. An increasing openness 
towards human mortality, allows meaningful perspectives on life to emerge.
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1. Demarcation of palliative care from other medical practices
As we have discussed throughout the preceding chapters, palliative care has 
been subject to important changes in the last three decades. The identification of 
palliative care with hospice care, terminal care and cancer care can and should 
no longer be assumed. As was discussed in chapter 3, only a small minority of 
professionals working in the field of palliative care prefer to denote their 
profession as terminal care whereas a majority hold that palliative care starts 
from the time of diagnosis. Furthermore, the vast majority do no longer 
associate palliative care with the hospice institution but agree that palliative care 
should be fully integrated within the mainstream health care system. If we take 
the views of this majority seriously, it is safe to conclude that palliative care will 
in the nearby future increasingly be formed in the context of a variety of medical 
practices. Attention will be shifted to other groups of patients than those 
suffering from cancer. Patients suffering from diseases such as chronic heart 
failure, kidney disease, neurological disease (notably dementia) and chronic 
diseases such as multiple sclerosis, will be cared for by caregivers who affiliate 
themselves with palliative care. In order to meet the demands from the formal 
health care systems, research in palliative care will remain focused on the 
establishment of an evidence base, and the care provided will have to be cost- 
effective and efficient. Furthermore, the ‘emotional planning’ of the past, 
especially in the British context, will have to be abandoned and establishment of 
palliative care units will have to render account of the demand in a certain 
region (Clark et al, 1997). This process of integration is on the one hand a 
process of maturation of palliative care. As was indicated throughout the 
preceding chapters, this process was expected and aimed at by many hospice 
caregivers themselves. On the other hand, it will lead to an increasing ambiguity 
of the concept of palliative care. If palliative care forms a part of many medical 
practices, whether they be curative or palliative, how can we be able to 
demarcate the concept and practice of palliative care from these medical 
practices? The demarcation of palliative care is one of the major challenges 
palliative care faces at the beginning of the 21st century. Again, the majority 
hold that palliative care should be fully integrated with the mainstream health 
care system. But at the same time, concern is expressed about the medicalisation 
of palliative care (remarkably, much less concern is expressed about 
bureaucratisation). Integrating palliative care in a variety of medical practices 
carries with it the risk of medicalisation, i.e. the risk of loosing exactly that what 
is at the heart of palliative care, namely the quality of life of the patient and his 
or her loved ones from a physical, mental, social and spiritual point of view. The
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concern that is expressed regarding the medicalisation of palliative care is 
corroborated by the view of the majority that palliative care entails a specific set 
of values, other than the mainstream health care system. That being so, 
demarcating palliative care from other medical practices is probably an ethical 
enterprise. The specificity of palliative care is then a moral specificity. Clues for 
articulating this moral specificity can be drawn from the questionnaire study, in 
which it was indicated that the notions of acceptance of human mortality, quality 
of life, human dignity and total care are considered essential.
The moral values underpinning palliative care are not static notions, valid 
once and for all. Rather, the moral values said to be essential for palliative care 
are subject to historical change. In the last three decades for instance, religious 
values have lost territory. In this respect, it is noteworthy that a notion such as 
‘sanctity of life’ is not considered important by the majority. In other words, the 
traditional axiology of hospice has increasingly become subject to critique. 
Instead of presuming a clear-cut set of values and norms, arguments to sustain 
these values and norms are now required in the context of ethical debates in a 
pluralistic society. It is not unlikely that the values that are currently said to be 
central to palliative care will change in the future. Be that as it may, if the 
demarcation of palliative care from other medical practices is at least for an 
important part of a moral nature, it is imperative to carry out further research in 
the moral values underpinning palliative care. Thus, an important challenge 
palliative care faces in the nearby future is: to assess, analyse and evaluate the 
moral values that are specific for palliative care in order to demarcate palliative 
care from other medical practices.
2. Moral notions denoting palliative care
In palliative care journals, there is a significant interest in ethical issues 
(Hermsen and Ten Have, 2001). The majority of ethical articles comes from the 
medical profession. Only a small minority is written by professional ethicists. 
This can explain the relative absence of historical, philosophical and theological 
theory in the debates on palliative care. Another source of explanation relates to 
the conception of the dominant form of medical ethics itself, as was indicated in 
the first chapter.
Because of the relative absence of historical, philosophical and 
theological theory, moral notions used in the ethical debates are often 
insufficiently subjected to critical analysis. Their meaning is too often taken for 
granted. Notions that are used in the field of medical ethics in general, such as
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autonomy, beneficence, quality of life, are often uncritically applied to the field 
of palliative care. However, the meaning of such notions in the context of 
palliative care is likely to amount to something different than is the case in the 
context of curative practices. Moreover, the meaning of notions that are often 
used to denote a certain specificity of palliative care practices, such as 
spirituality, acceptance of mortality, psychosocial care, is also lacking critical 
analysis.
The relative absence of history, philosophy and theology in the literature 
of palliative care is to be regretted since notions that are said to be essential for 
palliative care remain unclear. Moreover, without a certain critical distance from 
palliative care practice, new, richer perspectives on palliative care are unlikely 
to be developed. In other words, as was argued in chapter 1, in order to be 
practically relevant for palliative care practice, ethicists should adopt a critical 
distance to the dominant ethical discourses. The meaning attributed to moral 
notions in the ethical debates should be made explicit. Then, it may appear that 
this meaning denotes a particular understanding, reflective of a particular 
discourse. Other meanings reflective of other discourses of the past may have 
been forgotten and can be re-introduced in order to shed a new enriching light 
on the notions used. In the confrontation of the current meaning of notions with 
other meanings that the notions once carried, new and richer perspectives are 
allowed to emerge. In this thesis for instance, the notion of pain is analysed from 
a philosophical perspective. In confronting dominant ways of dealing with pain 
(e.g. medical treatment), with other, forgotten meanings (e.g. heroism, art, 
religion), broader perspectives that are relevant for medical practice emerge. 
Critical distance is also required to assess what remains unspoken. New notions, 
or even neologisms, can be proposed if they carry more practical relevance than 
others. In this thesis, the notion of authenticity is proposed as an alternative for 
autonomy. In chapters 6 and 9, the term eschatology is used referring to the 
questions of ultimate importance that force themselves upon us at the end of our 
lives. Whereas ‘spirituality’ has become more of a container notion, the notion 
of eschatology may be better equipped to denote what ‘spiritual’ care is in the 
end about. Again, it requires a theological or philosophical background to 
introduce such notions since they have been part of philosophical and 
theological discourses of the past in which they were given meaning and in 
which they were reflected upon.
History, philosophy and theology bring the particularity of current 
discourses to the surface. They remind us that other discourses are possible. 
Their practical relevance for palliative care practice is concerned with their 
potential to confront current, dominant meanings with other, forgotten
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meanings. Thus, new perspectives emerge that can sensitise the moral 
experience of the caregivers. A second challenge facing palliative care in the 
nearby future is thus: to introduce historical, philosophical and theological 
analysis of moral notions in order to allow new perspectives to emerge that 
provide a richer understanding of the morality of palliative care practice.
3. Moral dilemmas in palliative care
Up until recently, the debate on euthanasia in the Netherlands has focused on 
data, procedures and assessment of articulated conditions under which 
euthanasia would be tolerable. In the context of increasing interest in palliative 
care, the euthanasia debate is now widening. More attention is given to the 
preventability of requests for euthanasia by means of good compassionate care 
from the time of diagnosis onwards. Physicians who consider euthanasia a 
means of last resort, to be carried out only in very exceptional circumstances, 
agree that a further development of palliative care is among other (perhaps more 
important) reasons imperative in order to decrease the number of cases of 
euthanasia in the Netherlands.
As was pointed out in chapter 7, many patients assess at the time of 
admittance to a palliative care unit whether the physician is willing to carry out 
euthanasia on them if their suffering becomes unbearable. An affirmative 
answer from the physician, or a guarantee that they will not need to suffer 
unbearably, provides them with a feeling of security. Only a minority explicitly 
reiterate their request for euthanasia in a later stage of their illness. Many of 
them will meet the conditions that have been formulated in the Dutch 
jurisprudence. Indeed, their suffering may be unbearable in the physician’s 
perception and their request may be autonomous. Meeting their request will not 
lead to prosecution of the physician. The assumption in those cases is (1) that 
the patient wants to die, and (2) that the patient wants to die from euthanasia, i.e. 
the patient wants to have his or her life actively ended. Caregivers in the field of 
palliative care are right to consider both assumptions problematic. Regarding the 
first assumption, the question why the patient wants to die should be addressed. 
Where does his or her suffering come from? Is the suffering of the patient 
refractory and can nothing be done anymore to relieve it? As it appears from the 
participant observation study in a Dutch hospice, reported in chapter 7, a 
patient’s wish to die is often a cry for help. In the context of good 
interdisciplinary care, the wish to die often disappears. Regarding the second 
assumption, it is argued in chapter 8 that alternative palliative modalities are in
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almost all cases available. Withdrawal of life prolonging treatment may in some 
cases be a satisfactory option for the patient. In a small minority of cases, 
terminal sedation may be the only alternative means of last resort to relieve the 
suffering of the patient. If we assume that the active taking of another person’s 
life is at least prima facie morally wrong, and if we assume that intentions are 
relevant for the morality of our actions, terminal sedation is a morally better 
option than euthanasia. Some patients do want to die since their suffering is 
unbearable and refractory. But what is imperative in this respect is that these 
patients are presented with the possibility of more than one choice. Some may 
not prefer to be killed by the physician who has cared for them. Instead, terminal 
sedation may be a preferable option for these patients. Others may hold on to 
their request to have their lives actively ended. These are difficult cases in which 
the autonomy of the patient can never be the only and exclusive argument to 
meet the request because the autonomy of the physician is as important. The 
issue of terminal sedation has so far been left largely unaddressed in the Dutch 
debate. Even though empirical evidence is hard to find, it seems as if in the 
Netherlands the unproven assumption prevails that active euthanasia is a more 
comfortable way of dying than dying in a state of sleep.
Throughout the thesis, it has been argued that the traditional axiology of 
the hospice concept is increasingly subject to debate. It is more and more 
acknowledged that normative statements require arguments to justify them. For 
a long time however, caregivers in palliative care outside the Netherlands have 
relied on firm statements against euthanasia, either arguing that the option of 
euthanasia decreases the quality of palliative care or arguing that the option of 
euthanasia is necessitated because of a poor quality of palliative care. Both 
arguments are problematic if one oversees recent developments in the 
Netherlands. As was pointed out in chapter 2, a critical, open debate on the 
(im)morality of euthanasia as well as on the traditional axiology of the hospice 
concept should be the goal.
There are many more moral dilemmas in palliative care practice. Not only 
medical decisions such as withholding or withdrawing medical treatment, use of 
high doses pain medication, status of artificial hydration and research issues 
merit attention. Also moral problems in everyday practice, such as caring for 
difficult patients, the role of proxies, dealing with burn out, care for caregivers, 
need to be researched. The dilemmas addressed in this thesis dealt with medical 
decision-making issues at the end of life. It has to be acknowledged that moral 
problems of a different nature probably occur more often in everyday practice.
Based on what has been said about medical decision-making at the end of 
life, the third challenge for palliative care in the nearby future is: To broaden the
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debates on euthanasia, stressing alternative palliative measures and assessing 
carefully what patients really mean when they request for euthanasia, while at 
the same time allowing for an open, critical debate on moral dilemmas in 
palliative care in which different opinions can co-exist.
4. Palliative care and human mortality
An issue that has marginally been addressed in chapters 2 and 6 relates to 
current attitudes towards death and dying. In 1974, 7 years after the opening of 
St Christopher’s, Ariès argued that the western attitude towards death is 
characterised by denial. Death has become fearsome, forbidden, hidden away, 
and intolerable. Whereas death in earlier times took place in the home of the 
dying, death has now become more and more a medical enterprise, taking place 
in the context of hospitals. Often, medical decisions precede and influence the 
time of death. The physician, and not the priest or the dying person’s loved ones, 
has become the director of his or her patient’s death. The denial of death is thus 
closely related to the medicalisation of death (Ariès, 1974; Dekkers, 1995).
Articulating our West European attitude towards death at the end of the 
20th century is problematic for two reasons. First, important varieties exist 
among the West European nations. Attitudes towards death in Spain differ 
considerably from attitudes in Northern European countries (Núñez Olarte and 
Gracia, 1999). Second, it seems as if different attitudes towards death are co­
existent. On the one hand, it can be argued that death is disregarded (not 
necessarily denied) in the context of our everyday life. Living life constantly in 
the face of death makes our everyday concerns appear meaningless and absurd. 
Disregarding our mortality is necessary in order to be able to give meaning to 
our everyday concerns. On the other hand, it can be argued that in the direct 
confrontation with a dying loved one, our attitude is under change. As in earlier 
times, death is again becoming situated in the home of the dying. It is 
acknowledged that a time comes when life prolonging measures should be 
deemed futile. Unlike the time in which Ariès wrote his book, it is now agreed 
upon that the dying person has a right to know that he or she is dying. Death is 
again communicated. Funeral rites are given more and more attention. Personal 
elements, reflective of the deceased, are introduced (Dekkers, 1995). What is 
important in this respect is that the hospice movement and the subsequent 
developments in palliative care have been both symptomatic and stimulative for 
this change. Development of home care services, development of bereavement
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services, rejection of the ‘conspiracy of silence’, refraining from 
disproportionate measures, have been central to hospice from the beginning.
It has been argued in chapters 6 and 9 that it is our mortality that makes an 
eschatology possible. Because we are mortal, we cannot escape from answering 
the questions that are of ultimate importance. Especially in the direct 
confrontation with our own or a loved one’s death, we are confronted with these 
questions. In such situations, it appears that for many involved their main 
concern does not relate to themselves but to their loved ones (Desmet, 1996). 
Research among men that were cured from testicular cancer revealed that they 
viewed their lives more purposefully, they were capable of more enriching 
social relationships and their interest in personal ambition had decreased 
(Brodsky, 1995; Cited from Clark and Seymour, 1999).
We disregard death in our everyday lives because death makes our 
practical concerns look meaningless. Yet, many of us are not embarrassed in the 
direct confrontation with death. Instead, and paradoxical to what has been said, 
this confrontation provides us with potential to spiritually grow and receive 
meaning. The old maxim memento mori can sometimes help us realise what life 
is in the end about. The fourth challenge for palliative care in the nearby future 
is: to further stimulate new ways of dealing with death and dying, 
acknowledging that it is our mortality that enables us to give and receive 
meaning in life.
Of course, many more challenges that have not been addressed here face 
palliative care in the future. Improvement of care remains imperative. Education 
in palliative care in the medical and nursing curricula has been underestimated 
in many countries for too long. Further integration of palliative care will 
undoubtedly lead to competition struggles within which palliative care has to 
prove its effectiveness and efficiency.
In the beginning of the 21st century, the climate for progress in palliative 
care is favourable. In order to meet the positive challenges that lie ahead it is 
imperative that palliative care further reflects on an identity of its own. This 
thesis intends to contribute to this reflection.
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SUMMARY
The key argument of this study is that the concept of palliative care is in need of 
critical, philosophical and theological analysis. In the beginnings of the 
development of palliative care, the scope was limited to the terminal phase. The 
demarcation of palliative care from other medical practices was relatively 
unproblematic since hospice caregivers chose to leave the formal health care 
structures out of a moral discomfort with the situation of the dying in the 
hospitals. Moreover, palliative care was firmly linked with cancer care. The 
religiously inspired values of palliative care were shared and so was the norm 
that active termination of life should not be part of palliative care. At the same 
time, paradoxically, the motive of the hospice movement has always been to re­
integrate its philosophy into the mainstream health care system.
Overseeing recent developments of palliative care in Europe, it is safe to 
conclude that time is considered ripe for palliative care to become an integrated 
part of a variety of medical practices. This is on the one hand symptomatic for 
the maturation of palliative care. On the other hand it has increased the 
ambiguity and ambivalence of the concept of palliative care. Palliative care is 
now said to begin from the time of diagnosis. It is acknowledged that, apart from 
cancer patients, many other categories of patients are in need of palliative care. 
This makes the demarcation of palliative care from other medical practices 
problematic. Palliative care is no longer based on religious values and ethical 
debates on medical decision-making at the end of life reflect dissension. Many 
caregivers, especially in the Netherlands, do not exclude euthanasia from 
palliative care. The integration process of palliative care into the mainstream 
health care structures, has made the concept of palliative care unclear. This 
unclarity is the starting point of this study.
In chapter 1, an account is given of an appropriate ethical theory that is relevant 
for palliative care practice. It is argued that the dominant form of medical ethics 
lacks this practical relevance, focused as it is on problem-solving in the context 
of curative practices. For an ethics to be relevant for palliative care, it is 
imperative to re-introduce philosophical and theological theory. Only a medical 
ethics that is solidly based on philosophy or theology, only a medical ethics that 
adopts a critical distance from medical practice, is able to reveal the particularity 
of dominant discourses and to introduce new meanings taken from other, 
forgotten discourses. Thus, ethics can contribute to a sensitisation of the 
experiences of caregivers in the field. New orientations for concrete acts are
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allowed to emerge. And new perspectives on palliative care practice can be 
proposed.
In chapter 2, the concept of palliative care as it is currently understood is 
reflected upon from an historical perspective. It is argued that an ‘historical 
detour’ can provide insight in the original motivations of palliative care and that 
these motivations are important since they can enrich current views on palliative 
care. When Cicely Saunders founded the first modern hospice (St Christopher’s) 
she herself referred back to the hospices that were developed in the early 
Christian era. St Christopher’s was also clearly situated in an earlier tradition of 
hospices many of which were established around 1900. Whereas Cicely 
Saunders stressed the continuity, there is also reason to stress discontinuities. 
For instance, the idea that pain and symptom control are primarily important 
because they ease spiritual reconciliation (an idea that was central to the early 
hospices for the dying) has been abandoned now. Based on the historical detour, 
it is argued that at least two aspects of palliative care are essential. First, 
palliative care should be considered as total care, stressing the importance not 
only of physical pain relief but also of psychological, social and spiritual pain 
relief. Second, the acceptance of death, present in the maxim that nothing should 
be done to hasten or postpone death in palliative care, is essential. Palliative care 
is said to stand in the middle of disproportionate life prolonging measures on the 
one hand and active euthanasia on the other. Chapter 2 ends with an overview of 
more empirical dimensions of palliative care. Organisational and conceptual 
differences are analysed in order to stress the novelty of the ambivalence of the 
concept of palliative care.
Chapter 3 discusses empirical findings on conceptual and ethical aspects 
of palliative care. The results of a large scale survey that was sent to over 2000 
European professionals of palliative care are described and analysed. The 
majority of these professionals hold that palliative care starts from the time of 
diagnosis. Palliative care should be integrated within the mainstream health care 
system but without loosing a set of values that is said to be specific for palliative 
care. The danger that palliative care becomes medicalised is real according to 
just over half of the respondents. Medicalisation threatens that what is at the 
heart of palliative care namely the idea that medical, psychological, social and 
spiritual care are of equal importance. Notions that are considered most 
important for palliative care are quality of life, human dignity, acceptance of 
mortality and total care. Assumably, these notions reflect something of the 
moral specificity of palliative care. The norm that euthanasia can in extreme 
circumstances be part of palliative care is adhered to by not more than 5 % of 
the respondents. Remarkably, 15 % hold that the intentional shortening of life by
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raising opioid doses can be part of palliative care whereas 36.5 % can conceive 
of situations in which medical treatment is withheld or withdrawn with the 
intention to shorten the life of the patient. Apparently, a substantial number of 
respondents do not consider intention crucial for the morality of a life shortening 
act.
Chapter 4 has come forth out of an analysis of the Dutch debate on 
palliative care. Palliative care is currently at the focus of interest in the 
Netherlands and further developments are expected to take place. There is a 
consensus that the quality of life of the patient and his or her loved ones is 
crucial for palliative care. It is agreed upon that palliative care is 
interdisciplinary, total care. However, if one follows the debates in the literature, 
disagreements on palliative care seem to be central. Disagreements that are 
under debate relate to the scope of palliative care, the organisational context best 
suitable to provide palliative care, the history of palliative care, the moral 
language of palliative care and, finally, to the question of euthanasia. Debates on 
euthanasia among palliative care practitioners do not only concern the morality 
of the act itself. Also, and perhaps more importantly, the quality of palliative 
care is central. Opponents argue that once the door stands open for euthanasia, 
palliative care practitioners will become less creative in their search for 
alternative palliative modalities. Allowing euthanasia thus leads to less quality 
of palliative care. This is refuted by ‘proponents’ who argue that the quality of 
palliative care is not diminished by including euthanasia in palliative care as a 
means of last resort. Empirical evidence is hard to find in this matter. It is 
concluded that there is reason for optimism if one oversees the developments in 
the Netherlands. Debates on palliative care are in need of a re-orientation 
towards the internal goal of palliative care, i.e. the quality of life of the patient 
and his or her loved ones. Then, it will appear that a larger consensus exists on 
palliative care than appears from the often polarised debates.
Chapter 5 discusses the notion of pain from a phenomenological 
perspective. For a long time, pain has been situated within a dualistic biomedical 
paradigm. In this model, pain is a sensation that is caused by external 
stimulations. Medical interventions are required to remove it. Alternative views 
of three Dutch philosophers from the phenomenological tradition (Buytendijk, 
Van den Berg, Metz) are analysed in order to formulate a critique on the 
biomedical paradigm and to introduce alternative understandings. Buytendijk 
has argued that pain can provide meaning in life. Van den Berg has confronted 
our current impoverished understanding of pain with other understandings from 
the past. Metz stressed that (chronic) pain can only be explained if it is situated 
in the intimate social sphere of the pain sufferer. Since the beginning of the
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1990s, the interest in pain and pain treatment has increased. Many have 
interpreted pain as an experience that allows meaning to occur. In the debates on 
chronic benign pain, broader perspectives have emerged. The debates on cancer 
pain have benefited from the input of the hospice movement stressing not only 
the medical, but also the psychological, social and spiritual aspects of pain. 
Recently, it has been argued that the concept of total pain still carries traits of 
the dualistic Cartesian biomedical paradigm. Thus new narrative approaches 
towards pain are proposed and attention is drawn to realms of life in which pain 
is not stripped of its meaning. Chapter 5 concludes that relief of the pain of 
medicine, i.e. the inability of medicine to bring new, non-dualistic models of 
pain into practice, is one of the important challenges medicine faces in the 
future.
Chapter 6 draws attention to three notions that are not often used in the 
debates on palliative care: medical restraint, authenticity and hope. They are 
proposed because they are helpful in articulating the concept of palliative care. 
With regard to the medical realm, the notion of medical restraint is proposed 
because it implies the acknowledgement of the boundaries of medicine and 
because it implies that the medical realm of palliative care co-exists with other 
realms that are equally important. The notion of authenticity is proposed as an 
alternative for the notion of autonomy. The notion of autonomy has been part of 
a medical ethics that wanted to secure patients’ interests against the power of the 
physician. Such a discourse is at odds with palliative care practice because it is 
based on mistrust. The notion of authenticity provides an alternative because it 
renders account of our dependency and fragility (characteristic for all of us but 
for the dying in specific) and because, unlike autonomy, it stresses that real 
choices are choices in character; real choices fit to a person’s unique personality. 
Because the notion of authenticity, as it was developed in the existentialist 
tradition, cannot well render account of spirituality, it is argued that it should be 
paired with the notion of hope. Hope is an existential category. Without it we 
cannot live. It can relate to obtainable objects but hope can also relate to 
questions of ultimate importance, i.e. to eschatology. And especially in the 
direct confrontation with death, these questions urge themselves upon us. 
What’s more, it is our mortality that makes an eschatology possible.
Chapter 7 results from a participant observation study in one of the 
hospices in the Netherlands. It begins with a short description of the hospice 
movement in the Netherlands. Then, with the help of four case studies, medical 
decisions directly or indirectly relating to euthanasia are examined. Euthanasia 
is not carried out in the hospice but if patients want, they can be transferred to a 
nearby hospital where they can have euthanasia carried out (self-evidently under
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conditions). While 25 % of the patients admitted in the hospice request for 
euthanasia at a given time, it hardly ever happens that patients hold on to their 
request and are transferred to the hospital. Apparently, in the context of good 
care, the vast majority of euthanasia requests disappear. One case describes a 
homeless man who suffered from excruciating physical pain. The caregivers 
suffered with him and began to feel burnt out after some time. The decisions that 
were taken to decrease his pain perfectly match the demands of the doctrine of 
double effect. But the caregivers felt they had failed. An important conclusion of 
chapter 7 is that everyday practice is different from ethical logic.
Chapter 8 draws attention to a subject that has not been given much 
attention in the Netherlands: the subject of terminal sedation. Three positions 
that can be found in the literature are analysed. The first position is adhered to 
by the majority of caregivers (see chapter 3) and holds that terminal sedation can 
be a means of last resort in palliative care but euthanasia cannot. The second 
position holds that in some cases, euthanasia can be part of palliative care, even 
though terminal sedation is to be morally preferred. A third position holds that 
terminal sedation is morally indifferent from euthanasia and that both acts can 
be part of palliative care. Subsequently, it is argued that the last position is 
untenable since (1) intentions are relevant for the morality of actions and since 
(2) the taking of another person’s life is at least wrong at first sight. The chapter 
continues to argue that based on these two grounds terminal sedation can serve 
as a good alternative for euthanasia even though hard cases can be conceived of 
in which patients do not want to die under heavy sedation. In such cases, the 
autonomy of the patient can never be the only reason to meet a request for 
euthanasia. Concludingly, it is argued that patients who want euthanasia carried 
out should be informed of the alternative of terminal sedation. For some, 
terminal sedation may be preferable to euthanasia. Therefore, the issue deserves 
more attention than it has received thus far in the Dutch debates.
Chapter 9 examines the morality of clinical trials in palliative care. Can 
clinical trials be a part of palliative care at all? Certainly, when patients are 
about to die, they should not engage in such trials. But when death is still 
relatively far ahead, patients may want to participate. At first sight, clinical trials 
put that at risk what is essential for palliative care namely the best possible 
quality of life of patients and loved ones. Participation in trials carries with it the 
risk of severe physical, emotional, social and spiritual harms. The question 
whether the imperative to improve care for future patients excludes the 
imperative to provide the best of care for current patients is answered 
negatively. Again, the notions of authenticity and hope are analysed in order to 
argue that for some patients, not all, participation in clinical trials may be a
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meaningful enterprise. In helping the treatments of future patients improve, their 
lives may gain meaning. Thus, clinical trials need not be excluded from 
palliative care.
The conclusion of this study focuses on four challenges palliative care 
faces in the future. First, more research needs to be conducted in possible 
demarcations of palliative care from other medical practices. If one considers the 
results of the survey that was discussed in chapter three, meeting this challenge 
is for an important part an ethical task. More research needs to be conducted in 
articulating and evaluating the moral specificity of palliative care. Second, 
through input of philosophy, theology and history, the particularity of current 
discourses need to be brought to the surface. Room should be given for new 
perspectives on palliative care. In the debates on palliative care, the meaning of 
notions that are used is too often taken for granted. They are in need of 
philosophical and theological reflection with the help of which other, broader 
meanings that have become forgotten may be re-introduced. Also notions that 
have been central in the past but have been forgotten in the current discourses, 
may be potentially relevant. Thus, a richer understanding of palliative care can 
be developed. A third challenge palliative care faces has to do with moral 
dilemmas. Two issues are pointed out (acknowledging that many more moral 
dilemmas that occur in everyday practice should also be subject to analysis). 
First, the debates on euthanasia need to be broadened, stressing alternative 
palliative modalities and assessing what patients really mean when they request 
for euthanasia. Second, the international debates should become more open. In 
pluralistic societies, different opinions should be allowed to co-exist, also in the 
area of palliative care. A fourth challenge palliative care faces has to do with 
perspectives on human mortality, a topic that was marginally addressed in 
chapters 6 and 9. It is argued that in everyday life we cannot but disregard death 
to a certain extent. In the face of mortality, our everyday concerns appear 
meaningless. At the same time, paradoxically, in the direct confrontation with 
the death of a loved one, the eschatological questions of ultimate importance 
urge themselves upon us. It is argued that palliative care has been both 
symptomatic and stimulative for recent changes in our attitudes towards death. 
Death is more in the open. Furthermore, many acknowledge that the direct 
confrontation with a loved one’s death provides us with opportunities to give 
and receive meaning in life. The fourth challenge for palliative care is thus to 
further stimulate new ways of dealing with death and dying, acknowledging that 
it is our mortality that enables us to give and receive meaning.
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SAMENVATTING
In deze studie wordt beargumenteerd dat het concept palliatieve zorg kritische, 
filosofische en theologische analyse behoeft. In de beginfase van de moderne 
palliatieve zorg was de reikwijdte van het concept beperkt. Palliatieve zorg was 
terminale zorg. Palliatieve zorg was ook relatief helder onderscheiden van 
andere medische praktijken. De hospicebeweging koos er immers voor om het 
formele gezondheidszorgsysteem te verlaten vanuit een moreel onbehagen dat 
voortkwam uit de wijze waarop in de ziekenhuizen met stervende patiënten 
werd omgegaan. Bovendien werd palliatieve zorg met name opgevat als zorg 
voor kankerpatiënten. De categorie patiënten die palliatieve zorg ontving was 
dus eveneens helder afgebakend. De zorgverleners in de eerste moderne 
hospices deelden het religieus geïnspireerde waardepatroon waarop de 
hospicebeweging was gestoeld en er bestond consensus over de norm dat 
euthanasie geen deel mocht uitmaken van palliatieve zorg. Tegelijkertijd was de 
intentie van deze zorgverleners van het eerste uur om ‘hospice’ (opgevat als 
“filosofie van zorg”) te herintegreren in de gezondheidszorg.
Als we de recente ontwikkelingen op het gebied van palliatieve zorg in 
Europa bezien, kunnen we concluderen dat momenteel de tijd rijp wordt geacht 
om palliatieve zorg verder te integreren zodat het een onderdeel wordt van 
uiteenlopende medische praktijken. Aan de ene kant is deze ontwikkeling 
symptomatisch voor het rijpingsproces dat palliatieve zorg doormaakt. Aan de 
andere kant heeft ze geleid tot een toenemende onhelderheid en meerduidigheid 
van het concept palliatieve zorg. Palliatieve zorg begint volgens de meeste 
zorgverleners vanaf het moment van de diagnose (bewijs hiervoor wordt in 
hoofstuk 3 gegeven). De exclusieve associatie met zorg voor kankerpatiënten 
kan niet meer worden verondersteld. Veeleer wordt erkend dat er vele andere 
categorieën patiënten zijn die eveneens behoefte hebben aan palliatieve zorg. Dit 
maakt de demarcatie van palliatieve zorg ten opzichte van andere medische 
praktijken problematisch. Palliatieve zorg is inmiddels een geseculariseerde 
praktijk en de ethische debatten rondom medische beslissingen aan het 
levenseinde laten belangrijke meningsverschillen zien. Veel zorgverleners, met 
name in Nederland, sluiten euthanasie niet bij voorbaat uit van palliatieve zorg. 
De nog immer toenemende integratie van palliatieve zorg in de gezondheidszorg 
heeft het concept onhelder gemaakt. Deze onhelderheid kan gezien worden als 
het centrale uitgangspunt van dit onderzoek.
196
In hoofstuk 1 wordt rekenschap afgelegd van een passende ethische theorie die 
praktisch relevant is voor de palliatieve zorg. Beargumenteerd wordt dat de 
dominante vorm van medische ethiek, welke zich met name bezig houdt met het 
oplossen van morele dilemma’s in curatieve praktijken, deze praktische 
relevantie ontbeert. Wil ethiek relevant zijn voor palliatieve zorg, zal 
filosofische en theologische theorievorming geherintroduceerd moeten worden. 
Slechts een ethiek die zich verstaat als een onderdeel van de theologie of de 
filosofie, met andere woorden, slechts een ethiek die een kritische distantie 
betracht ten opzichte van praktijken, is in staat om de particulariteit van het 
gevestigde discours te onthullen en nieuwe betekenissen uit andere, vergeten 
discoursen voor te stellen. Op deze wijze draagt ethiek bij aan een 
sensibilisering van de ervaringen van zorgverleners. Nieuwe orientaties voor 
concreet handelen dienen zich aan. En nieuwe perspectieven op palliatieve zorg 
kunnen ontwikkeld worden.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt nagedacht over conceptuele aspecten van palliatieve 
zorg vanuit een historisch perspectief. Beargumenteerd wordt dat een 
‘historische omweg’ inzicht kan verschaffen in de oorspronkelijke motivaties 
van de palliatieve zorg. Deze motivaties uit het verleden kunnen ons huidig 
verstaan verrijken. Cicely Saunders heeft tijdens de ontwikkeling van haar eerste 
professionele hospice (St Christopher’s) zelf terugverwezen naar de allereerste 
hospices die ontstonden in de vroegchristelijke tijd. Bovendien maakte St 
Christopher’s deel uit van een reeds bestaande hospicebeweging die was 
ontstaan aan het einde van de 19e eeuw. Maar terwijl Cicely Saunders met name 
de continuïteit in de geschiedenis van de hospices benadrukte, kunnen eveneens 
discontinuïteiten waargenomen worden. De nadruk op spirituele zorg van de 
eerste hospices for the dying waarbij bijvoorbeeld pijn en symptoomcontrole als 
middel werd gezien om spirituele verzoening te vergemakkelijken, wordt niet 
meer gedeeld. Op grond van de historische omweg wordt in dit hoofdstuk verder 
beargumenteerd dat tenminste twee aspecten cruciaal zijn voor palliatieve zorg. 
Ten eerste is palliatieve zorg altijd ‘totale zorg’ in de zin dat niet enkel de 
verlichting van fysieke pijn centraal staat maar ook de verlichting van 
emotionele, sociale en spirituele pijn. Ten tweede is de acceptatie van 
sterfelijkheid essentieel, zoals bijvoorbeeld verwoord in de maxime dat niets 
gedaan wordt om de dood te verhaasten noch om de dood verder uit te stellen. 
Palliatieve zorg, zo wordt beweerd, staat in het midden tussen een 
disproportionele inzet van middelen om genezing of levensverlenging te 
bereiken enerzijds en actieve levensbeëindiging anderzijds. Het hoofdstuk 
eindigt met een kort overzicht van meer empirische dimensies van palliatieve 
zorg. Organisatorische en conceptuele verschillen worden geanalyseerd om de
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meerduidigheid van palliatieve zorg (een meerduidigheid die recent is) aan het 
licht te brengen.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een empirisch onderzoek naar ethische en 
conceptuele aspecten van palliatieve zorg beschreven. De resultaten van een 
vragenlijst die naar meer dan 2000 Europese actoren in het veld van de 
palliatieve zorg is gestuurd, worden er geanalyseerd. De meerderheid vindt dat 
palliatieve zorg begint bij de diagnose. Palliatieve zorg zou volledig 
geïntegreerd moeten worden in de gezondheidszorg, echter zonder een specifiek 
waardenpatroon daarbij te verliezen. Het gevaar dat palliatieve zorg steeds meer 
gemedicaliseerd raakt, wordt onderkend door een kleine meerderheid. 
Medicalisering brengt de kern van de palliatieve zorg in gevaar namelijk het 
uitgangspunt dat medische, psychologische, sociale en spirituele zorg van even 
groot belang zijn. Morele noties die het meest belangrijk worden geacht zijn: 
kwaliteit van leven, menselijke waardigheid, acceptatie van sterfelijkheid en 
totale zorg. We mogen aannemen dat deze noties iets onthullen van de morele 
specificiteit van palliatieve zorg. De norm dat euthanasie in extreme 
omstandigheden deel kan uitmaken van palliatieve zorg wordt door niet meer 
dan 5 % van de respondenten ondersteund. Opmerkelijk is dat intentionele 
levensverkorting door middel van toediening van hoge doses medicatie door 15 
% wordt geaccepteerd. En niet minder dan 36,5 % van de respondenten sluit 
intentionele levensverkorting door middel van het staken of afzien van medische 
behandeling niet uit van palliatieve zorg. Blijkbaar is er een aanzienlijk aantal 
respondenten dat intentie niet cruciaal acht voor de moraliteit van een 
levensverkortende behandeling.
Hoofdstuk 4 is voortgekomen uit een analyse van het Nederlandse debat 
over palliatieve zorg. Palliatieve zorg in Nederland staat momenteel in de 
schijnwerpers en zal zich ook in de toekomst verder ontwikkelen. Er bestaat in 
de Nederlandse literatuur een consensus dat de kwaliteit van leven van de 
patiënt en diens naasten essentieel is voor palliatieve zorg. Palliatieve zorg is 
interdisciplinaire, totale zorg. Wanneer men echter kijkt naar de debatten valt op 
dat op belangrijke punten onenigheid bestaat. Gediscussieerd wordt over de 
reikwijdte van palliatieve zorg, de organisatie van palliatieve zorg, de 
geschiedenis van de Nederlandse palliatieve zorg, de morele taal van palliatieve 
zorg, en over euthanasie als onderdeel van palliatieve zorg. Ten aanzien van dit 
laatste debat moet opgemerkt worden dat niet enkel de moraliteit van euthanasie 
als zodanig op het spel staat. Ook, en misschien belangrijker, staat de kwaliteit 
van de palliatieve zorg op het spel. Tegenstanders van euthanasie beweren dat 
wanneer eenmaal de deur voor euthanasie openstaat, de creativiteit van de arts 
daardoor zal verminderen. Hij of zij zal minder snel op zoek gaan naar
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mogelijke alternatieven. Toestaan van euthanasie lijdt tot een minder goede 
palliatieve zorg. Voorstanders beweren dat hun palliatieve zorg helemaal niet 
van mindere kwaliteit is doordat euthanasie niet bij voorbaat wordt uitgesloten. 
Bewijs voor beide stellingen is niet gemakkelijk aan te voeren. In dit hoofdstuk 
wordt geconcludeerd dat er reden voor optimisme is wanneer we de recente 
ontwikkelingen op het gebied van palliatieve zorg in Nederland bezien. De 
debatten in de media behoeven echter een herorientatie op het ‘interne doel’ van 
de palliatieve zorg, namelijk de kwaliteit van leven van de patiënt en diens 
naasten. Dan blijkt dat er meer consensus bestaat dan op het eerste gezicht het 
geval lijkt te zijn.
Hoofdstuk 5 analyseert de notie ‘pijn’ vanuit een fenomenologisch 
perspectief. Lange tijd werd pijn gesitueerd binnen een dualistisch biomedisch 
kader. Hierbinnen werd pijn opgevat als een gevoel dat door externe stimuli 
wordt veroorzaakt. De geneeskunde neemt de oorzaak van de pijn weg en de 
pijnsensatie zal verdwijnen. Drie alternatieve visies uit de fenomenologische 
traditie worden vervolgens besproken om een kritiek te kunnen formuleren op 
het biomedische paradigma en nieuwe verstaansmogelijkheden te kunnen 
introduceren. Buytendijk heeft gewezen op de mogelijkheid dat pijn aanleiding 
kan zijn voor zingeving. Van den Berg heeft ons huidige, verarmde, verstaan 
van pijn geconfronteerd met andere verstaansmogelijkheden uit het verleden. 
Metz heeft benadrukt dat (chronische) pijn enkel verklaard kan worden door de 
intieme sociale context van de pijnlijder erbij te betrekken. Sinds het begin van 
de jaren 90 neemt de interesse in pijn en pijnbestrijding toe. Velen hebben pijn 
geïnterpreteerd als een ervaring waaraan zin ontleend kan worden. In de 
debatten rondom chronisch benigne pijn zijn bredere perspectieven ontwikkeld. 
En de debatten rondom maligne pijn hebben kunnen profiteren van de inbreng 
van de hospicebeweging welke niet enkel de medische kant, maar eveneens de 
emotionele, sociale en spirituele kanten van pijn heeft benadrukt. Recentelijk is 
beargumenteerd dat het concept van ‘totale pijn’ nog immer karaktertrekken 
bevat van het Cartesiaanse dualistische denken. Nieuwe narratieve benaderingen 
worden voorgesteld en aandacht wordt gevraagd voor levensbereiken waarin 
pijn niet koste wat kost vermeden moet worden maar waarin pijn verschijnt als 
betekenisvol en aantrekkelijk. Hoofstuk 5 concludeert dat verlichting van de pijn 
van de geneeskunde, d.w.z. het onvermogen van de geneeskunde om niet­
dualistische theoretische modellen concreet in praktijk te brengen, een 
belangrijke uitdaging is voor de geneeskunde in de nabije toekomst.
Hoofdstuk 6 vraagt aandacht voor drie noties die minder vaak in de 
debatten rondom palliatieve zorg gebruikt worden: medische terughoudendheid, 
authenticiteit en hoop. Deze worden hier voorgesteld omdat ze goed in staat zijn
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de betekenis van het concept palliatieve zorg te verwoorden. Met betrekking tot 
het medische bereik van de palliatieve zorg wordt de notie van medische 
terughoudendheid voorgesteld omdat ze een aanvaarding van de grenzen van de 
geneeskunde veronderstelt. Tevens erkent ze dat medische zorg onlosmakelijk 
verbonden is met psychologische, sociale en spirituele zorg. De notie van 
authenticiteit wordt voorgesteld als alternatief voor het autonomieprincipe. 
Autonomie heeft deel uitgemaakt van een ethiek die patiëntenrechten wilde 
beschermen tegen de macht van artsen. Zulk een discours stemt niet overeen met 
de palliatieve zorg omdat het gebaseerd is op wantrouwen. Authenticiteit is een 
bruikbaar alternatief omdat het rekenschap aflegt van onze afhankelijkheid en 
kwetsbaarheid (karakteristiek voor ons allen, maar in het bijzonder voor 
ongeneeslijk zieken). Ook benadrukt authenticiteit, in tegenstelling tot 
autonomie, dat ‘echte’ keuzes, keuzes zijn die passen bij iemand’s 
persoonlijkheid. Authenticiteit, zoals het ontwikkeld is binnen het 
existentialisme, kan echter moeilijk rekenschap afleggen van spiritualiteit. 
Daarom dient het gekoppeld te worden aan de notie hoop. Hoop kan betrekking 
hebben op concrete, bereikbare objecten. Maar het heeft ook te maken met 
vragen die in laatste instantie van levensbelang zijn, met andere woorden, hoop 
heeft ook te maken met eschatologie. Met name in de directe confrontatie met 
het sterven van een geliefde naaste dringen zulke vragen zich aan ons op. 
Sterker nog, onze sterfelijkheid vormt de mogelijkheidsvoorwaarde voor het 
stellen van zulke vragen.
Hoofstuk 7 is voortgekomen uit een participerende observatie in één van 
de Nederlandse hospices. Het begint met een korte beschrijving van de 
Nederlandse hospicebeweging. Vervolgens worden, met behulp van vier 
casusanalyses, enkele medische beslissingen die direct of indirect betrekking 
hebben op euthanasie geanalyseerd. Euthanasie wordt in het hospice niet 
toegepast maar als patiënten willen, kunnen ze overgebracht worden naar een 
nabij ziekenhuis waar euthanasie, onder voorwaarden natuurlijk, wel toegepast 
wordt. Terwijl 25 % van de patiënten op enigerlei moment een 
euthanasieverzoek uit in het hospice, gebeurt het bijna nooit dat deze patiënten 
bij hun verzoek blijven en uiteindelijk door euthanasie sterven. Blijkbaar 
verdwijnt het overgrote deel van de verzoeken door middel van goede zorg. In 
één casus wordt een thuisloze man beschreven die leed aan ondraaglijke, fysieke 
pijn. De zorgverleners raakten hierdoor opgebrand. De beslissingen die 
vervolgens genomen werden om de pijn van de man te verlichten 
corresponderen aan de vereisten die het principe van dubbel effect stelt. Toch 
hadden de zorgverleners het gevoel gefaald te hebben. Een conclusie die uit dit
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hoofdstuk wordt getrokken is dat de alledaagse praktijk van de palliatieve zorg 
verschilt van ethische logica.
Hoofdstuk 8 vraagt aandacht voor een thema dat nog niet veel aandacht 
heeft gekregen in de Nederlandse debatten: terminale sedatie. Drie posities die 
in de literatuur te vinden zijn worden uiteengezet. De eerste positie wordt door 
de meerderheid van Europese palliatieve zorgverleners onderschreven (zie 
hoofdstuk 3) en stelt dat terminale sedatie een laatste redmiddel kan zijn en 
euthanasie niet. De tweede positie stelt dat euthanasie een laatste redmiddel kan 
zijn maar dat op morele gronden terminale sedatie de voorkeur heeft. Een derde 
positie stelt dat terminale sedatie vanuit moreel perspectief op hetzelfde 
neerkomt als euthanasie. Vervolgens wordt beargumenteerd dat de laatste positie 
onhoudbaar is omdat (1) intenties relevant zijn voor de moraliteit van ons 
handelen en (2) het doden van iemand tenminste op het eerste gezicht een 
moreel kwaad is. Op grond van deze twee aannames moet worden 
beargumenteerd dat terminale sedatie een goed alternatief vormt voor euthanasie 
alhoewel tragische casus voorstelbaar zijn wanneer een patiënt bijvoorbeeld niet 
onder sedatie wil sterven. De autonomie van de patiënt kan in zulke casus niet 
de enige reden vormen voor euthanasie. Geconcludeerd wordt dat patiënten die 
verzoeken om euthanasie tenminste geïnformeerd zouden moeten worden over 
de alternatieve mogelijkheid van terminale sedatie. Sommigen zullen terminale 
sedatie prefereren boven euthanasie. Daarom verdient dit thema meer aandacht 
in de debatten dan dat het tot nu toe heeft gekregen.
Hoofdstuk 9 onderzoekt de moraliteit van klinisch experimenteel 
onderzoek in de palliatieve zorg. Kan zulk onderzoek überhaupt deel uitmaken 
van palliatieve zorg? Het moge duidelijk zijn dat patiënten in de terminale fase 
niet voor zulk onderzoek in aanmerking komen. Maar als de dood nog relatief 
ver weg is, kunnen er patiënten zijn die met zulk onderzoek mee willen doen. 
Op het eerste gezicht brengt deelname aan klinisch experimenteel onderzoek 
precies dat in gevaar wat cruciaal is voor palliatieve zorg, namelijk het welzijn 
voor de patiënt en diens naasten. Ernstig lichamelijk, emotioneel, sociaal en 
spiritueel lijden kan worden veroorzaakt door deelname. De vraag is of de 
morele imperatieven om enerzijds de behandelingsmogelijkheden voor 
toekomstige patiënten te verbeteren en anderzijds goede zorg voor huidige 
patiënten te verlenen elkaar niet uitsluiten. Beargumenteerd wordt dat dit niet 
het geval hoeft te zijn. Opnieuw worden de noties van authenticiteit en hoop 
geanalyseerd om te laten zien dat voor sommige, niet alle, patiënten deelname 
aan een klinisch experimenteel onderzoek een zinvolle aangelegenheid kan zijn. 
Door te helpen de behandelingsmogelijkheden voor toekomstige patiënten te
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verbeteren kan hun leven als zinvol worden ervaren. Klinisch experimenteel 
onderzoek hoeft dus niet uitgesloten te worden van de palliatieve zorg.
De conclusie van deze studie vat vier uitdagingen voor palliatieve zorg in 
de nabije toekomst samen. Ten eerste dient meer onderzoek uitgevoerd te 
worden naar demarcaties van palliatieve zorg ten opzichte van andere medische 
praktijken. Als we de resultaten van de questionnaire bezien (zie hoofdstuk 3) 
kan geconcludeerd worden dat dit voor een belangrijk deel een ethische taak is. 
Tot op heden is de morele specificiteit van de palliatieve zorg nog onvoldoende 
gearticuleerd en geanalyseerd. Ten tweede dient de particulariteit van het 
huidige discours aan het licht gebracht te worden door middel van filosofische, 
theologische en historische inbreng. Er dient meer ruimte te komen voor nieuwe 
perspectieven op palliatieve zorg. In de huidige debatten blijft de betekenis van 
morele noties vaak onbereflecteerd. Ze behoeven echter filosofische en 
theologische reflectie opdat bestaande betekenissen beter kunnen worden 
gearticuleerd en andere relevante betekenissen, die ondergesneeuwd zijn 
geraakt, kunnen worden geherintroduceerd. Relevante noties die binnen andere 
discoursen betekenisvol zijn maar in de debatten over palliatieve zorg niet 
gebruikt worden, kunnen worden voorgesteld. Zo ontstaat een rijker verstaan 
van palliatieve zorg. Een derde uitdaging in de nabije toekomst heeft betrekking 
op morele dilemma’s in de palliatieve zorg. Twee aspecten worden aangegeven 
(in het besef dat er in de alledaagse praktijk van de palliatieve zorg veel meer 
morele dilemma’s zijn die vragen om analyse). Ten eerste zou het 
euthanasiedebat verbreed moeten worden. Alternatieve mogelijkheden dienen te 
worden benadrukt en zorgvuldig zou nagegaan moeten worden wat patiënten 
daadwerkelijk menen als ze vragen om euthanasie. Ten tweede dienen de 
internationale debatten over euthanasie opener te worden. In pluralistische 
samenlevingen mogen meerdere meningen naast elkaar bestaan, ook binnen de 
palliatieve zorg. Een vierde uitdaging voor palliatieve zorg betreft het stimuleren 
van nieuwe perspectieven op onze sterfelijkheid. Dit thema is slechts aangestipt 
in de hoofdstukken 6 en 9. In ons dagelijkse leven negeren we veelal het feit dat 
we sterfelijk zijn. Leven in het gezicht van de dood maakt onze dagelijkse 
zorgen zinloos en in zekere zin is dat ondraaglijk. Tegelijkertijd worden wij in 
de confrontatie met de dood van een geliefde geconfronteerd met vragen van 
levensbelang. De ontwikkeling van palliatieve zorg is tegelijkertijd 
symptomatisch en stimulerend voor een zich recentelijk aftekenende 
verandering in onze houding tegenover onze sterfelijkheid. De dood wordt 
openlijker bejegend. Velen erkennen dat de confrontatie met de dood 
mogelijkheden bevat voor spirituele groei. De vierde uitdaging voor de 
palliatieve zorg is een verdere stimulering van nieuwe omgangswijzen met dood
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en sterfelijkheid in het besef dat onze sterfelijkheid de mogelijkheidsvoorwaarde 
is voor een zinvol bestaan.
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